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PREFACE 
In preparing this thesis, attempt has be.en mad.e to present 
' 
the Marshall Plan as a pattern for a constructive American for -
eign pc;>licy which, if adopted throughout the worl.d, would lay a 
sure foundation for peaceful living. 
The economic and pol1t1oal conditions or Europe after WoPld 
War II are examined in order to explain the aims of the Marshall 
Plan. The doubts of its success are answered in the light of 
the remulte , 1n the first. two years of the program, as reported 
by the Economic Cooperation Adm.1n1strat1on and recogn.1zed by 
outstanding European and American personalities. 
Criticism of the Marshall Plan as an intervention in poli-
tical affairs and as . infringement of the sovereignty of other 
nations is discussed in relation to international law. 
Trying to outline the trend of the Marshall flan and con-
sidering the present economic and political situation in the 
world, op1n1en 1s e~pressed aa to the importanee of United State.a 
leadership and cooperation among the countries of the free world 
in order to face the 4anger Qf the Twentieth Century to hum.an 
civilization. 
I should like to exp~ess my sincere appreciation to 
Prot.essor Glenn ,B. Hawkins, Head of the Political Science 
Department., ;Oklaho~ Agricultural and Mechanical College, Pro-
fessors Robert E" Powers, John D. Hall, E. Foster Dowell, under 
whose teaching I was able to enlarge my knowledge in American 
po_li t1cal sci_ence. 
iv 
The insight so gained and the patient counsel and under-
standing guidance of my Adviser Pr·ofessor Roscoe R. Oglesby, his 
helpful su.ggeat1ons and criticism, enabled me to prepare this 
work 
L~ 'I . 
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CHAPTER I 
ENUNCIATION OF THE MARSHALL PLAN 
On June 5 , 194? , a group of confident and eager young 
American graduates assembled at Harvard to be addressed by the 
Secretary of State , George c. Marshall . 
The Secretary then made his historical proposal: that 
the nations of Europe get together and plan for the economic 
recovery of all Europe; that the initiative should come from 
the European countries in a concerted program of self-help . 
ftAny government that is willing to assist in the task of 
recovery will find full cooperation , I am sure , on the part of 
the united States Government . nl 
This suggestion was received immediately with great enthu-
siasm, and, on June 19, the British and French Foreign Ministers 
issued invitations to the Russian Foreign Secretary to join them 
in the talks opened in Paris two days before . Eight days later , 
the three Foreign Ministers began their conference, but , on 
July 2 , this ended with the withdrawal of Russia . 
Twenty- two additional European nations were then invited to 
meet for further discussion of the Marshall proposal: ten 
loeorge c. Marshall , "European Initiative Essential to 
Economic Recovery," United States Department of State Bulletin , 
16 (June 15, 1947J, 1159. 
2 
accepted the invitation. Eastern Europe's countries behind the 
Iron Curtain declined to attend. The Conference of European 
Nations convened in Paris on July 12, to set up a permanent 
Committee of European Economic Cooperation (C. E. E. c.) and to 
study and coordinate the needs of the various regions of Europe, 
including Western Germany. 
In attendance were representatives of Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom. 
Working committees were set up to study: (a) food and 
agriculture, (b) fuel and power, (c) iron and steel, and (d) 
transport, and the committees were to complete reports tor sub• 
mission to the United s tatea.2 
Meanwhile, on June 22, President Truman had appointed 
three conmittees to study the extent to which the United States 
could and should make assistance available to foreign countries. 
One government committee, under the chairmanship of Secretary 
of the Interior Krug, was directed to study the relation of a 
program of foreign aid to the national resources. The second 
government committee, under the chairmanship of the Chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisers, Dr. Nourse, was directed to 
2Economic Cooperation Administration, First Report to . 
Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), 
95. 
look into the impact of foreign aid on the American national 
economy . The third committee, made up of distinguished citizens 
under the chairmanship of Secretary of Commerce Harriman , was 
requested to determine the .facts with respect- to the character 
and quantities of United States resources available for economic 
as-sistance to foreign countries and to advise the President , in 
the light of these facts , of the limits within which the United 
States might safely and. wisely extend such assistance . 3 
On July 21., Secretary Marshall met w1 th House Foreign 
Affairs Committee in closed session to explain his p l an , and , 
eight days later , the House of Representatives set ups, new 
nineteen-member committee to study the Marshall Plan. 4 . This 
committee , sailed for Europe in order to make extensive investi -
gations on its political and. economic conditions , and it returned 
1n October to the UQtted Sta tes . Reports by the Comm! ttees 
appointed by President Truman were also submitted to him in 
October and November·. 5 
On Sept-ember 22 , the General Report of the Committee of 
European Economic ·Cooperat1on, signed by sixteen nations, was 
presented to the United States and, on October 7,, conversations 
began in wa.shington between European and United States techni-
cians on this Report . 
3united States Department of State, Foreign Ai'fairs Out-
lines- No. 15 - Building the Peace, 'lhe United St-a~s and 
Eu,robean Recovery, Publ . 2954, (Washington: Government Print-
ing · tl'lce, Autumn, 1947), 4 . 
4Econom1c Cooperation Administration, First Report to 
Congress , (Washington: Government Printing Off1oe, 1948) , 95 . 
5Ibid., 96 . 
4 
Meanwhile , on October 6 , the Cominform, representing the 
Communist Parties of nine nations - Ruesia , Yugoslavia , France , 
Italy, Poland , Bulgaria , Czechoslovakia , Hungary , and Rumania -
was organized to combat the Marshall Plan and ttUnited States 
im.perialism. " 6 
On November 10, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
the House Foreign Af.fairs Committee met in joint session to 
begin hearings on the Europe·an Recovery Program, and , on January 
6, the Congress , began to study 1t . 7 
On April 2 , 1948, ten months after Secretary Marshall's 
historical proposal , the Congress of the United States passed 
the Foreign Assistance Act , thus demonstrating the determina-
·tion' ot the American c1 t1zens to assist all free peoples in their 
efforts to achieve recove·ry and stability. 
Congress called it an Act "to promote world peace and the 
gen,eral welfare , national interest , and foreign policy · of the 
\' 
United States through economic , tinancial , and other measures 
necessary to the main tenanee of conditions abroad in which free 
institutions may survive and consistent with the maintenance of 
the strength and stability of the United Statea . 11 8 
6Ib1d . 
7 Ibid . 
8United States Statutes at Large, Vol . 62, Part I , 137 
I 1949) . 
5 
President Truman, who sponsored the legislation, in signing 
the measure on April 3, said: "This is the ans•er to the chal-
lenge facing the free world . n9 
The action on foreign aid was certainly hurried up by the 
Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and immediate pro• 
visions were taken to enforce the legislation~ 
On April 6, Paul G, Hoffman , president of the Studebaker 
Corporation, and a Republican, was nominated by the President 
as Economic Cooperation Administrator with cabinet rank . 
On April 15, the first cargo financed by the Economic 
Cooperation Administration sailed from the United States bound 
for Europe . 
The day after, the representatives of the sixteen partici-
pating nations and of the occupying Powere of Western Germany 
signed at Paris the multilateral agreement for economic coopera-
tion and created a permanent body , the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (o. E. E. c. ) to develop and carry through, 
with the assistance of the United States , the combined program 
for the economic rehabilitation of the European nations. 
The proposal of Secretary Marshall thus marked a new 
approach to the problem of European recovery based on European 
initiative, and self- help , and started a cooperative effort of 
unpreceden.ted· proportions by the representatives of sixteen 
European nations, and by the legislative and executive branches 
9Economic Cooperation Administration, First Report to 
Congress, (Washington: Government Printing ottlce, l948), iv. 
of the Government of the United States . in order to provide a 
sound basis f'or the economic revival of Europe . 
In his Harvard speech. Secretary Marshall said he thought 
the initiative must come from Europe . The role of the United 
States should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a 
European program and of later support of such a program so far 
as it may be practical for it to do so . The program should be 
6 
a joint one . agreed to by a number . if not all . European nations . 
He added . as a condition of American cooperation. that the 
European nations would have to increase their industrial pro• 
.Q..1@J!on and give other evidence of being ready to aid themselves 
instead of placing their reliance solely on American aid . 10 
l 
The European countries formulated a combined program ex-
press.Ing their resolution to achieve economic recovery by their 
own joint efforts, aided by the United States . In their report 
t hey stated that the difficulties by which they were beset were 
due to six primary cau_ees: physical devastation and disruption 
in Western Europe,; pro.longed interruption of internationa l trade; 
human strain and exhaustion r sulting from six ye.a.rs -of war or 
occupation;~ ·:!.nterne.l financial disequilibrium; a shortage of food 
and .raw materials from Southeast Asia , which were vital to 
lOaeorge c. Marshall , "European Initiative Essential to 
Economic Recovery , " United 8tates Department of State Bulletin. 
16 ( June 15 , 1947) , 1160. 
European economy, and the abnormal increase of popu.lation in 
certain areas resulting from a war- time movem.etl t of peop~.es .11 
7 
Under the leadership of the Department of State, represen-
tatives of virtually all departments of the Government partici-
pated in a review of the report of the European countries and :tn 
the preparation of the materials to be submitted t .o the Congreas . 12 
The President presented to the Congress recommendations for a 
long- range program of aid and the legislative branch undertook 
a thorough investigation, a searching examination of the projected 
plan, and heard extensive testimony. 13 
The President and the Congress were provided with a com-
plete background on which to make the historic dec1:,1ons involved 
in the European Recovery Program. 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall declared: 
After the Paris program was submitted to our Government , 
it was given an intensive and critical examination . 
No peace- time project in government history has re-
ceived more careful attention and study from a large 
number of highly qualified individuals both 1n and out 
of Government . As a result , the measure recommended 
to the Congress represents the combined judgment of a 
large number of the nation's beat talent . It 1s the 
plan, we believe, best a4apted to serve the interests 
both of the United States and the European countries 
we wish to help • •• 
llun1ted States Department of State, Committee of European 
Economic' Cooperation General ~eport, Vol . I , (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing ottlce, 1947) , 1~ . 
l2Econom1o Cooperation Administration, First Report to 
Congress, (Washington: Government Printing ot'ffee, 1948), v . 
13Ibid., v1 . 
~bat: 
Its principal features have been shaped with ut-
most care, to meet many vital considerations 
affecting the nat1onal ·1nterest.l.4 
The President and Congress reached a consensus of opinion 
to avoid econoudo collape~ Western Europe must bave 
long-range aaeiatanee on a comprehensive scale; that 
the material and spiritual resources of the countries 
ot Western Europe gave promise that, with such aid, 
, they ·would be able to achieve recovery-; that· with 
skillful management, the resources and productive 
-capacity of the United States were equal to the extra-
ordinary task; and that, if aid were not extended, 
fr·ee institutions everywhere, inelud1ng our own in 
the United States, would be put 1n jeopardy.l.5 
Congress outlined in the Act three major elements of the 
recovery program: 
8 
1. The promotion of industrial and agricultural produotion 
in the partieipa ting eountriea; 
2. The furthering of the reetorat1on or maintenance of the 
aoundne1ts of European currencies, budgets, and finaneea; -and 
3. The facilitation and stimulation of the growth of 
international trade ,of participating countries with one another 
and with other countries by appropriate measur-es, in.eluding 
reduction of barriers which might hamper such trade.16 
Supplemental measures were directed also to: encourage the 
largeet possible utilization of manpower within each participating 
14aeorge C. Marshall, The Stake of the Businessman in the 
EurgSean Recovery Program ... Address delivered before the Pitts-
bur Chaii6e.r ol' Commerce on January l.5, 1948, u. s . Dept .. of 
state (Washington: Government fr1nt1ng 0£f1ee, 1948), 4. 
15Econom1c Cooperati.on Administration, First Report to 
Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Off1ee, l948), vi. 
l 6un1ted statea Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, Part I, 138 (1949). 
9 
country; make available to European countries American technical 
experience and advice in :management and production; encourage 
' ' 
American investments in Europe through. guaranties of converti-
bility of local currencies into dollars; develop programs by 
which counterpart funds are uaed to promote recovery 1n the coun-
tries which receive aid in the form of grants - (when a e:ountry 
receivoa a grant rather than a loan, it must deposit lo(:al currency, 
equivalent in valut to the grant, in a fund to be used-for recovery 
purpose.a in that coµ_ntry); see that assets and earnings belonging 
to citizens of part1cipating. eountr1ee, but situated in United 
States territory, are so far a, possible located by the partici-
pating country and put to appropriate use in furtherance of the 
European Recovery Program:; : 
In addition, in order not 0 to impose an excess! ve burden on 
the ·resources of the United States or not to impair the fulfill-
ment of the vital needs of the American people., Congress vested 
certain responsibilities in the Economic Cooperation Adm1nistra-
t1on. In order to protect the American economy, the European 
Cooperation Administration was directed to: restrict the export 
ot commodities in short supply; encourage the export of eommod1-
t1es in ample supply; encourage the use of norm.al private channels 
of trade; scrutinize carefully all prices pa.id particularly to 
see that bulk pur•chases made in countries outside the United States 
are not made at prices higher than those -"revailing in the United 
States; route at least 50% of all shipments to Europe in ships 
flying the American flag. In order to promote the security of 
the United States, the Economic Cooperation Administration was 
10 
directed to: li.rrange for the purchase of strategic ms:teriale 
from the participating nationa and their dependene1es; utilize 
a portion of the counterpart funds for exploration and develop-
ment to insure an increased supply of strategi.c materials; refuse 
deli very to participating countries of commoditi·es for use in 
the pl"oduction o-f other commodities f or delivery to any non-
participating European country which .would be refused an export 
license for such commodities in the interest of national security. 
Other act1-v1t1es of the Economic Cooperation A.dm1n1strat1on 
reqll1red by the Act were: reimbursement to certain voluntary 
foreign relief agencies for the ocean treignt they . spend in send-
...... 
ing relief to Europe.i, and encouragement and facilitation of travel 
in Europe by American citizens, so that the European countries 
with dollars so earned could balance their trade account:s· w1 th the 
Western Hemisphere .17 
Wlth this program. the Marshall Plan entered into action in 
the Qpring of 1948. 
CHAPTER II 
ECONOMIC MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE MARSHALL PLAN 
l. Situation in Europe 
The impact of World War II fell on Europe with the violence 
of a cyclone, disrupting 1ts industry and the normal channels of 
trade. The homeless were scattered over the f'ace of' Em-ope; 
natural resources were badly depleted; the political situation 
in most countries became unsettled and poverty was the only item 
in abundance. In addition, the population of the Marshall Plan 
countries had increased over pre-war levels. Against an esti-
mated average population or 206 million in 1934-38 (249 million 
with Western Germany) the 1947 estimates were 219 million (269 
., million with Western Germany) .1 This meant a greater population 
to support with decreased resources. Yet in spite of the numeri-
cal increase, most of the Marshall Plan countries were suffering 
from manpower difficulties, particularly decreased productivity 
of labor. This resulted from a variety of causes, including war 
damage to productive plant, obsolescence of _equipment, irregu-
larity 1n the .flow of raw materials, lack of adequate occupational 
'• 
training over the war years, an older labor .force, the physical 
deterioration of the population through the cumulative e.f.fects 
\ !Economic Cooperation Administration, The European Recoverf 
Program: Country Studies, Vol. I, (Washington: E. c. A., l949 , 7. 
of inadequate diets, and decreased incentive arising from the 
shortages of consumers• goods.2 
12 
National income on a per capita basis in Europe had fallen 
from one-half the United States level in 1939 to one-quarter in 
19•6. 'l'he q.1stribution of losses was very uneven and further 
accentuated Europe's d1ffieult1es.3 
Most of the Marshall Plan countries had been long dependent 
upon large imports of raw materials, particularly imports of 
fuels, fertilizers, fibers, ores, and metals. The most part of 
them were dependent, some of them entirely dependent, upon coal 
imports. In none of th•m was there any substantial production 
of petroleum o~ cotton. Their industrial activity was based 
primarily upon the processing and manufacturing industries and 
t~eir exports were largely in the form of manufactured goods.4 
Indu,trial disruption meant devastated factories and cities. 
It meant shortages of materials and lack of tools and machines. 
Ins:uffie1ent production resulted and the most elementary civilian 
needs could not be satisfied. 
Ruined trade and low production meant worthless currencies, 
which, in turn, meant tba t the means did not exist to import a 
minilllWD. of essential supplies. High prices and black markets 
flourished. 
2 Ibid. 
3seym\ur E. Barris, The ~ropean Reco•e11 Pro§ram, (Cam-
bridge, Mase.: Harvard University Preas, l94 ), 9. 
4Economic Co~perat1on Ad.D11nietration, The European Reeove~ 
Program: Country Studies, Vol. I, (Washington: E. c. A., 194~, 3. 
I 
13 
The war effort . in Western Europe had been financed in large 
part by government borrowing, . with the result that strong in-
flationary forces were generated by the greatly expanded money 
supply • . As long as inflationary forces were dominant , economic 
recovery on a sound basis was not possible . In all eountrie.s 
widespread economic controls b~came necessary, but there never-
thelees devel oped str~ins which, in some cases, resulted in 
difficult internal political situations . 
Inflation was .a barrier to European recovery, for it brought 
maldistr1but1on of income; distortions in the economic system, 
inclusive of mal-allocations; impaired the strength of govern- · 
ment, reduced the incentive to produee, and aggravated the 
deficit in the balance of payments . 
In the words of the Committee of European Economic Co-
operation Report, 11 1n 1945, Europe was perhaps more denuded of 
resources than at any time in modern history. ft5 What little 
existed could not be adequately distributed because of 1neur-
.f1c1ent, ruined transportation . 
Transportation difficulties, represented by bombed-out 
freig~t yards, .bridges, tracks; and ha~bor facili ties, had 
added i.Jmnea~ably to the curtailment of eeonomie activity . 
war-t.1me lqsses of three million freigh~ cars and 22 million 
tone of shipping created an urgent need or steel for replacement . 6 
Sun1ted States Dep~rtment o.f State , Committee of European 
Economic C.oop~rat1on General Re,ort, Vol . I, (Washington: 
Government Printing orllee, u;r,J, 4 . 
6Uni ted States Department of state, Foreign Aff'airs out-
lines No . 15 - Building the Peace, The United States and European 
Recovery, Publ . 2954 , {Washington: Government Printing Ot?ice , 
Autumn , 1947), 2 . 
14 
Disrupted agriculture meant drastic shortages of basic 
foods, seeds, ma,chinery, and fertilizers. Droughts and flood-s 
in the two years after VE-Day further reduced minimum subsistence 
Most of the Marshall Plan countries had never met their 
food requirements from their own production . They were charac-
teristically dependent upon the Western Hemisphere, the Far 
East, and Eastern Europe for large imports of grain, feeds, and 
fats and oils . 
Even before the war the percentage of production to re-
quirements was 32 for the United Kingdom, 47 for Switzerland 
and Norway, 62 for the Netherlands , 75 for Austria, and 83 
for France . Those countries , therefore, were greatly injured 
by a reduction in cereal output by 14 per cent (1946 - 47 as 
compared to pre- war output) and in several important foods by 
even larger ·percentages . Besides, they were confrented with 
population increases of about 10 per cent over pre- war levele . 7 
Food- producing areas like France and Italy were hard hit . 
French grain production in 1938 waa almost 9 million tons . In 
1947, it was less than 4 million tons . Short supplies of 11ve-
stoek products meant a very small weekly ration of meat . Fats 
were rarer still, and vegetables were scarce . Milk was hard to · 
get . Mo~t of the coffee was made from roasted grains a~d acorns . a 
7Un1ted Nations - Department of Economic Affairs, A Survey 
of tb.e Economic S1tua tion and Prospects of Europe , ( Geneva·: 
United Nation~ , 1948), 16 ~ 
'Soni ted States Department of state , Foreign Affai'rs out-
lines No . 15 ~ Building the Peace, 'Ihe United States and F.Uropean 
Recovery, Pu~l . 2954, (Washington: Government Printing Office , 
Autumn , 1947)1, 2 . 
I 
15 
The problems of Europe were complicated by the unavail-
ability of natural resources in the Far F.ast. Europe, heavily 
dependent upon her access to raw materials in this area, was 
handic~pped by the unsettled and war- deva.atated conditions 
there. Restrictions on trade in many areas, heretofore markets 
for European goods, meant a bleak outlook i n the citiee of 
Western Europe for the thousands of people dependent upon 
Europe's .once thriving . export trede ~ 
In his statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on January 8, 1948, Secretary Marshall said: 
The war disrupted the flow of vital raw materials 
from Southeast Asia, the~eby breaking the pattern 
of multilateral trade which formerly provided, 
directly or indirectly, large dollar earnings for 
Western Europe . In the postwar period artificial 
and forcible reorientation to the Soviet Union 
of eastern European trade has deprived Western 
Europe of sources of foodstuff and raw material 
from that area.9 
The industrial .strue ture of Western Europe was based upon 
coal, steel , and chemicals and none of the Western European 
countries was in a position to organize its industry effectively 
without the support of the others. This structure was highly 
developed and depended tor 1te efficient working upon the 
smooth working of international trade and the uninterrupted flow 
of goods and services . The war destroyed t~s process and this 
breakdown altered the whole basis of the economy of Europe . 
9oeorge c. Marshall , nAssistance to European Economic 
Recovery," United States Department of State Bulletin, 18 
( January 18, 1948), 7l-77 .• 
16 
The continued shortage of coal, the increased cost of pri-
mary products and the prolonged world shortage of food and other 
essential commodities in the winter 1946-1947, stopped the 
improvement which had already been proceeding well since the 
end of the World War II . 
Coal and stee-1 are dependent upon each other. Shortages 
in these basic resources had dealt the hardest blow to European 
economy. The greatest source of coal supply, the Ruhr, was 
barely above 50 per cent of pre- war production , and even to 
restore output to pre- war levels would have required nearly 
two million tons of steel for repairs and maintenance . Coal 
for domestic heating was virtually non- existent . During most 
of the 1946-47 winter in Britain there was not sufficient 
coal- produced electricity to provide electr:1c lighting for 
indu.stry, government , and homes . 10 
The balance between the productive power and the resources 
of the Western ~em1sphere and t hose of the rest of the world 
was upset: the European countries had to maintain the volume 
of their imports from the American continent at increasing 
cost. Thie process inevitably led to a rapid depletion of 
gold and dollars reserves and the effects of this process 
reached far beyond Europe and threatened the foundations of 
the world economy. 
In his address befoN the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce , 
Secretary Marshall said: 
10un1ted States Department of State, Foreign Affairs out-
lines No . 15 - Buil ding the Peace , The United States and European 
Recovery , Publ . 2954, :_(Washingt~on: ' Government Printing oftlce, · 
Autumn, 1947), 2. 
• • • I have been ta lk1ng about Europe, but the 
situation is even more serious than that . Europe 
was at the heart of a great world trading and 
financial organization. Her failure to recover 
would have disastrous effects in many otl;ler areas. 
The economies of Latin America and Canada , for 
example, are organized on the basis of having 
markets in Europe . If Europe fails to recover, 
and she certainly cannot do so without our aid, 
the repercussl!ns will be felt throughout the 
entire world. 
Europe suf fered more acutely and urgently because her 
financial and physical resources were dissip,ted during the 
war . All the improvements Europe could make following the 
winter crisis was maintained only at the cost of depletion 
17 
of financial reserves . When these were exhausted , the peoples 
of Europe would be threatened with an indefinite prolongation 
of insecurity and lower standards of living unless drastic 
steps were taken to arrest the process, European preduction 
could never play a proper part in redressing the growing un-
balance of the world eeonomy. 12 
In 1947, the annual United States exports to the Marshall 
Plan countries were approxima tely $5 , 300,000, 000 and i mports 
$700 , 000, 000 . '!he deficit of $4,600 , 000, 000 was made up 
largely by gifts and loans to t he European nations b y the 
American people.13 
llaeorge c. Marshall, The S take of the Busines sman in the 
European Recovery Program - Address delivered before the 
Pittsburgh Ghainber of commerce on January 15, 1948, u. s. Dept . 
of State (Washington: Government Printing Office,. 1948), 6 . 
l 2Un1ted States Department of State, Committee of European 
Economic Co-Oferat1on General Report, Vol . I; (Washington: 
Government Prln ting ofr!ce, 1947 >, 17. 
13Paul o. Hoffman, Address delivered before the Philadelphia 
Chamber of Commerce on February 21, 1949, (Washington: E. c. I., 
1949), 2 . 
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The breakdown of trade with Eastern Europe , Eastern Ger-
many, and Asia, the crop failures, and especially higher prices 
for imports and losses of invisible credits, were ~pecial 
factors intensifying the crisis of dollar shortage. 
The task of bringing exports and imports into rough balance 
by June 30, 1952 ; was obviously quite an undertaking, but this 
task had to be aecompl18hed if European recovery was to have 
substance. 
German occupation had drastically upset the economic life 
of many of the Marshall Plan countries. The Germans madesery 
effort to integrate the economies of the occupied ·eountries 
into the German war machine, a policy which meant the breaking 
of existing economic ties with neighboring countries and the 
focusing of the economies of the occupied countries on Berl~n. 
With the collapse of Germany in defeat, it was necessary 
to start almost at the beginning to recreate economic inter-
course between the European countries. 'l'he virtual disappear-
ance of Germany as a major ractor in the post-war European 
economy had drastic repercussions on · the · Marshall Plan count_ries.14 
Divided into a western economy and an eastern economy, 
and without Germany , Europe was heavily dependent on overseas 
i!uppl1es . It was not .functioning as a single trade eommunity 
and the division of Europe presented an unhappy prospect. 
· · l4Economic Cooperation Administration , European Recoveri 
Program: Country Studies , Vol. I, (Washington: E. c. A., · 1~49), 
2-4. 
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Western Europe was then facing catastrophe~ The Committee 
of European Economic Cooperation Report expressed it clearly: 
If the flow of goods from the American Continent 
to Europe should cease, the results would be 
calamitous. Europe's dollar res·ources are running 
low. One country after another is already being 
forced by lack of dollars to cut down vital imports 
of food and raw materials from the Am.e~1can Contin-
ent. If nothing is done a catastrophe will develop 
as stocks become exhausted. If too little is done, 
and if it is done too late, it will be impossible 
to provide the momentum needed to get the programme 
under way. Life in Europe will become increasingly 
unstable and uncertain; industries will grind to a 
gradual halt for lack of materials and f'uel, and the 
food supply of Europe will diminish and begin to 
disappear.15 
Besides, Europe had ( and still has) to overcome obstacles 
of ane1ent habits, national borders, limited trade areas and 
land monopolies and systems of government; had to break through 
these restr1ct1ons to save her 1nd1v1dua11ty, achieve a customs 
union, and an economic partnership. 
2. Repercussions in the United States 
The situation in Europe led the United States to take ac-
tion, not only in order to re-establish the economic order, but 
also to defend its own interests. 
The United State.s had a vital interest - hulSllinitarian, 
economic, strategic; and political - in helping the participating 
countries to achieve the economic recovery. 
"An objective analysis of the situation," the Harriman 
Committee reported, '-'points conclusively to the need for courageous 
l5Un1ted States Department of State , Committee of European 
Economic Cooperation General Re,ort, Vol. I, (Washington: 
Government Printing ot(!ee, 194 ), 6-7. 
constructive action to aid Western Europe, both for its sake 
and for our own enlightened self-interest.nl6 
In his address at a dinner at Palmer House, in Chicago, 
on November 18, 1947, Secretary Marshall said: 
It seems evident that as regards European re-
covery, the enlightened self-interest of the 
··, United States coincides with the best interest of 
Europe itself and of all those who desire to seek 
conflicts of whatever nature resolved, so that 
the world can devote its full attention and energy 
to the progressive improvement of the well-being of 1 
mankind. 'lhe place to begin that process is Europe. 7 
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In his message to Congress on December 19, 1947, President 
Truman declared: 
Considered in terms ot our own economy, European 
recovery is es·aent1al. '!he last two decades have 
taught us the bitter lesson that no economy, not 
even one so strong as our own, can remain healthy 
and prosperous in a world of poverty and want. 
Europe is an essential part of a world trading 
network. The failure to revive fully this vast 
trading system, which has begun to function again 
since the end. of the war, would result in economic 
deterioration throughout the world. The United 
States, in common with other nations, would 
suffer.18 
In passing the Economic Cooperation Act of April 2, 1948, 
the Congress stated: 
Recognizing the intimate economic and other rela-
tionships between the United States and the nations 
l6European Recovery and American A1d - A Report by the 
Pres1dent•s Committee on Foreign A1d, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, November 7, 1947), 21. 
l7George c. Marshall, ''1he Problems or European Revival," 
United States Department of State Bulletin, 17 (November 30) 
1947) , Io:25. 
18Harry s. Truman, A Program for United States Aid to 
European Recovery, Message to the Congress on December 19, 
1947, u. s. Dept. of State, Fubl. 3022 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, February, 1948), 4. 
of Europe, and recognizing that disruption 
following in the wake of wa~ is not contained 
by nationa.l frontiers, the · Congres'S finds that 
the· ex.is ting s1 tua tion in Europe endangers 
the establishment of a lasting peace, the gen-
eral welfare and national interest of the 
United States, and th• attainment of the objec-
t! ves of the Uni tea Na tiona. 19 
21 
The United States could not permit the collapse of Europe, 
because getting along without· Europe would in an economic sense 
almost mean getting along without the rest of the world. One-
fifth of the imports that came in 1938 to the United States 
from the sixteen Marshall Plan countries included many manµ-
faetured articles the United States could not easily do without. 
In the event or collapse of the mother oountries, . the - exporte 
from the colonies of Europe, source of many of United States 
. . 
essential raw ms."ter1al imports, would hav~ been disrupted. 20 
Also getting along without Europe would mean pre~ty much 
getting along without exports. In the period 1921-25. about 22 
per eent or ~nited States expor~e went to the United Kingdom; 
approximately 20 per cent went to Germany, France, and Italy. 
During the worldwide depression of the l930•a the . United States• 
exports to Europe were reduced, but from 1936 to 1938 the United 
Kingdom took 17 per cent and, in 1938, the Marshall Plan countries 
together took 35 per cent of the United States' total· e.xp.orta .21 
19un1ted States Statutes· at Large, Vol. 62, part I, 15"7 
( 1949). 
20Alger Risa, "Basic Questions in the Great Debate,tt New 
York Times Magazine, (November 16, 1947), 7. ~ 
21Ib1d. 
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The economic dislocation of Europe would have also heavily 
cut United States exports to non-European countries, whose 
ability to buy United States products would have been sharply 
reduced by the inability to acquire dollar exchange trom the 
sale of commodities to Europe. An area normally responsible 
for more than half the world 's trade could have not been elim-
inated without a major disruption in world economy - a disrup-
tion from which the united States would have suffered. With 
the greatly expanded productive capacity of today, loss of 
export markets would have had still greater impact on the 
United States• eeonom7.22 
The European countries had been by tradition the best 
customers of the United States and were vital to the function-
1ng of world commerce. If conditions in Europe had continued 
to deteriorate, all American business would have s-uffered. The 
United St.ates' export trade has been an important part of its 
national economy; therefore it was distinctly to its advantage 
. . 
to recreate a atrong and healthy Europe , which, in turn, would 
mean a larger market for Amer1can gooda.23 
The situation of Europe would have alao had serious 
repercussions on the internal setup of the American economy. 
The failure of Europe to recover," said President Trwnan 
22Ib1d. 
23Econom.1c Cooperation Administration, The Marshall Plan, (Washington: E. c. A., 1950), 10. 
·1n his message to Congress, "her surrender to totalitarian 
centro1·, might well comp-el us to modify our own economic 
system.n24 
23 
6 The freedom that we cherish in our own economy and the 
freedom that we enjoy in the world today are both at stake, n he 
declared·.25 
Addressing the Chamber of Commerce of Pittsburgh, Secre-
tary Marshall said: ttThe cumulative loss of foreign markets 
and sources of supply would unquestionably have a depressing 
influence on our domestic economy and would drive us to 1n-
J 
creased meas.urea of government control. ttt26 
This danger was also expressed in the Report ef the 
Harriman Committee: 
Our economic self'-interest is closely related to 
the rate of Europe . The deterioration of European 
Economy for lack of means to .obtain esaential im-
ports would force EUPopean . countriea to re1ort to 
trade by gove:rnment monopoly , - not only for economic 
but for political ends. The United States would 
almost 1ne,v1tably have to follow suit. The result-
ing system of state controls. at first relating to 
foreign trade, would soon ha79 to be extended into 
24Harry S. Truman, A Prosram for United States Aid to 
European Recover.: , Message to the Congress on December 19, 
1947, tr. s. Dep. of State , (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, February, 1948), 10. 
26Harry S. Truman, "The Future of the Free Nations of 
Europe Hangs in the Balance, n United States Department or 
state Bulletin, 17 (November 30, 1947), 1023. 
26George c. Marshall, The .Stake of the Businessman in 
the Eu~opean Recoveg Pro!tam - Address dellverea on January 
15, 1948, u. s. 1,ep. of ate (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1948), 6. 
the domestic economy to an extent that would 
endanger the survival of the American system 
of free enterprise.27 
24 
The United States was vitally concerned over living stan-
dards a nd general conditions in Western Europe and o t her .areas. 
A lowering of living standards in Europe as a whole would have 
had a depressing effect on living standards in the United States. 
Serious concern over the effects of the European situation 
on the American taxpayers and businessmen was clearly expressed 
by Secretary of State Marshall: 
The fatal deterioration and collapse of Europe 
economically and therefore politically would 
result in consequences of a most .serious nature 
for this country. The situation we then 111ould 
face would necessarily impose on us such burdens 
in the way of tax~s, discomforts, sacrifices, 
and impairments of the rights and privileges 
we now enjoy as to make those tha t now confront 
us seem trivial by comparison • 
• • • If the businessmen of this country are 
again to enjoy the former facilities for re-
siding, traveling, and doing bus iness among the 
European peoples, then it is essential that the 
Europeans retain their confidence in this coun-
try and in the soundness of liberal institutions 
1n general. It is idle to think that a Europe 
left to its own efforts in these serious problems 
of recovery would remain open to American business 
in the same way that we have known it in the past. 
We are, (he continued), all stockholders in the 
same company - the United States of America. The . 
paramount question be.fore us, I think, can be stated 
in business terms.28 
27European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the 
President's Comm.lttee on Foreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, November 7, 1947), 19. 
28oeorge c. Marshall, The Stake of the Businessman in the 
European Recovery Pro~ram - Address delivered on January 15, 
1948, u. s. Dept. of tate (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1948), 6-7. 
25 
He explained, saying that the American people were required 
to make a decision as to which was the wiser course: whether 
to make a capital investment in European recovery involving a 
sum that though large was well within their means, with a good 
prospeot of realizing long-term gains; or whether to spend 
their abundant capital for the satisfaction of their immediate 
wants, in the hope that the day of reckoning could be indefinitely 
defe.rre.d. 
I consider, (he concluded), the prudent course 
in this situation is prompt and effective action 
to assure solvency and stability in Europe . I 
think that is our:i~role as a l eader in a dis-
tressed world.29 
Should, then, the United States have concerned itself with 
European recovery or not? 
In his address delivered before the National Industrial Con• 
ference Board in New York City on January 22, 1948, Willard L. 
Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, de-
clared: 
One can approach the question from the economic 
side • . There can be no doubt that a collapse of 
Europe would have repercu·ssione all around the 
world , and would disrupt all of our normal inter-
national economic relationships. First to euffer, 
of course, would be our exporters. But they ' 
cannot be segregated from o.ur general economic 
life. If the cotton farm.er loses his foreign 
ms~ket, a11· those who sell commodities to him 
will f~el the blow. The starting p·oint may be 
the ex.porting group~ but proj!per1 ty as well as 
depreesio~ tends to be indivisible. 
Actually, the new post-war e~~nomie world will 
have a somewhat different pattern from the pre-
war world. If we could make the incredible 
assumption that the only variables 1n the 
situation were economic, and then we should 
shut off our as5istance, there would be a 
serious eollapse in other countries. We would 
then have to make our own readjustments to an 
extre~ely low level of trade, which might 
gradually and slowly build up again over time. 
'1he alternative, under the recovery Program 
is to have a gradual readjustment without the 
intermediate collapse. From the point of 
view of economic waste and disorganization, 
there can be little choice between the two 
courses. When one adds the non-economic 
factors , the future trade pattern - it' there 
were an lmm~diate eollapse in Europe - is 
most obscure; but we can be sure that we 
would not like it. Sudden major economic 
changes are always costly. 
And finally, we must look at the alternative . 
Choices should never rest on seeing only one 
side of the coin. Secretary Marshall summar-
ized it in eight words , 1tthe program is an 
economy, not an expense.'' 
Who can calculate to the full the cost tor 
us of a disorganized and disturbed Europef 
It is a risk without limit and the costs- to 
all of us would be much more than those wpieh 
would then appear in the Federal budget and 
more painfully in our communications to the 
Collector of Internal Revenue .30 
26 
Speaking before the annual Cor1vention of the Texas Cotton 
Association in Corpus Christi, Texas , o.n March 19, 1948, Mr . 
Winthrop G. Brown, Acting Director of the Office of Interna-
tional Trade Policy, Department of State, declared: 
You may well ask how this recovery program will 
affect each of you and what role you will be 
called upon to play. Cotton , for example, is 
one of the raw materials most needed for 
30w111ard L. Thorp, Elements in European Recove~, u. S. 
Dept. of State (Washington: Government Printing offce, 1948), 
13-14. 
European textile production . It is now esti-
mated that Europe wil l need about 27 million 
bales of cotton during the next four and one 
half years. Of this total, 10. 7 million bales 
will be shipped from the United States under 
the projected program. From Aprill , 1948, 
to July l , 1949 , it is estimated that 3 million 
bales of cotton will be supplied to Europe from 
the United States . Shipments planned under the 
program will , therefore, provide an outlet for 
a considerable portion of the cotton we produce 
for export in the next several years . 
Oscar Jolmston, Chairman of the National Cotton 
Council' s board of directors , recognizing the 
importance of the European Recovery Program for 
the American cotton producers and urging its 
support, said: "The Marshall Plan is the best 
possible insurance for the cotton farmer over 
the next several years . " Stressing the political 
and economic repercussions should there not be 
such a program, he stated: "The odds are over-
whelmingly against individuals in a free- enterprise 
system dealing successfully against totalitarian 
governments . If we are to remain free and pros-
perous , we must have some company. If we act with 
courage, intelligence , and dispatch we can assist 
the countries of Western Europe to restore their 
economies . Certainly this is in our national 
interest. " Mr. Johriston•s words are well chosen . 31 
27 
The Harriman Committee, despite occasional disagreement 
respecting details, came to the over- all conclusion that the re-
covery program not only was well within the American capacity 
but also that it was essential to the beat welfare of the United 
States: 
The Committee ~a eonvinced that a sound program for 
Western Euro_,pean erecovery should be formulated and 
adopted by the United States with the same boldness 
3lw1nthrop G. Brown, Unit~d States Economic Fore!~ Policz~ 
u. s . Dept . of State (Washington: Government Printing trice , 
1948) , 3 . 
and determination , and the .same confidence . in 
t he worthiness of the democratic cause , which 
characterized our action in World War II . 32 
28 
In his addres s delivered before the Convention of the Amer1 -
can Legion , in. Philadelphia, Penn ., on August 29 , 1949 , President 
Truman reasserted the reasons for the United States to undertake 
the recovery of Europe . 
We in the United States depend upon foreign 
countries for many vital minerals and other raw 
materia l s . Without foreign trade , many of our 
industries would suf fer . Moreover , we need to 
sell many things abroad . Our cotton , our wheat , 
and our tobacco , for example , must have foreign 
markets . Our prosperity would be seriously 
damaged if the export of our products were cut 
off . 
We cannot , therefore, fall back into economic 
isolationism. 
One of. the most serious difficulties we face is 
the fact that, at present, foreign nations need 
to buy more things from us than we ne.ed to buy 
from them. They have called upon us for food 
and raw materi~ls in unprecedented amount . 
Furthermore , many couptries need equipment and 
machinery, which only ,re can eupply , if they 
are to develop their own resources and ra1ee 
their own standards of living . 
The urgent demand which foreign countries have 
for these things far exceeds their present 
capacity to pay for them. 
We will continue the European Recovery Program 
as our principal means of meeting emergency 
needs for the next three years . 33 
32European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the 
President's Commlttee on Foreign Aid, ( Washington: Government 
Printing Office , November 7, 1947), 22 . 
~
3H~r~y S. Truman , A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and Statements , U. s. Dept . of State, ( Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 54- 55. 
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3. Objectives in Europe 
The economic aims of the Marshall Plan were broadly ex-
pressed in the message of President Truman to Congress and the 
American people, on December 19, 1947. 
The first essential for a successful European 
Recovery Program is that each nation separately 
and all the nations together should take vigor-
ous action to help themselves. The second 
essential is that sufficient outside aid should 
be ma.de available to provide the margin of 
victory for the recovery program • . 
The necessary imports which the sixteen countPies 
cannot finance without assistance constitute 
only a small proportion of their total national 
production - some 5 per cent over the four years 
of the program, but these imports are of crucial 
importance in generating recovery. They represent 
the difference between ;ever-deepening stagnation 
and progressive improvement. 
Only t .he United States can provide the bulk of the 
aid needed by Europe over- · the next four yea.rs. 
Our funds . will enable the countries of Europe to 
purchase goods which will achieve two purposes -
to lift the standard of living 1n Europe closer 
to a decent level, and at the same time to enlarge 
European capacity for production . 
They will enable them to import grain for current 
consumption, and fertilizer and agricultural 
machinery to increase their food production. lb.ey 
w111 import fuel for current use, and mining 
machinery to increase their coal output. In 
addition, they will obtain raw materials, eueh 
as cotton, for current production, and some manu-
facturing and transportation equipment to increase 
their productive capacity. 
Recovery for Europe will not be achieved until 
its people are able to pay for their necessary 
imports with foreign exchange obtained through 
the exports of goods and services .• 34 
34Harry s. Truman , A Program for U~ited States Aid to 
Euro~ean Recover~ - The Message to the Congress on De·cember 
19,947, U. s. ~ept. of State (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, February, 1948), 1• 
30 
In passing the Economic Cooperation Act on April 2 , 1948. 
the Congress stated: 
The restoration or maintenance 1n European 
countries of pr1nc1ples· or individual liberty, 
free institutions , and genuine independence 
' rests largely upon the establishment of sound 
economic conditions, stable international 
economic relationships, and the achievements 
by the countries of Europe of a healthy economy 
independent of extraordinary outside assistance . 
The accomplishment of these objectives calls 
for a plan of European recovery , open to all 
euc):l nations which cooperate in such plan , based 
upon a strong production effort , the expansion 
of foreign trade , the creation and maintenance 
of internal fipanc1al stability, and the develop-
ment of economic cooperation , inc l uding all 
possible steps to establish and maintain equitable 
. rates of exchange and to bring about the pro-
~ress1ve elimination of trade bar~iers . 35 
European reconstruction was the battle aga i nst hunger , 
poverty and chaos , and an effort to avert Communism. 
The objective of the European Recovery Program, 
(said Secretary Marshall) , is to achi eve lasting 
economic recovery for Western Europe: reeovery 
in the sense that after our aid has terminated, 
the European countries will be able to maintain 
the1118e l ves by their own efforts on a sound economic 
basis . 
So long as hunger, poverty, desperation and re -
sulting chaos threaten the great concentrations of 
people in We s tern Europe , there will steadily 
develop social unease and political confusion on 
every side . 
• • • The foundation of political vitality is 
economic recovery . Durable peace requ1res6the 
restoration of Western European vitality. 
35un1ted States Statutes at Large, Vol . 62 , Part I , 137 
( 1949} . 
36oeorge C. Marshall , "Assistance to European Economic 
Recovery,'' United States Department of State Bulletin, 18 
(January 18, 1948) , 11- 11 . 
Speaking about the functions of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration , the Administrator Paul G. Hoffman said: 
The Economic Coopera tion Administration had been 
established to mak'e effective a wholly new fo;re1gn 
Jeonomic policy designed to· build a solid base 
for peac.e •.. Th.is policy recognizes the interdepen-
dence of UQ1 ted Sta.tea economy and e·conomy of 
We tern Europe and seeks to protect and promote 
freedom and prosper! ty at home by protecting and 
promoting i t abroad . This new policy is· based . 
".lpon t 'he hard-earned conclusion that the most 
effective way to stop Communism is to help remedy 
th~ ece>nomtc conditions that cause people in 
despair to turn to Communism. 
The,Jlarshall Plan is the official expression of 
the new foreign economic policy of the United 
States . 3"! 
Should the United States have not decided to give assis-
31 
tance to Europe , the grim downward spiral ; in which each cri tical 
shortage begat other shortages , might have moved £aster . Spots 
of starvation would undoubtedly have appeared and spread as 
pani c would have driven the remaining food supplies into hiding . 
, 
Short$ges of coal and raw materials could have progressively 
shut down .the powerhouses and factories . Disorder, riots , and 
chaos then would have followed . 
If more food could have b-een furnished the Ruhr , more coal 
would have been produced. If more coal coul d have been supplied 
t o n1,trate plants , the additional fertilizer would have aug-
. 
mented· the European food supply, which wou l d have greatl y 
incr eased the productivity of labor 1n industry and coal min-
ing. More coal would have likewise made more s -teel available , 
37p~ul o. Hoffman , The Role of E. c. A. in National 
,Administrat.ion , (W.ashington: E. c. A. , December 29 , 1948) , 2 . 
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which could have been used in the production of mining equipment 
to produce more coal and to make freight cars to break the 
transport bottleneck. 
The .Marshall Plan countries, in their Conference for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation, held in Paris on September 22, 1947, 
agreed on coordination of their economies and on the aims of the 
Marshall Plan. 
Their Report assumed a high degree of self-help by the 
countries concerned and mutual help between them. This recovery 
p_ro)gram was based on four lines of action= 
1. An all-out effort toward increasing production, espec-
ially in agriculture, fuel and power, transport, and moderniza-
tion of equipment. 
(a) Restoration of pre-war bread grain and other 
cereal production, with large increase above pre-war in sugar 
and potatoes. some increase in oils and fats, and as fast an 
expansion in livestocks products as supplies of feeding stuffs 
will allow. 
(b) Increase of coal output to 584 million tons, 1. e. 
145 million tons above the 1947 level (an increase of one-
third), and 30 million tons above the 1938 level. 
(c) Expansion of electricity output by nearly 70,000 
million kwh or 40 per cent above 1947 and a growth of generating 
capacity by over 25 million kw or two-thirds above pre-war. 
(d) Development of oil refining capacity in terms of 
crude oil throughout by 17 million tons to two and a half times 
the pre-war level. 
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(e) Increase of crude steel production by 80 per cent 
above 1947 to a level of 55 million tons or 10 million tons 
(20%) above 1938, 
(t) Expansion of inland transport facilities to carry 
a 25 per cent greater load than in 1938 at the end of the pro-
gram. 
(g) Restoration or pre-war ~erehant fleets of the 
participating countries by the end ,of the European Recovery 
Program.38 
2. The creation and maintenance of internal financial 
stability as an essential condition for securing the full 
utilization of Europe's productive and financial resourcee. 
3. Development of ma,ximum economic cooperation between 
the participating countries. Thirteen countries constituted 
themselves as a group to study the creation of a European cus-
toms union. The French Government stated that it was ready to 
commence negotiations with all European nations who wished to 
enter a customs union with France and whose national economies 
were capable of being combined with the French economy in such 
a way as to make a viable unit. The Italian Government asso-
ciated itself with the French statement. 
4. A solution of the problem of the participating 
countries' trading det1c1t with the American continent, parti-
cularly by increased exports. The problem before the partici-
38un1ted States Department of State, Committee of European 
Economic Cooperation General Re~ort, Vol. I, (Washington: 
Government Printing Otrlce, 194 ), .14. 
pating countries, as well as the basic aim of the recovery 
program, was thus to revive and expand their production so 
as to eliminate abnormal demand on the outside world and pro-
duce for export the increased volume ?f goods. required to pay 
for the imports the participating countries would continue to 
need.39 
,. 
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In relation to the 1947 levels of trade (expressed in 1938 
prices) the gap was about $3.3 billion and would have involved 
a 114 per .cent increase in export or a 53 ·pe~ cent contraction 
1n imports. 
Europe's adverse balance of trade with the United States 
was 70 per cent of her total deticit.~O 
Agreement was achieved on collec_~J, action on the follow-
ing special problems: common planning of the exploitation of 
new sources of electric power; encouragement of th.e standardiza-
tion of mining and electric supplies and .freight ears; examination 
of speed-up methods for transportation; and arrangements for the 
. ·'. 
intf)rchange of knowledge about programs of modernization and 
extension by steel-producing countries. 
'lhe ~eport showed thati even after taking full account of 
the supplies which they ·could hope to obtain from the rest of the 
world, the part1cipating ,countr1ee would require large quantities 
of .food, fuel, raw materials, and capital equipment from the 
39Ib1d., 4-7. 
40un1ted Nations - Department of Economic Affairs, A Survey 
of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe, (Geneva: 
United Nations, 1948), 40. 
American continent. Without this flow of goods the whole 
recovery program would be in jeopardy.41 
Even United States e::xperts, more conservative than those 
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of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation, anticipated 
the following percentage rise 1n 9utput trom 1947 to 1962 _: coal, 
33; .finished steel, 71; hydreelectric power, 36; grains, 39; 
mea-t, .31 per cent. These rises and particularly those for coal, 
steel, and power, were compatible with a rise or income of at 
least 25 per cent from 1947 to 1952.•2 
In his address before the joint meeting of Chicago Asso-
ciation of' Commerce and Industry and Executives Club of Chicago, 
on November 5,. 1948, . Paul Hoffman declared: 
In the year of 1947 the total income produced 1n 
the Western European nations was approximately. 
$100 billion. If by the terminal date of June 
30., 1952, the European annual income is at a 
level of approximately $135 billion, we will feel 
that our operation has been a succesa.43 
4. European Cooperation 
The United States sought, above all, th~ mutual cooperation 
ot the European nations to the end of genuine economic self-
support on their part. The United States wanted to help them 
to help themselves, recognizing that American resources could be 
41United States Department of State, Committee of Euro~ 
Economic Cooperation General Re~ort, Vol. I, (Washington.: ·~rn-
ment Printing office, 1947), 4-. 
42 
. Uni~ed Nations - Department of E~ono~c Affairs , A Survey 
of the Economic S1tAat1on and Prospects of ·Europe, (Geneva: 
United Nations, 194 ), 26-29. 
43Econom1c Cooperation Administration, ~eport on the 
Euro~ean Recovery Program, (Washington: E. c. A., November, 
1948, 1. 
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of little real help unless Europe's own resources were well and 
fully used. The objective was expressed by the United States 
Special Representative, W. Averell Harriman, on his arrival in 
Paris, when he said, nThe United States wants to make Eu~ope 
self-sustaining and then get out and tend to our own business 
at home. '!he sooner we can push this program through and get 
out, the happier the American people will be. n44 
In passing the Economic Cooperation Act on April 2 , 1948, 
Congress asserted: 
Mindful of the advantages which the United States 
baa enjoyed through the existence of a large 
domestic market with no internal trade barriers, 
and believing that similar advantages can accrue 
to the countries of Europe, it 1a declared to be 
the policy of the people of the United States to 
encourage these countries through a joint organi-
zation to exert sustained common efforts as set 
forth in the report of the Committee of E.uropean 
Economic Cooperation signed at "'Paria on September 
22, 194'7, which will speedily achieve that econo-
mic cooperation in Europe which is essential for 
lasting peace and prosperity. 
It is further declared to be the policy of the 
people Qf the United States to sustain and strengthen 
principles of individual liberty, free 1nstitutiom, 
and genuine independence in Europe through aaaia-
tance to those countries of Europe which participate 
in a joint recovery program based upon self-help 
and mutual cooperation.46 
.In his address (The Requirements for a Lasting Peace) 
delivered at t he dedication of ·World War Memorial Park 1n 
i(Economic Cooper~tion Adl!l1n1strat1on, American Business 
and Eurolean Recovery ~rogram, (Washington: E. c. A., August 
11, l948, 4-5. 
45United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, Part!, 137 
( 1949). 
IJ.ttle Rock, Arkansas, on June ll, 1949, President Truman de-
clared: 
One condition essential to peace is that other 
nations, as well as our own, must be strong and 
prosperous. 
We need other nations as our allies in the cause 
of human freedom. We have seen ' tree nations lost 
to the democratic way of life because of economic 
disaster. We lmow that despair over economic . condi-
tions will turn men away from rreedom and into the 
bands of dictators. It is to our interest, there-
fore, to aid other nations to restore and maintain 
their economic health. Our aim is not only to help 
other nations to help themselves, but also to en-
courage economic cooperation among them. 
This cooperative principle bas been applied in our 
great undertaking to restore the economies of the 
Western European nations to a self-sustaining 
basis.46 
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A major field in which the European countries were expected 
to act was in the reduction of tariff and other barriers to 
trade among themselves and with other countries. Barriers which 
s tifl.e the exchange of goods prevent max1.mum production and 
employment. 
In his address (New Problems in World Prosperity) delivered 
before the Convention of the American Legion in Philadelphia, 
President Truman declared: 
We are encouraging closer regional ties among 
nations in order to lower trade barriers and 
increase production. 
The nations of Europe, under the stimulus of 
our aid, are working toward closer ties of 
·, 46Harry S. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs, Selected 
Speeches and Statements, u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 19-20. 
economic union. Already, through the Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation, they 
have begun to make joint decisions that affect 
their basic economic policies. In the Council 
of Europe, now meeting at Strasbourg, more far-
reaching measures of European union are being 
considered. 
Closer economic union means a difficult period 
of transition for the countries that enter into 
it, but 1 t is essential for a better world. 'lbe 
United States will do what it can to aid the 
European nations to achieve greater unity.•7 
5. Interest of the United States and or the World 
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For the United States, furthermore, the aim of the European 
Recovery Program was one of enlightened self-interest - shared 
by Europe - in the rebuilding of a free, prosperous and secure 
world. 
The economic effects of the Marshall Plan would extend far 
beyond the boundaries or the sixteen countries involved. It 
was in one important sense a world recovery program, a key part 
in the greater objective of improved economic conditions through-
out the world. 
The European Recovery Program, (said President 
Truman 1n his message to Congress on December 
19, 1947), is also the means by whieh we can 
make the quickest and most effective contribu-
tion to the general improvement of economic 
conditions throughout the world. The workabbps 
of Europe, w1 th their great reservoir of ski lle.d 
workers must produce the goods to support peoples 
of many other nations.48 
47Ib1d., 56. 
48iJarry s. Truman, A Program for United States Aid to 
Eurofean Recovery, The Message to the Congress, u. S. Dept. 
of Sate (Washington: Government Printing Office, February, 
1948), 4. 
Th.en, self-help of eaeh nation, mutual help of all the 
sixteen nations, and American aid were intended to integrate 
the single unit of' Western Europe into the world economic 
pattern. 
39 
With the sixteen nations of Western Europe restored to 
health, production and cooperative trade, the world would achieve 
a new stability which nothing could attempt to upset. 
In his address before the National Industrial Conference 
Board, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Wil-
lard L. Thorp, declared: 
!here is no way in which Europe can be separated 
from the rest of the world. Recovery there is 
certain to mean economic improvement elsewhere. 
Many countries have traditionally suppl1e-dthe 
European market with raw materials and other 
· commod1.t1es. Western Europe used to aceount for 
n•arly qne-half' .of the world' a imports and 40 
per cent of the exports. Its failure to act 
.1n its pre-war capacity has upset trade channels 
everywhere. 
So far as the Weetern Hemisphere is concerned, 
the effect of the European Recovery Program will 
be direct, through the purchase of commodities 
there for shipment to Europe . The 1mmed1~te 
economic problem of our northern and southern 
neighbors 1s t~t of finding a market. But 
procurement under the plan will create the same 
condition as though the market were re-established; 
and the recovery of Europe will provide them 
once again with a permanent market for their 
raw materials. 
It is true that many parts of the world today are 
eager to raise their standard of living. There 
is a great demand in the underdeveloped areas 
for industrialization and diversification. 'Ihese 
are long-run objectives. T.b.ey will require equip-
ment arid technical assistance. The recovery of 
Europe , the second greatest workshop in the 
world, (after the United States), will in turn 
make it possible for the underdeveloped areas 
to move upward towards their great objectives.49 
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By taking .part in a program for European recovery, the 
American people were not only making a significant contribution 
toward the preservation of European civ111zatio?:\. b'1t would 
the.mselves benefit directly through increased European trade, 
political stability, and social progress. These were the ob-
jectives. They were the principal weapons 1n the 11truggle for 
peace. The~ are the reasons which underlie the .Marshall Plan. 
'lhe economic objectives for the United States were clearly 
established by the Congress. The Economic Cooperation Act of 
1948 said that: 
(a) participating countries would develop and make avail-
able for American stockpiling essential materials needed 1n the 
United States; 
(b) goods tinaneed under the Marshall Plan must go, at 
lea-at to the extent of 50 per cent, in American ships; 
(c) by raising the living standards and increasing con-
sumer capacity in the participating countries the United States 
was enlarging its foreign market; 
(d) the restoration of confidence and the stimulatio~ of 
free enterprise in Europe would provide a strong economic as 
well as political bulwark for America,50 
49willard L. Thorp, Elements in European Recove{i - Address 
delivered on January 22, l948, u. S. Dept. of Stateash1ngton: 
Government Printing Office, 1948), 12-13. 
50un1ted States Statutes at large, Vol, 62., Part I. 146 (1949). 
·, 
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The European Recovery Program was in line with, and an 
integral part of, American foreign trade policy. Only when 
foreign countries regained their caps.cl ty to pr'oduce goo~s and 
services. for their own use and for exchange with other countries 
could American investors expect repayment of their foreign 
loans and American exporters hope for remunerative foreign 
markets for their goods. 
Payment of loans begins in 19·56. Interest at 2} per cent 
r,...., 
per annum wi 11 become ef'fec t1ve in 19 52. 51 "The true · return 
to the American taxpayer, however," said Economic Cooperation 
Admipis·trator Paul G. Hoffman , ttwill be in other savi ngs made 
possible by the success of the Marshall Plan.tt52 
Why must the United Statea,carry so great a load in help-
ing Europe? Can the United States afford the European Recovery 
Program?· "The answer is simple, tt said Secretary Marshall . "The 
United States is ~he only country in the world today which has 
the economic power and productivity to furnish the needed assia-
tanee. "53 
In addition, in order to protect the American economy , the 
Congress established in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 
that "no assistance to the part1cipat.1ng cotmtr1es may be given 
51Econom1c 
(Dayton, Ohio: 
1950) I 4. 
52Ib1.d. 
Cooperation Administration, E. o. A. At Work !, 
Dayton Council on World Affairs, Mirch 2o, 
53oeorge C. Marshall , ,.Assistance to European Economic 
Recovery ," United States Department of State Bulletin, 18 
( January 18, 1948), 71-77. · · 
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which would seriously impair the e-conomic stability of the United 
States . Procurement must be ertected in such a way aa to mini-
mize the drain upon the resources of the Uni.ted States . No 
commodity that is in short supply here will be shipped abroad 
under the Marshall Plan.n54 
On this subject, Secretary or State Marshall said: 
In developing the program of American assistance, 
no question has been more closely examined -than 
the a·bility of the United States to provide assis-
tance in the magnltude,a proposed. Both in terms 
of phy.s1oal resources and in terms of financial 
capacity, our ability to support such a program 
seems clear. 
Considerations of the cost must be related to the 
momentous objective on the one hand and to the 
probab-le price of the alternatives. The 6.8 
billion dollars proposed for the first 15 months 
is less than a single month's charge or the war. 
A world of continuing uneasy halt'-peace will create 
demands for constantly mounting expenditures for 
defense. This program should be viewed as an 
investment in peace. In those terms, the cost 
1• low.56 
•The Secretary of Defense and the Army Secretary," declared 
Senator Arthur A. Vandenberg on March l, 1948, "testified to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that in the absence of 
some reasonable prospect for the stabilization of Western Europe 
they would find it necessary to urgently demand billions more 
for nati·onal military defense. n56 
s,Ubited States Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, Part I, 146 {1949). 
5Soeorge C. Marshall, '-"Assistance to European Economic 
Recovery,tt United States Department of State Bulletin, 18 
(January 18, l948), 11-17. 
56Arthur H. Vandenberg, "The E.C.A.: A Plan for Peace, 
Stability and Freedomn - Address delivered in the U.S. Senate, 
Vital Speeches, 14 (March 15, 1948), 325. 
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However, the burden on the American people was not a 
light one: 
"The aid which the United States gives will impose definite 
sacrifice on this country," declared the Harriman•s Committee 
in its Report to the President.57 
But, notwithstanding this prospect of the heavy task the 
American people were going to undertake, they accepted in great 
majority the support of European Aid: 
I have been heartened, (declared President Truman 
in his mea,aage to Congress on. Decembe,:fi 19, 1947), 
by the w1d_eapread ·support which the citizens of 
the United States have given to the concept under-
lying the proposed aid to European recovery. 
Workers, farmers, businessmen and other major 
groups have all given evidence of their con~i-
dence in its noble purpose and have shown their 
willingness to give it full support.58 
At the Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 
held in San Francisco in 1947,. the representativee of over 7 
million American wage-earners, . after carefully weighing all the 
pros and all the cons,. decided unanimously that the Marshall 
Plan merited the unequivocal support of every loyal .American . 
The Convention said: "It is to the self-interest of ,very 
American worker that the rehabilitation of wal'-tar.n W:'estern 
Europe be succes.sfully accomplished. n59 
57European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the 
President's Committee on Foreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, November 7, 1947), lI . 
58u_ D 1.1.arry s. Truman. _A &rogram for United $tatea Aid to 
European Recovery, The Message to the congreea ·on December 19, 
1947, u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: Govemment Printing 
Office, February, 1948), 17. 
59oeorge Meany, "Why Labor Supports the Marshall Plan,'' 
American Federat1on1st, 55 (January, 1948), 5. 
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In the labor's platform presented by the American Federa-
tion of Labor in .Philadelphia in June, 1948, this proposal was 
submitted: "We urge vigorous. proa6cu tion of the European Re-
covery Program throughou·t its full contemplated period of 
operation in a manner that will assure the rehabilitation of 
the Western European nations. Nothi'ng less than the .full program 
will do the Job.•60 
In embarking on thie program, the United States recognized 
that it cannot be an island of prosperity and security in an 
unstable and impoverished world. The United States foreign 
economic policy 1a a policy of cooperation with other nations 
for the be·ne.fit of all, including the United States, which has 
the most at stake. 
60ttI,abor' s Platform, n American Federa.tionis t , . 55 · (July, 
1948), 7. 
CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL REASONS AND AIMS OF THE MARSHALL PIAN 
1. Situation in Europe 
The reasons, however, which compelled the United States to 
take control of the situation and strive for the reconstruction 
of the Old World lay tar beyond t)l.e contingent situation of 
Europe after the World War II. ' 
The economic situation of Europe brought along political 
disorganization and disorder. Bread riots and general strikes 
put in jeopardy already staggering governments . Lack or con-
fidence among whole populations was proving the principal handi-
cap to Europe's industrial recovery, and feelings of frustration 
and hopelessness were stifling progress. Young people, seeing 
no future, wanted to emigrate. Businessmen feared government 
rules that prevented long-term investments. Disregard of pro-
perty rights was driving capital into hiding; black markets 
were flourishing everywhere and government authority was 
weakening . 
In opposition to the basic principles of democracy stood 
a philosophy dedicated to the regimentation of peoples and world-
wide aggression. This philosophy has expressed itself as being 
. I 
unmistakably antagonistic to the aims of the United States and 
the sixteen nations participating in the European Recovery 
Program. Its subversive elements were hampering recovery and 
engineering social chaos, further aggravating the economic 
difficulties which faced Europe. 
The economic plight 1n which Europe new finds 
itself, ( said President Truman in his message 
to Congress on December 19, 1947), has intensi-
fied a political struggle between those who wish 
to remain free men living under the rule of law 
and those who would use economic dis tre&a as a 
pretext for the establishment of a totalitarian 
state • 
• • • If Europe fails to recover, the pe(!ples of 
these countries might be driven to the philosophy 
ot despair - the philosophy which contends that 
their basic wants can be met only by the eurrender 
of their basic rights to totalitarian control. 
It is for these r ·eaaons that the United States has 
so vital an interest 1n strengthening the belief 
of the people of Europe that freedom from fear and 
want will be achieved under free and democratic 
governm.ents.l 
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In this way the United States recognized that the economic 
situation of Europe was endangering 1ts integrity and indepen-
dence. Who was threatening its independence? 
Notwithstanding its repeated declarations of having aban-
doned the idea of world conquest and the intention of spreading 
the Communist ideology, Russia had acted, since the end of the 
war, in the very opposite direction. Ber support .of the Commun-
1st governments in Eastern European countries, which took over 
power in opposition to the freely expressed will of the majority 
at the polls, and the Communist coup d •etat tor se.1zure of power 
lBarry. s. Truman, A Program for United States Aid to 
European Recovery, The Message to the Congress on December 19, 
l947, u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, February, 1948), 10. 
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in Czechoslovakia·, lei't no doubt on her intentions toward the 
other nations of Western Europe. The .activities and the state-
menta of the Communist parties in Italy, France, and other 
countries clearly showed the preordinated program directed from 
Moscow. 
Since the close of hostilities, (said President 
Truman in his message to Congress on March 17, 1948), 
the Soviet Union and its agenta have destroyed the 
independence and democratic character of a whole 
series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe . 
It is this ruthless course of action, and the clear 
design to extend it to the remaining free nations 
of Europe , that have brought about the critical 
situation in Europe today. 
The tragic death of the Republic of Czechoslovakia 
has sent a shock throughout the civilized world. 
Now pressure 1s being brought to bear on Finland, 
to the hazard of the entire Scandinavian peninsula. 
Greece is under direct military attack from rebels 
actively supported by her Communist-dominated neigh-
bors. In Italy, a determined and aggressive ei'fort 
is being made by a communist minority to take con-
trol of that country.2 
Through the seizure of poll tical power 1n various nations 
and the establishment of the Communist economic system, Russia, 
in her determined, mortal struggle against capitalism and 
democracy, was showing her stubborn willingness to dominate 
all Europe in order to have her foothold well established to 
make the last, definit1.ve step against the United States . 
It was very clear that, if she were able to keep the 
economic situation of Europe 1n the lowest degree, she would 
2Harry s. Truman, Toward Securing Peace and Preventing 
War - Address delivered to the Congress on March 17, 19481 U:-s. Dept . of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
March, 1948), 2. 
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not fail to succeed.. Her con~inuous refus~l to join the other 
nations 1n the agreements for the reconstruction of the world 
and her constant use of the power of veto in the decisions of 
the United Nations point out her distrust of the o~her nations 
and her lack of willingnes~ to collaborate. 
The Soviet foreign policy is a combination of the old 
Russian imperialism combined with international communism. 
The Russian leaders hope to achieve their aie by organiz-
ing and supporting communist parties all over the world. A 
Communist party in any country is not an independent political 
party. It acts as a fifth column for the Soviet Union. 
In their struggle, (said the Harriman · - Committee 
in its Report to the .President), the ·police states 
have effective allies in every country beyond the 
Iron Curtain. Their allies are the indigenous 
Communist parties which have loyalty, not to the 
nations in which they live, but to the Kremlin . 
These well- disciplined forces have been stripped 
for action by the open acknowledgment that the 
Comintern is rev1ved . 3 
nThe Soviet Government,n said President Truman, tthaa inter-
vened 1n the internal .affairs of many countries by means of 
Communist parties directed from Moecow. "4 
The Russian leaders hope to achieve their alma by utiliz-
ing and exploiting any economic 1n\juat1ces for the purpose of 
overthrowing the existing regimes, (as in China) . 
3:European Recovery and American Aid .- A Report by the 
Pr esident*s com'iii!ttee on Foreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office , November 7, 1947), 20. 
4Harry s. Truman, American Peace Pol1ci - Address delivered 
on June 12, 1948, u. S . Dept . of State (Waa ington: Government 
Printing Office, June, 1948), 6 . 
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In Europe the various communist parties were capitalizing 
on economic maladjustments in the hope of dislodging middle~of-
the-road governments led by Socialists, ran$ing .from Marxism 
to Catholicism in inspiration. 
The Russian leaders hope to achieve their alms by estab-
liehlng a communistic regime- through poll tical pressure or the 
threat of force. (Th.ls was the case in Rumania, Poland·, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.) They endeavor wherever possible 
to create revolutionary conditions which will help them and 
their fifth column to take over the power. 
"The Soviet Government," said President Truman, "bas used 
indirect aggression against a number of nations in Eastern 
Europ~ and extreme pressure against others in the Middle East."5 
The disorganization of Europe was the ideal seed bed for 
the growth of the strength of the Communist parties. The only 
work they had to do, in order to become stronger and in a posi-
,, 
tion to push over the weak governments and seize the power, 
was the increasing of such disorganization. The continuous 
riots and strikes in Western Ellropean countries were only de-
tails of a bigger plan accurately mapped by Russia in her long-
range battle for the destruction of the enemy. 
The intensity of communist activities, however~ was in it-
self an indication that, 1n spite of grave economic dislocations 
and profound post-war fatigue, the peoples of Europe we-re re-
' 
5Ib1d., 5. 
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luctant to consider political totalitarianism as the way out of 
problems which sometimes seemed insoluble . 
It is an historical fact, (said the Harriman's 
Committee 1n its Report to the President) , that 
the' sixteen European Western nations participat .. 
ing in the Marshall Plan are nations which, like 
our own, h~ve fostered and developed the concept 
that individual liberty and fundamental human 
rights are essential to domestic society and 
hold out the hope for peaceful world relation-
ships . 6 
Bu~, by the laws of seit-preservation, the masses might 
have turned to the more strictly -disciplined Russian system 
rather than starve in ruin and disorder . T.b.e insistent econo-
mic pressures compelled governments to rat1~n , to control, to 
regulate. Individual energies and individual i-n1;iat1ve had to 
- ___ ..,,. 
be fostered if any type of economy is to be vigorous and healthy. 
~nan address delivered on December 8 , 1947, William L. 
Cl~yton, former Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
declared: 
Western Europe is made up of our kind of people . 
Many of our forefathers came from there . Those 
people hate Communism, but if they must resist 
it under conditions of economic frustration, cold, 
and hunger, they will lose the fight . 
Let there be no mistake about it . If we should 
say th.at we will not supply :the necessary help 
without which there can be no European recovery 
within the foreseeable future, it is almost cer-
tain that every country in continental Europe would 
los·e the battle to maintain its ·integrity and 
independence . 7 
6European Recover1 and American Aid - A Report by the 
President ' s cfommlltee on Foreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, ·:November 7, 1947), 20 . · · 
7will1am L. c+ayton, ttAid Essential ·to European Integrity 
and Independence, ~ ·united States Department of State Bulletin, 
17 (December 21 , 1$47) , 1213. 
In an address delivered on January 2~ 1948, Willard L. 
Thorp , Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs , 
declared: 
From the social and political point of view, 
the degree of economic health will have a major 
bearing on the extent to which the traditional 
patterns of democratic life and parliamentary 
procedure will be maintained in the European 
community. It is a oonmninity with roots like 
our own- It is under tremendous strain and 
attack. Hungry people and masses of unemployed 
cannot be expected to maintain social discipline 
and order. If we care for these things - free-
dom of speech, individual opportunity and 1n1~ 
t1at1ve, respect for property, and above all 
the dignity and rights of the individual - we 
must help thos~ people and their institutions 
to survive who understand and appreciate them. 
We owe our own heritage .in this area in large 
part to Western Europe . It is a tremendous 
debt which we now have the opportunity to . repay 
at lea-st in part. 8 
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There is no doubt that today there is an increasing rest-
lessness of the masses all over the world, a worldw~de revolution, 
a pressure of population on means of sustenance. If an objective 
observer really wants to recognize and admit the truth he cannot 
deny that in the world still there is not an equitable distri-
bution of the wealth, a fair share of the opportunities offered 
by the earth. 
In his address (New Problems in World Pro~p,rity) delivered 
before the Convention of the American Legion 1n Philadelphia, on 
August 29, 1949, President Truman declared: "There is the rising 
8w111ard L. Thorp, Elements in European Reeove~ - ·Address 
delivered before the National Industrial Con?erence~oard, 
U.S. Dept . of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1948), 14. 
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demand of men all over the world for independence, and for a 
greater share of the good things of life which only a restored 
and expanding economic system can bring.n9 As a logical con-
sequence the peoples strive for better. economic and social 
justice, and they employ every means at their disposal. 
Many Europeans irrevocably opposed to the political aspects 
of . .-. Communism shared some of the Communists' ideas on the need 
for thorough overhauling of production and distribution. 
We know that if this struggle is fought with democratic 
means, progress will be made without violent, destructive blows 
to the peaceful development of the economy and to the democratic 
poll tical institutions, but peoples who are under the level of 
normal economic conditions are not bound to think first of 
freedom or democracy: they fight first to keep themselves alive. 
Here is where Communism enters into action trying to bring 
on its side those hopeless peoples. 
"The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nutured by misery 
and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and 
strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people 
for a better life has died,~ said President Truman in his message 
to Congres s, on March 12, 1947.10 
9Harry s. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and s tatements, u. S. Dept. of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 51-52. 
10Ha.rry s. Truman, ll Message to the Congress on March 12, 
1947, 0 u. $ . De~artment of State Bulletin Supplement, 16 
( May 4, 1947} I 32 • 
The role of the countries of Western Europe in 
world affairs, (said the Harriman•s Committee in 
its Report to the President), has been so great 
as to represent one of the foundation stones of 
United States security. But these countries · . 
ea_nnot continue unaided to play this role·. Their· 
p~ople are sorely disaatiefied with their present 
plight. If t>y democratic means they do not soon 
~btain an improvement in their affairs, they may 
be driven to turn in the opposite direction. 
'lberein lies the strength of the Communist tactic: 
1.t wins by.- default when misery and chaos are great 
,,.,.1-,, · 11 enoue-• . 
A policy th.at is simply opposed to Communism, regardless 
.. -. .,.. ,,... 
of what the needs of the people may be, is scarcely likely to 
prove effective. 
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It is essential to realize that economic and social eondi-
tions which offer fertile soil for Communist propaganda can be 
corrected only by fundamental reforma, not by mere opposition 
to Communism. 
Then, the only way to win against Communism is to win 
against it in the economic field. The real threat to peace 
is not the Communist idea, but conditions of intolerable want 
and oppression which make men turn to any radical remedy pro-
mising relief. The Communist idea cannot be stopped by physical 
force, but by stopping the reasons which generate it. 
This was also recognized in the American foreign policy 
when it shifted emphasis from the conception of the Truman 
doctrine to that of the Ma.rah.all Plan. 
llEuropean Recovery and American Aid• A Report by the 
:President's committee on· P'ore!gn Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, November 7, 1947), 19. 
The principle of the Truman doctrine was that the United 
States would aid free peoples everywhere who desired to live 
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in peace with their neighbors. The principle of the Marshall 
Plan was that there would be no lasting peace or prosperity 
until the various nations get on their feet again. The TrUman 
doctrine was said to involve a world-wide ideological crusade 
against the Soviet Union and to implicate that the United s tates 
should. 1n disregard of the United Nations, appoint itself the 
world •a judge and the world's policeman. Congress voted for the 
aid to Greece and Turkey, but both Congress and the people 
argued the basic doctrine. 
The principle involved 1n the Marshall Plan, on the contrary, 
is more nearly recognized and accepted, not only by the respon-
sible statesmen, but also by the people. 
2-. Repercussions in the United States and 1n the World 
The interest of the United States in Europe cannot be 
measured simply in economic terms. The United States had a 
threefold interest i n European recovery: humanitarian, economic, 
and political. 
9 But, 11 said the Harriman' s Comm! t tee in 1 ts Report to the 
President, "there is an interest of t he United States in European 
recovery which overshadows the others, and with which any plan 
for the economic recovery of Western Europe is most directly 
concerned: the political interest.1tl2 
12Ib1d. 
-
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This interest was clear. American security has tradi-
tionally been based on the kind of democratic Europe which was 
then in jeopardy. 
The United States position in the world has been based for 
at least a century on the existence in Europe of a number or 
strong states committed by tradition and inclination to the 
democratic concept. 
The foreign policy of the United s tates, in its: support 
of the United Nations and other agencies designed to promote 
international peace, has rested on the assumption of the con-
tinuance in Europe of free states subservient to no· single 
power and determined to preserve their common heritage of civil 
liberties. 
The overthrow of European democracy would have necessitated 
a complete re-evaluation of the international position of the 
United States. Such a situation might have in time reduced 
the United states to cultural, political, and economic isolation. 
This country, (declared Secretary of State Marshall 
on July 14, 1947)~ now stands at a turning point in 
its relations to its traditional friends among the 
nat1ons of the Old World. Either it must finish 
the taek or assisting these countries to adjust 
themselves to the changed demands of a new age, 
or it must reconcile itself to seeing them move 
in directions which are consistent neither with 
their own traditions nor with those of this country. 
In this latter case, the United States would be 
faced with a radical al.teration of its own position 
in the world. I ask you to coneider most carefully 
the implication of such a development for the future 
prosperity and security of our country.13 
13Un1ted States Department or State, Foreign Affairs Outlines 
No. 15 - Building the Peace, - The United States and European 
~ecovery, (Washington: Government Printing Office, Autwnn, 1947), 1. 
On January 12 , 1948, Secretary Marshall stated: 
I turn to the inevitable questions: What does the 
United States get out of this recovery program? 
Why should the people o~ the United States accept 
European burdens in this manner? 
European economic recovery, we feel sure , is 
essential to the preservation of basic freedom 
in the most critical area in the world today. 
European economic recovery is essential to a return 
of normal trade and commerce throughout the world. 
The United States is the only nation today with 
the strength to lend vital support to such a 
movement. Do we meet the situation with action 
or do we step aside and allow other forces to 
settle the pattern of future European civ111zationfl4 
Three days later he declared: 
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We are dealing with a matter which may largely ti'et!_r-· ..J 
mine the course of history - certainly the character-O'f------~~~----"-~ 
Western i 5viliza·t1on - in our time and for many years 
to come . 
In his address delivered at the Lincoln Day Dinner in Boston, 
Massachusetts, Thomas E. Dewey, Governor of New York, said: ~The 
stakes are too great . The difference between success and failure 
this time may well mean the difference between survival and total 
destruction . nl6 
The Harriman Committee, in its Report to the President, 
said the total consequences in a Communist- dominated world 
140eorge c. Ms.rah.all, "Relation of European Recovery Program 
to American Foreign Policy, tt United States Department or State 
Bul letin, 18 (January 25, 1948), 113. 
150eorge c. Marshall, The Stake of the Businessman in the 
Eurghean Recovery Program - Address delivered before the Pitts-
bur chamber o? Commerce on January 15, 1948, u. s . Dept . of 
State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), 4 . 
16Thomas E. Dewey, ~Foreiga Policy: Steps to Permanent 
Peace,'' Vital Speeches, 14 (March 1, 1948), 295. 
could include ttthe immediate and sweeping limitation of our 
eeonom1c and political life, perhaps extending even to our 
very form of government . ftl7 
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In his address to the Congress on Kareh 17, 1948, President 
Truman declared: 
Rapid changes are taking place in Europe which 
affect our foreign policy and our national 
security. There is an increasing threa·t ·to 
nations which are tr1v1ng to maintain a foPm 
of government which grants freedom to its o1ti .. 
zens . The United States 1a deeply concerned 
with the survival of freedom in those nations. 
It is of vital importance that we act now,· 1n 
order to preserve the conditions under which we 
can ach1!!• la ting peace baaed on freedom and justice . 
On J'Une 6 , 1948, in his address (Free Peoples Unite), de-
livered at the University of Notre -·Dame, South Bend, Indiana , 
Economic Cooperation Administrator Paul G. Hoffman said: 
OUr concern about free institutions and the lib-
erty of peoples must extend beyond our shores . 
We must remember that there are 1n Western E-urope 
some 270 million people with whom moat of us share 
a common ancestry . If totalitarianism should be 
imposed upon those people, our own tree society 
would be put in jeopardy . Surely two terrible 
wa.r..a have taught us that we cannot exist as a free, 
prGJperous island in a world of slavery ,and misery . 19 
Secretary Marshall said: 
If Europe was to recover, rather than suffer a per-
haps fatal relapse, vigorous action would be required~ 
17European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the 
President is Oommlttee on Foreign Aid , (Washington: Government 
Printing Off 1c.e, G ember 7, 194'7) , 22 . 
18Harry, Sit Truman, T01rard Securing Peaee and Preventing 
War - Address delivered to the Congress on March 11 , 1948, 
U:-s. Dept . of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
March, 1948) , 1 . 
19Economic Cooperation Administration , The European Recovery 
Pro ram - Information for Americans Goi Abroad, (Washington: 
ng ugus • 
The United States was the only nation in the 
position of economic power and leadership to 
take the initiative in the matter. The 
alternatives to such action were so repugnant 
that for our own self-interest, if for no 
other reason, we could make only one cho1ee . 20 
This w.as clearly explained 1n the report of the House,· 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
It is unnecessary to paint the picture of the 
. alternative with which this country would be 
faced, should the few great critical barriers 
· tp the march of Communism .disappe,;ir. Past and 
present sacrifices of an economic character 
would be .small indeed compared to the burden 
which this Nation would have to assume in such 
a world. 
The very survival of the United States would 
be more seriously at stake than at any other 
time in its history. Faced with this prospect, 
there can be but one choice: to extend the aid 
necessary in both economic and m111te.ry spheres. 
A calculated risk, it has been called. But such 
a risk is no·· risk, ~ompared to the grim certainty 
of the alternative. i 
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The consequences of continued economic deterioration 1n 
Europe would have bad a grave effect upon the United States and 
the world. Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of 
State, in a speech before the Na t1ona l Convention of the United 
States Junior Champer of Commerce at Long Beach, California, 
on June 17, 1947, declared: 
200eorge C. Marshall, The stake of the Businessman in the 
European Recovery Program - Address delivered before the 
Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce on January 15, 1948, u. s. Dept. 
of State ; (Washington: Government . Pri·nting Office, 1948), 3. 
If we want peace, we must deal with the causes 
of unrest in the world and not merely their 
symptoms • • • 
To cut Europe adrift and. to compel her in her 
misery to shift tor herael.f during the ne.xt 
few years would be a body blow to security, 
political stability and economic progress .the 
world oyer. The loss o.f European markets. ' 
would not only cauae serious and painful 
readjustments in our own country , but would 
have repereuaaions all over the world . 
Economic help to revive war- shattered Europe 
will be costly . But the withholding of eco-
nomic help would also be eo•tly - not only 
in economic consequence, but in social and 
political consequencea . 22 
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In his speech before the Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations, in Boston, Massachusetts, on Oct.ober 15, 1947, Secretary 
Marshall said: 
When I made a public statement at Harvard on 
J1.U1e 5 last, 1t was plainly evident that a 
situation bad developed where we must immed-
iately choose between two lines of action -
either to concern ourselves solely with our 
internal affairs while Europe suffered a com-
plete political and economic demoralization; 
or we must .take action to assist Europe · in 
avoiding a disaatrous d1sintegra ~ion wi_th 
tragic consequences for the world • 
• • • We have great admiration tor the forti -
tude displayed by the people of these countries 
under prolonged conditions of ~ t and extreme 
hardship; but the present · situation requires 
mere than stoical , even heroic endurance; 
• • • The situation involves dangers which af-
fect every American alike. · It would be a .great 
folly t.o a_saume that we can stand ali>ot or that 
we can straddle the issue . A very distinguished 
AI.11er1can recently stated that ftno private program 
of 
and no public policy, in any sector of our 
national life , can now escape from the compel-
ling fact that if it is not framed with reference 
to the world it is framed with perf~ct futility . ft 
What endangers the Un!t'ed States endangers all 
of us - labor , industry and agriculture alike . 
Because the economic stability of Europe is 
essential to the political stability of Europe, 
it ls of tremendous importance to us, to our 
peace and security, and it is equally important 
to the entire world. We are faced with the · 
danger of the actual disappearance of the charac-
teristics of Western c1v1lizat1on on which our 
Government and our manner of living are based. 
We are proceeding in a determined campaign which 
has for ita purpose world stability, a condition 
absolutely necessary to world peace . 23 
3 . Objectives in Europe 
The political situation of Europe, then, was a serious 
concern for the United States, determining the most important 
course of its foreign policy. 
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In a speech delivered before the Michigan Municipal League, 
in Battle Creek, Michigan, Paul G. Hoff'man said: 
I put it to you in all candor, and at the risk 
of being undiplomatic, that our problem is not 
only to get Europe on its feet, but off our 
backs . 
Why should we be concerned about getttng Europe 
back on its feet? Why did Congress, after a 
year of study - the most intensive study ever 
given to any peacetime governmental project -
conclude that a four- year program of foreign 
assistance was worth the billions it would cost? 
The answer, to q·uote a phrase from the Foreign 
Assistance Act itself, is that .the then existing 
situation in Europe endangered lasting peace •• • n24 
23oeorge c. Marshall, nAmerican Labor's Part in Determining 
For,1gn Pol~ey,tt - Address delivered before the National Conven-
tion of the C. I . O. in Boston, United States Department of State 
Bulletin, 17 (October 26, 1947), 827 . 
24Economic Cooperation Administration, A Current Report on 
the Marshall Plan Pre red for the E. C. A. Public Advisor Board, 
Wo . ngton: E. c. A. , November, 194 6- 7 . 
said: 
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The Harriman's Committee, in its Report to the President, 
Whatever we do for the Western European nations, 
their own qualities will some day regain for -them 
the measure of influence which they have always 
been able to exert in the modern world . But until 
that is done there can be no real balance in world 
affairs, and no real peace . 25 
Economic Cooperation AQministrator Paul G. Hoffman declared: 
The European Recovery Program is an investment in 
the continued surv1 val of a world econom1ca-lly 
stabilized and peacefully conducted - a world in 
which governments based on fundamental democratic 
principles and in which religious treed.om, economic 
opportunity, and individual liberties are maintained 
and respected . 25 · 
In his message to Congress on December 19, 1947, President 
Truman said: 
Our deepest concern with European recovery, is that 
it 1s essential to the maintenance of the civilization 
in which the American way of life is rooted . It is 
the only assurance of the continued independence 
and integrity of a group of nations to constitute a 
bulwark for the prine1ple m of freedom, justice and 
the dignity of the individuai.27 
In sp~aking about the functions of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, Paul G. Hoffman said: 
'lhe Economic Cooperation Administration is the 
Government's principal agency in putting American 
26European Recoverl and American Aid - A Report by the 
President's Committee on Foreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, November 7, 1947), 21 . 
26Econom1c Cooperation Administration, The Euroiean 
Recover Pro am - Information for Americans Goin 1:road, 
overnmen Pr n ng ugus ), 2 . 
2711arry s. Truman, A Program for United States A;ld to 
Euro19an Recovery - 'lb.e tlessage to the Congress on December 19, · 47, u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, February, 1948), 10 . 
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money and goods and know-how to work in th• 
most effect1.ve ways to rebuildi in foreign 
countries the economic basis for freedom. 
The poli t1cal cone~rpt behind this program 
la that a unified and. stable Europe w.111 
automatically constitute• barrier to Soviet 
expansion and Communist infiltration, and 
in doing so will provide a vi~•l structural 
support for ,. peace in the world ••• The 
\ peliey we ca~ry out is the policy ,of the 
United Statea' .Government as a whole . 28 
Our faith, (he declared in Cincinnati on Jan-
uary 10, 1950) , ~• in man as an individual . 
Our objective. is. that k1.rid of ~ociety in 
which men as individuals can live · in decency 
and d1gn1 ty ,._ a · society in which free inquiry 
and tree 1ns\~tut1ons can flourish.29 
The Marshall Plan, then,was aimed to strengthen faith in 
democracy. 
In his inaugural address, President Truman said: 
Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force 
to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant 
action, not only against their human oppressoi-,a, 
but alao against their ancient enemies• hunger, 
misery and despair.30 
Fear tends to paralyze recovery and to increase political 
instability. It weighs on the mind and spirit of the peoples 
.. upon whose productive output recovery depends. Considerations 
.of security and self-defense make it difficult for governments 
28paul G. Hof fman, The Role of E. c. A. in National Adminis-
tration, (Washington: E. o. A. , December 29, 1948), 2. 
29Econom1c Cooperation Administration , Marshall Plan News, 
(Washington: E. c. A., April, 1950), l. 
30Jlarry s . Truman, A N,ew Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and Statements, u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 8 . 
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to undertake the kind of bold constructive action necessary for 
effective mutual aid and self-help. It was therefore essential 
to the interests of recovery that the fear which pervaded Europe 
be dispelled . 
4. Russian Opposition 
~"hus the ' purposes of the arahall Plan were aimed at remov-
ing the basic causes which allowed Communism to sp.read, and this 
was the major reason why Soviet Russia was so opposed to the 
adoption of the Marshall Plan. 
In his Harvard address of JUne 5, 1947, Secretary Marshall 
offered help to all of Europe, but he was dubious of Russia's 
willingness to cooperate: 
Any government which maneuvers to block the 
recovery of other countries cannot expect help 
from us. Furthermore, governments, poll ti~al 
parties, o,:, groups which seek to perpetuate · 
human misery in order to profit therefrom 
pol1 t1oally or otherwise will engiunter the 
opposition of the United States. · 
Dean Acheson, at that time Undersecretary of State, sounded 
a blt.ter note on Russian interference with reeovery in Europe 
in h1s June 15, 1947, address at Wesleyan University: 
In E&.atern Europe , the Soviet Union, over Ameri• 
can·,and British protests, has used its do~inant 
m1lit~ry pos1 tion to carry on a unilateral pol-
icy, contran to tl).e. Yalta .Agreenients ,· by which 
free chb:1ice 'dt ·the1r dest!ny has been denied 
these peoples. Even more important, the minority 
3lu. s. Congress, Senate, The Euro'Sean RecoveFn Program, 
Sen. Document 111, Basic dQcurt1ents and 0 ackground nfoPD1&ti-on 
prepared by Staffa of Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, 80th Cong.,· 1st Seas . (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1947), 79. 
Communist regimes fastened upon these peoples 
have acted to cut them off economically from 
the community of Europe , curtail their produc-
tivity , and bind them to exclusive economic 
relations with the Soviet Union • • • 
As a result, the recovery of Europe has long 
been delayed - tragically long. 32 
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Yet, in reporting out the bill on Foreign Assistance (S. 2202 ) 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations still lett the door 
open to the u.s.s.R. : 
In view of the coopera~ive nature of the recovery 
program, the Committee believed the door should 
be left open for other countries if they choose 
to enter ••• Such countries must , however, ad.; 
here to a joint program for European recovery . 3w 
Although the Foreign Assistance Act does not specifically 
mention Russia , it might be interpreted as leaving the door 
open to Russia: 
The European Recovery Program is open to all 
such nations which cooperate in such plan. 
It is declared te be the policy of the people 
of the United States to sustain and strengthen 
principles of individual liberty, free institu-
tions and genuine independence in Europe through 
assistance to those countries of Europe which 
participate in a joint recovery prograw4based 
upon self-help and mutual cooperation. 
33u. s . Congress, senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Europee,n Recovery .Froflam, Sen. Report 935 , on S ,. 2202, 80th 
Cong. , Bnd Seas . {Was ngton: Government Printing Office , 
February, 1948) , 13. · · 
34un1ted States Statutes at Large, Vol . 62 , Part I, 
137 ( 1949) . 
65 
Instead, in an effort to bring about widespread economic 
and political collapse before the recovery program coul d be put 
under way, the Cominform promoted di~ruptive a ctions in many 
of the participating countries, using all the lmown Communist · 
teohniques of infiltration, political strikes, sabotage, and 
intimidation . Every weapon of Soviet propaganda was turned to 
the purpose of discrediting the United states and the European 
Recovery Program ., The satellite states were drawn tighter into 
the Soviet economic and political orbit . One country , Czeeho-
slovakia, which had been openly reluctant to stay out of the 
Europ~an Recovery Program, had its democratic government 
abruptly supplanted by one more amenable to Soviet objectivea.35 
The House Committee was less diplomatic than the Senate 
Committee . After castigating the Russians for draining re-
sources away from European countries which at the same time were 
being aided by the United States , and generally for holding back 
recovery in Europe, the House Committee made clear the main 
reason for espousal of the European Reeovery Program: 
The Committee has concluded that the program 
is necessary to prevent the United State• from 
being confronted with a world so unbalanced 
and hostile as to present almost insuperable 
burdens to the peop-le of the United Sta tea in 
the future , if Europe is not once more rendered 
free and adequately strong, both in its political 
35un1ted States Department of State, Foreign Affairs 
Outlines - Building the Peace , Pro~reso 1n Eurorean R•covery 
and the Road Ahead, (Washington: overnment Pr ntlng Ott!ce, 
Spring, 1949).. 4 . 
and economic life . The same conclusion has led 
the Committee to include China as a barrier 1n 
the Far East against the further encroachment 
of Co~iam and the domination ot the world by 
Moscow . · 
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nit is within our power to lead the world to peace and 
plenty," dee lared President Truman in calling Congresl!!l to meet 
1n special session on November 17, 1947, for the d1scul!!lsion of 
the Marshall Plan.37 
"The u. s. s. R. will put all effort into seeing that the 
Marshall Flan is not realized," answered Andrei A. Zhdanov, 
member of the Politburo and creator of the nine-nation "Comin-
form."38 
President Truman meant ths.t the American administration 
was ready to go all out to accomplish the aim of the Marshall 
Plan and to 3top the spread of Communism in Europe through 
economic aid. 
Mr . Zhdanov's words meant that the governmental machinery 
of Soviet Russia and the Communist parties of Europe would be 
thrown into the struggle to bring about the Marshall Plan's 
defeat. 
The Soviet Government, (said Secretary Marshall) , 
evidently directed the Eaatern European countries 
subject to its influence or control to refrain · 
36u. s . Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Euro ean Recover Pro ram - Forei .Assistance Act of 1948, 
Bouse . epor , On . • , as ng-
ton: Government Printing Office, 
37New York Times, 8 SUmmons ,tt 97 (October 26, 1947), E 1. 
38Ib1d . 
from attending (the Paris Conference for the 
European Recovery Program), even after some 
of these had indicated a desire to participate 
and one had actually accepted . Sub!l&quently, 
a high , Soviet official , . a member of the r:u.l1ng 
Politburo, made a public s.tatement tha.t it would 
be the policy of his Government to oppose 'and 
at.tempt to defeat the Europea.n .Recovery Program 
by every possible means . That statement baa, 
been confirmed by the act1 one of the Com.muni.st 
Parties in several ~opean countries, notably 
France and Italy . 39 
In his call to the Communists of Russia and Europe to 
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rally against "world domination by American imper1al1sm, 0 the 
Russian Politburo member made clear the chief purpose of the 
Cominform: unless Russia can block the American-backed recovery 
of Western Europe, there seems to be little chance that RuiSaian 
influence can spread west of the Stettin-Trieste line . 
Far from cooperating, (declared Secretary Mar-
shall), the Soviet Union and the Communist 
Parties have proclaimed their determined opposi -
tion to . a plan for European economic recovery. 
Economic distress 1s to be employed to further 
political ends • •• 
It should, I think, be constantly kept in mind 
that this great project, which would be difficult 
enough 1n a normal international political 
climate, must be carried to success against the 
avowed deternd.nation of the Soviet union and the 
Communist Pt5ty to oppose and sabotage it at 
every turn . 
In his address to the congress on March 17, 1948 , President 
Truman said: 
~9Geo·rge C. Marshall, The ~take of the Businessman in the 
European Recovery Pro5§am .- Address delivered bi?ore the 
Plttiburgh chamber orommerce on January 15, 1948, u. s. Dept . 
of St$te (Waabington: Government Printing Office, 1948). 3 . 
40George C. Marshall, "Assistance to European Economic 
Recovery,n United States Department of State Bulletin, 18 
( January 18, 1948), 71-77 . 
The Soviet Union and its satellites were in-
vited to cooperate in the European Recovery 
Program . They rejected the invitation. More 
than that, they have declared their v1ole~t 
host111~y to the program and are aggressively 
attempting to wreck it. 
They see it a major obstacle to their designs 
to subjugate the free commun1 ty of Europe . They 
do not want the United .States to help Europe. 
They do not even want the sixteen cooperating 
countries to help themselves . 41 
In his address (New Problems in World Prosperity) , deli-
Nationa l 
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vered before the/ Conv'ention of the American Legion in Philadelphia, 
on August 29 , 1949, President Truman declared : 
Shortly after the war ended it became apparent 
that the economic life of the world was more 
badly disrupted than anyone bad expected . Still 
i"urther difficulties were created when it became 
clear that the Soviet Union would not join 1n 
working for world economic recovery . The Soviet 
Union was hostile to European economic cooperation . 
lt retueed to join in the European Recovery Pro -
gram, and prevented 1ta satellites from joining . 
Its agg~easive foreign policy created alarms 
and fears that hampered recovery . On every hand, 
there was evidence that the policy of the Soviet 
Union was aimed at prolonging the distress and 
suffering of the free nations. 
If we had been discouraged by these difficulties 
and bad abandoned our efforts , the results would 
wive been disastrous . Once again the streets 
ot Europe would have been tilled with crowds of 
hungry and hopeless men and women. Once again, 
unscrupulous agitators would·have used these 
angry millions to ereate tyranny and siavery. 
4la.rry s . Truman , Toward Securing Peace and Preventing War -
Address delivered to the Congress on March 1?, 1948, u. s . 
Dept. of State (Washington: .Government Printing Office~ March, 
1948), 1 - 2 . 
But the free nations did not let th1a hapiin. 
We went ahead with our recovery programs • . 
In h1s speech delivered at the cel._bration of t he halt-
way mark of the European Recovery Program, General Marshall 
declared: 
The nature of this struggle should be clearly 
understood. It seemed to me that at each meet-
ing of the Foreigµ K1n1stera , assaults against 
the enactment or progress of the r.ecovery pro-
gram were timed to confuse the understanding 
of the negotiations in the minds of the public·-. 
The·y were directed at weakening ~be program by 
forcing expenditure of funds beyond our calcu-
lations and appropriations.43 
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It is aymptomatie how Soviet Russia counterattacked the 
proposal of the Marshall Plan. The fairer and better way for 
the Russians to vindicate their principles of Marxist economics 
would have been for them to prove by their constructive activi-
ties in their own and their satellite countries the superiority 
of their system over the American system. Instead ot proposing 
a be.tter · way for the economic recovery of Europe , she cblrged 
the United States with the desire to interfere in the internal 
affairs of the European states and with the violation of the 
United Nations' principles. She also charged the United States 
with the intention of making the economy of the European countries 
dependent on 1ts interests, of openly giving up the principles 
42Harry s . Truman , A New Era 1n World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and Statements , u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 53-54. 
43Eeonom1c G.oopera t1on Administra t1on, The Marshall Plan 
at Kid-Point , (Washington: E . c. A., April, 1950), 3. 
of international cooperation and concerted actions of the 
Great Powers., and of passing to attempts to dictate its will 
to other independent nations . 
"Such policy.," said V1shinsky, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister ., in his speech at a plenary session of United Nations 
General Assemb ly, New York., on September 18., 1947., ~is in a 
deep contradiction with the principle proclaimed by the General 
Assembly in its resolution of December 11, 1946 ., " that the 
assistance to other -countries 0 should never be used as a 
political weapon. '·"44 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov., in his speech over the 
Moscow radio on November 6, 1947 , ·declared: 
'l'oday ., the ruling circles of the United States 
of America and ,Great Britain head one inter-
national grouping, which baa as its aim the 
consolidation ot capitalism and the achievement 
ot the domination of these countries over other 
;eo.plea . These countries are headed by 1mperial-
1.stt- and anti-democratic f'orees in international 
affairs, . with the ae ti ve part1c1l?a t1on of cer,4!in 
Socialist leade:i,S' ,0 1n several European states . · 
Secretary or State Marshall declared: 
I dv not have to tell you that this foreign econo-
miQ. program of the United States seeks no special 
advantage and pursues no sinister purpose . It 1s a 
program of construction , production , and recovery. 
It menaces no one . It is designed specifically to 
bring to an end in the shortest possible time the 
44
"Rel1ef and Reconstruction Debated.," United Nations Weekly 
Bulletin, 13 ( September 30 , 1947) , 429 . 
·
45J>M, "Molotov's Speech, n 5 .(Noveni>er 7,. 1947), 8- 9 . 
dependence of these eountriea upon aid from 
"'" the United States. We wish to see them aelt-
supporting. 46 
Senator Vandenberg, in his speech before the Senate on 
March 1, 1948, said: 
There is nothing in this plan which threatens 
the Soviet police empire. It is not a plan . 
against Eastern Europe. It 1s a plan for We~t-
ern Europe. It is not external conquest. It 
is not dictation. Eastern ~urope was invited 
in. It was her own decision that keepa her. out. 
It seems obvious that at leas·t three of these 
countries behind the curtain would have joine.d 
if left to their own tree wills. But there are 
no free wills in police states. 47 
In his address delivered on June 12, 1948, President 
Truman declared: "The only expansion we are interested in is 
the expansion of human freedom and the wider enjoyment of the 
good things of the earth in all eountries.n48 
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'!he Russian charges sound quite strange, especially when 
brought by a nation like Soviet Russia which has never paid any 
attention to the elementary rights of the other nations, whether 
she wanted them to have her same pol1 tical regime or to put at 
her dimposal their economic resources and organization. 49 
It can also be pointed out that, in the past, the United 
States has granted aid to Russia amounting to more than ten 
46oeorge C. llarshall, 1•Foreign Aid and Reconstruction: 
Effects on Long-Range World Economy, 1·1 United States Department 
of State Bulletin, 17 (November 23, 1947), 970. 
47 A.rthur H. Vandenberg, "The E.C.A. s A Plan for Peace, 
Stability and Freedom, Vital ~peeches, 14 ( March 15, 1948), 323. 
48Harry s. Truman, American Peace Policy, u. s. Dept. of 
State (Washington: Government Printing ottlce, lune, 1948), 11. 
49ttweak Spots .in Russia's Trade Web," World Report, 3 
(November 18, 1947), 7-9. 
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billion dollars without ever having been accused of threatening 
Russia's independence . SO 
The Communists said the Marshall Plan was a echeme to 
start a war . 
The Marshall Plan, in boasting p-roduction in industry and 
agriculture in We stern l!:urope, intended to build toward a better 
standard of living, to strengthen hope and .faith in democratic 
governments , and to fortify ability and will to resist aggre1 -
sors from within and without . 
They ea1d the 14arshall Plan was aimed at "col on1_zing" or 
enslaving Europe . 
The United States intended to help Europe build up its 
own production - in many instances building up ultimate compe-
titors to American business - and thus end its dependence on 
special help from the United States . The goal of the program 
was to make Europe self'-aupporting. 
They said the Marshall Plan was launched to prevent an 
Am&rican economic collapse, 
Of course , economic chaos in Western Europe would have 
damaged the American economic prosperity, just as the re'5tora-
t1on of healthy economic conditions in Western Europe would 
have strengthened Am:ericats· own economy and increased American 
welfare . · But the primary purpose of the program was to build 
the t:oundation.s of pe&.ee . 
5~conom1c Cooperation Administration, Summa~ and Notes, 
Vol . I , No . 1, (Wa shington: E. c. A., November 1~ 1948) .. 13. 
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'!hey said the Marshall Plan was a means of imposing the 
American economic system on Europe . 
It was the policy of the American government that planning 
and action for an economically stable Europe was the respon-
sibility and concern of the Europeans themselves . Any change 
in the economic institutions within the participating nations 
was a matter to be decided by the free peoples of those nations . 
They said the Marshall Plan was a device for dumping 
American surpluses on Europe . Much of the material the United 
States sent to Europe was in scarce supply at home and was 
exported at some sacrifice to the American people . The rest 
was goods which the European nations themselves requested , to 
further their goals of economic recovery . The United States 
did not dictate to Europe what it should have imported. It sent , 
if it bad it , what the Europeans themselves asked for.51 
'!hey said the Marshall Plan was a device of the United 
States for looting and stockpiling Western Europe•s strategic 
materials . 
In aiding Western Europe , the United States was drawing 
heavily on its own resources of strategic materials - such as 
lead, aluminum, copper, steel and coal - in spite of the fact 
that such materials were in great demand in the United States. 
51Economic Cooperation Administration, Information on the 
Marshall , Plan for .Americans Going Abroad, (Waahlngt.on: E. c. A., 
:tune\ 1, 1949), 9. 
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In order to build up its diminished stocks, the United States 
negotiated agreements to obtain a fair share, on reasonable 
terms and in reasonable quantities, of aearce raw materials 
which might exist within the boundaries of the nations of 
Western Europe and in their · dependent overseas terr1tor1es.52 
In a broadcaet to Europe ( E. c. A. Gets Under Way) for 
Worldwide Broadcasting Foundation, on July 20, 1948, Paulo. 
Hoffman declared: 
The Communists say that we are attempting to 
dominate Europe and to impose our economic 
system upon each participating country. We 
in the United States believe our economic system 
to be the best the world bas ever known - and 
we think that Communism is one of the worst, 
but we have no intention of dictating internal 
economic programs to our partner countries. We 
are seeking merely to help make each of them 
strong, prosperous, poli t 'ically independent, 
and free of all need for outside economic 
assistance. 
No communist claim has been more ridiculous 
than the char,ge tha. t we are dumping surpluses 
on Europe . 1he Economic Cooperation Adm1n1str -
t1on is doing everything possible to protect 
the American economy, but every American knows 
that the goods sent to Europe represent real 
sacrifices by our people. How great this 
sacrifice is may be indicated by these facts: 
52 million Americans pay Federal income taxes 
of l/6 to over 3/4 of their incomes. Such pay-
ments totaled about 20 billion dollars in 1947. 
Foreign aid is costing the United States 6 
billion dollars this year. This 6 billion dol-
lars for foreign aid is more than the amount 
spent by all the cities, towns , and villages in 
the United States for fire protection, police, 
schools, sanitation, and parks.53 
52 Ibid., 10. 
53Econom1e Cooperation Administration, The 
cover lro ram - Information for Americans 
European Re-
Abroad, 
74 
48), 11. 
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The purpose of Russia was already too · clear if her lack 
of willingness of collaboration and her determined refusal to 
discuss any problem submitted by the Western nations is con-
s1"dered . Her preconceived mistrust of the Western world rendered 
extremely problematic the possibility of any final settlement 
of the problems of the world. 
If the Communists got control of Europe the United States 
would not have much time to prepare for the catastrophe. The 
five hundred million non-Russian Europeans include thousands 
of scientists, millions of skilled workers, millions of trained 
sol diers . In a few years, Russia , plus Europe , might be 
stronger than the United States . 11.he Communists could not then 
be stopped, and safety for the United States would be put in 
danger, and , with it , the safety of the world. 
The Marshall Plan can , then, be considered a main weapon 
in the struggle against Soviet Communism. The alternative for 
the United States, instead of adopting the Marshall Plan, was 
to stand by idly while the Russians took over the entire European 
continent in the name of Communism. 
The first requirement of United States policy, then, was 
to keep Europe from going Communist and that is what the Marshall 
Plan is all about. 
5 . Political Integration of Europe 
:Besides the internal reconstruction of the individual 
European countries, the Marshall Plan aimed toward the reduc-
tion of political barriers to commerce, toward t he political 
.and economic integration of Europe , first step toward a fed-
erated Europe . 
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In his address delivered before a meeting sponsored jointly 
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Chicago 
Chamber of Commerce , in Chicago, on November 18 , 1947, Secretary 
Marshall said: "The logic of history would appear to dictate 
the necessity of the European community drawing closer together 
not only for its own survival but for the stability, prosperity , 
and peace of the entire world.~54 
A great emphasis on European union was created in October, 
1948, by Governor Thomas E. Dewey in his major campaign address 
on foreign policy at Salt Lake City . In that address Mr . Dewey 
i ndicated his intention to use united States aid and influence 
to build a United States of Europe into a world bulwark for 
peace: 
What is needed for Europe 1a unity. Joined in 
a great . federation , a free Europe can become 
a great bulwark for peace . 
In our magnificent Union we have achieved both 
spiritual and material blessing• such as the 
world hae never seen . We hold in our hands 
today the chance to spread those blessings to 
much of the worl d and to ach ieve world peace . 
Moving toward unity the peoples of Europe can 
in the same way become spiritually and mater-
ially strong enough to assure their own freedom 
and prosperity . They can provide a new force 
in the world great enough to assure its peace 
54oe~rge C. Marshall, "The Problems of European Revival , " 
United States Department of State Bu~letin, 17 (November 30, 
1947}, l024 . 
for generations to come. The European 
Recovery Program must be used creatively 
for this great, permanent good, American 
foreign policy can and it must be directed 
to that goal.~5 . 
In his statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on February 8 , 1949, Dean Acheson declared: 
'lhe peoples of the European democracies saw 
in the suggestion of a constructive program 
of international cooperation the possibility 
of demonstrating that economic recovery could 
b.e achieved w1thout sacrifice of the freedom 
which formed part of their traditional c1v111-
zat.ion and ours. Their response to Secretary 
Marshall's suggestion, in itself, was an im-
pressive demonstration of their will to recon-
struct their national lives on a basis of free 
institutions.56 · 
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These broad political purposes were reinforced by cultural 
and social ties with the traditional partners of the United 
States 1n the development of Western civilization, and by its 
commitment to the United Nations to support the freedom and inde-
pendence of its fellow-members in the world organization. 
'!be Western European nations, (said Harriman•s 
Committee in its Report to the President), are 
among the nations which have joined in a genuine 
ef'fort to make the ! ·deals enumerated in the 
United Nations charter a reality. Economio re-
covery 1n Western Europe is an _objeet1 ve consistent 
with and essential to the attainment of thesE3 1deals.57 
55•'r)ewey Links European Recovery Program to United Statt1ts 
of Europe,tt Congressional Digest, 27 (November, 1948), 259. 
56oean Aches.on, ttEuropean Rec_overy Program Gives New Faith 
in Vitality of Democratic System," United States Department of 
State Bulletin, 20 (Februa~y 20 , 1949), ~33. 
57European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the 
President's Committee on Foreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, November 7, 1947}, 20. 
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There was , also, a widespread opinion among the European 
parti-sans of world government that one of the prerequisites of 
a sound world federation was the re-establishment of a strong 
Western-Europe as lts third solid support ( the other tvo being 
the United States and u.s.s.R.). 
6 . Interest of .the United Statea 
With the Marshall Plan, the American people would promote 
the economic and political eecuri ty of the United States and· 
defend their own way of life. 
A nation in which the voice of its people directs 
the conduct of its affairs, (said Secretary of 
~tate Marshall) , cannot embark on an undertaking 
of auch magnitude and slgn1fieance tor light or 
purely sentimental reasons. Decisions of this 
importance are dictated by the highest considera-
tions of national interest. There are none higher, 
I am sure, than the eatablishm.ent of enduring 
peace and the maintenance of true freedom for the 
individual • 
• • • This unprecedented endeavor of the ·new world 
to help the old is neither sur.e nor easy. It is 
a calculated risk. But there can be no doubts 
as to the alterna·t1ves. The way of lif'e that we 
have known is literally in balance . 
Our country is now faced with a momentous decision. 
If we decide tba t the United States ls unable or 
unwilling effectively to assist in the reconstruc-
tion of Western Europe,. we must accept the conse- · 
quencea of its collapse into the dictatorship of 
oltee- states . 58 
It is in the direct line of American policy from the earliest 
days of .the republic to give support and aid, commensurat.e with 
---.-------
5~oeorge c. Marshall , · "Assistance to European Economic 
Reeovery , n United States Department of State Bulletin, 18 
(January 18, 1948); 71-77. 
the Nation 's ability and strength, to those foreign peoples, 
national groups and countries which are endeavoring to main-
tain their independence, internal sovereignty, free institu-
tions and hum.an freedoms against repressive and aggressive 
forces. 
Toda~•s expression of that policy is the extension of 
that economic and .financial assistance - and where requested, 
technical and administrative assistance and advice - which 
foreign countries need in order to maintain conditions in 
which individual liberty and free institutions can grow and 
national independence be preserved. 
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In his statement made before a Joint Session of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs on November 10, 1947, Secretary Marshall said: 
"The operation of this program will in many ways define and 
express the foreign policy of the United tates 1n the eyes 
of the European countries and the world,. ,,59 
In his statement (Relation of the European Recovery Program 
to American Foreign Policy) made before th-e Ho,.aie Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on January 12, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall 
said: 
'lhe European Recovery Program is intimately re-
lated to the foreign policy of the United Statea 
and to our relationship with the participating 
countries. It will become the most important 
single expression of American foreign relationships 
59oeorge C. Marshall , "Foreign Aid and Reconstruction: 
Effects on Long-Range World Economy," United States Department 
of State Bulletin, 17 (November 23~ 1947), 968. 
in this part of the woPld. Its efficient 
administration will have far-reaching in-
fluence on our foreign policy, which in its 
simplest form is concerned w1 th those condi-
tions abroad which affect or could later 
affect the future seg8ri ty and the well-
being of our nation . 
The Marshall Plan can rightly be called America 's design 
for peace. 
In his address to the Senate on March l, 1948, Senator 
Arthur H. Vandenberg noted: 
This legislation seeks peace and stability 
for free men in a free world. It seeks them 
by economic rather than by military means . 
It proposes to help our friends to help them-
selves in the pursuit of sound and successful 
liberty in the democratic pat'tern. - The quest 
can mean as much to us as it does to tnem ~ It 
aims to preserve the victory against aggression ~'-
and die ta tor ship which we thought we wbn in-
World War I,I. It strives to help stop W_orld 
War III before it starts. It fights the eeo-
nomic chaos wh1eh would precipitate far-flung_ 
disintegration. It sustains Western civiliza-
tion. It means to ts.lee .Western EUrope completely 
off the American dole at the end of the adven-
ture. It recognizes th~ grim truth - whether 
we like it or not - that American self-interest., 
national economy, and national security are 
inseverably linked with these objectives. It 
stops if changed conditions are no longer con-
sistent with the national interest of the 
United States . It .faces the naked facts of 
life.61 
The Marshall flan was aimed to demonstrate the American 
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belief in the free economic system in opposition to the totali-
tar1an conception. 
,SQGeot>ge C. Marsh.all, "Relation of European Recovery Pro-
gram to American Foreign Policy , ~ United States Department of 
State Bulletin, 18 (January 25 ., 1948), 112. 
;;.,,,,, .. 
61Arthur Ho Vandenberg., n'.rh.e E. C. A.s A Plan for Peace , 
Stability and Freedom., tt Vital Speeches ., 14 (March 15, 1948), 322. 
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In his address (New Problems in World Prosperity) delivered 
before the Convention of the American Legion in Philadelphia, 
on August 29, 1949, President Truman declared: 
In working for prosperity in the post-war world, 
the nations of the world face new problems -
and greater ones than they have ever faced be-
fore. They are suffering from the terrible 
aftereffects cf the war, which caused an almost 
complete breakdown of European industry and of 
world trade. Added to this problem there is a 
second. 'Ihat is the attempt of organized 
Communism to achieve economic and political 
doniination of the world through the misuse of 
the desires and aspirations of mankind. These 
problems require the combined efforts of the 
free nations. Together, we must repair the 
damage of war, complete the restoration of the 
economy of Europe, and revive world trade. We 
must go forward to establish an expanding world 
economy in which men everywhere can work to 
satisfy their desire for freedom and a better 
life. We must demonstrate that the economic 
system of the free nations is better than the 
system of Communism.62 
American foreign policy recognized the close interdepen-
dence between economics and politics and realized that 1 t ls 
no longer possible for the United States to remain isolated 
in either field from the rest of the world. 
James Reston of the New York Times has well said that "the 
economic peace is inseparable from the political peace;" that 
the economic peace is "the immediate test of our leadership 
in world affairs;" and that this country "cannot be politically 
international and economically nationalist1c.Q63 
62Harry s. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and Statements, u. S. Dept. of State (We.shington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 51-52. 
63New York Times, nAid for .Europe: The Problem and the 
Issues Before the United States, 0 97 (September 28, 1947), E 5. 
The European Recovery Program, (said the Harri-
man's Committee in its Report to the President), 
is an investment in the continued survival of 
a world economically stabilized and peacefully 
conducted, in which governments based on funda-
mental democratic principles can prosper, in 
which right, not might, prevails, and in which 
religious freedom, economic opportunity, and 
individual liberties are maintained and res-
pected.64 
On November 18, 1947, Secretary Marshall stated: 
Today Europe is devastated and dispirited, but 
once it regains strength and confidence it will 
draw on its store of resources, energies, skills, 
and spiritual qualities and again make major con-
ti'±butions tow orld progress. Th:ts is the goal 
of those who are genuine ly devoted to the cause 
of European reeovery.65 
In his speech delivered on the ocqasion of the half-way 
mark of the Marshall Plan, he declared: 
Frankly , in those days I thought of the rehabili-
tation of Europe more in terms of material 
reconstruction - harbors, buildings, eomm.unications 
and similar matters. But slowly I learned that 
the most serious phase of rehabilitation was re-
lated to other considerations - political, moral, 
spiritual. It is in the meeting of the$e problems 
that I feel the European Recovery Program is making 
its greatest contribution to the world.66 
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Besides, to help Europe in her recovery, the United States 
was moved by mo_tives of ordinary human decency ... the old tradi-
tion of helping friends in distress. 
64E.Uropean Reeoverz arid Ameriean Aid - A Report by the 
President's Committee on Foreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, November 7, 1947), 19. 
65oeorge C. Marshall, "The Problems of European Revival," 
United States Department of State Bulletin, 17 (November 30, 
l947} I l025e 
66Economic Cooperation Administration, '!'he Marshall Plan 
at Mid-Point, (Wa shington: E.C.A., April, · 1960), 3. 
One can approach this issue from the humani-
tarian side, (said Willard L. Thorp, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs). After 
all, we grew stronger during the war, our pro-
duction is at record levels, our standard of 
living 1s ~nequalled. Western Europe was 
devastated. Its social, economic and political 
institutions were shaken. It 1s trying hard to 
recover,- but needs help. Americans have a 
reputation for generosity. After giving so 
much aid since the end of the war, it would 
hardly be 1n keeping with our traditions and 
beliefs to withdraw the helping hand at this 
time. Secretary Marshall spoke of "friendly 
aid" and I hope we have not lostt .. that virtue 
from our composite national character.67 
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Among supporters of the legislation were those frightened 
of Russia and Communism and desirous of bolstering capitalism; 
those who viewed European recovery as an essential condition 
of prosperity in the United States; those who wanted markets 
for surpluses; and those who would help Europe out of humani-
tarian motives. The resulting legislation necessarily reflected 
the views of these groups as well as those of the numerous 
Americans who, though recognizing the need of legislation, were 
determined that the costs should be kept down to a minimum and 
that the project be run on business principles.68 
Other groups also supported the European Recovery Program, 
fearful of large surpluses in the years to come and aware of the 
67willard L. Thorp, Elements 1n Eurotean Recovery - Address 
delivered before the National Ind~str!al ~on?erence Board in 
New York City on January 22,. 19-48, ·u. s. Dept. of State (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1948), 13. 
68seymour E. Harris, European Recover{ Program, (Cambridge, 
)lass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), v 11. 
outlets offered by the European Recovery Program to improve 
their own marke·ts. 
Many American people thought the Marshall Plan would pay 
off in the long run in a flourishing of the economy of their 
country. 
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"Americans must be convinced that they will get new markets 
for their products and .vital raw materials which they need and 
a real chance for peace for their children as a result of these 
expenses," said Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts , 
in his speech "Quid pro quo" before the Senate on May, 1947. 69 
At the Convention of the American Federation of' Labor, held 
in San Franc isco in 1947, the representatives of over seven 
million American wage-earners, after carefully weighing all the 
proe and all the cons, decided unanimously that the Marshall 
Plan merited the unequivocal support of every loyal American. 
The Convention said: 
To win the peace, to avert a more terrible war 
than the one so recently ended, we of labor are 
giving our wholehearted backing to the Marshall 
Plan. After all, Who suffer~ most in a war? 
The answer 1s - the workers .70 
Pointing at the isolationist fallacy, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs Wil lard L. Thorp, said: 
69Time, 49 (May 26, 1947), 25. 
70oeorge Meany, ~Why Labor Supports the Marshall Plan," 
American Federationist, 55 (January, 1948), 6. 
Why should we bother? Here is the heart of 
the basic policy issue. The latest poll of 
business executive opinion, taken by Fortune, 
included the question, nAre you for or against 
the Marshall Plan as you understand .i't?'. · ·r.Se~enty 
per cent were for, 19 per cent against, and 
11 per cent with no opinion. This is a signi-
ficantly high percentage of agreem~jt for the 
top man in the business comm.unity. 
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In his address (A People's Foreign Policy) delivered at 
Soldie:z'sField before the Imperial Council Session of the Shrine 
of North America, in Chicago, Illinois, on July 19, 1949, 
President Truman declared: 
The major decisions in our foreign policy 
since the war have been made on the basis ot 
an informal public opinion and overwhelming 
public support. 
In 1948, after almost a year of discussion 
and debate, it was clear that a substantial 
majority of the people of this Nation approved 
our participation in the European Recovery 
Program. The Congress translated that approval 
into legislative action by a vote of approxi-
mately four to one.72 
An alternative for the United States to spending more 
billions for the Marshall Plan would have been to start war 
against Russia., but a principle of democracy is that a demo-
cratic nation has no right to go to war unless driven to it. 
And, even if the United States would be willing to start a 
preventive war with Russia, it would be held back by a highly 
practical reason: at the end of that war the world might well 
71w1llard L. Thorp, Elements in European RecoveFc, u. s. 
Dept. of State (Washington: Government Printing Ottcie, 1948), 13. 
72Harry S. Truman, A New Era in World Affairm - Selected 
Speeches and Statements, u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: 
Government Pr in ting Off ice, 1949), 37-. 
be in such a mes8 that the post-war chaos again would create 
more Communists than the atomic bombs had killed. 
The American Federation of Labor Convention, held in San 
Francisco in 1947, said: 
The cost of the Marshall Plan to the American 
people will be small as compared to the alter-
native of an unaided Europe falling under 
tota 11 ta rian do min a ti on, w1 th the ultimate 
possibility of war .73 
For this reason the cost of the Marshall Plan to the 
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American people is far below the terrific expense of a shooting 
war fought against Communism. The last war cost the United 
States three hundred and forty-one billion dollars.74 
In his address delivered in the United states Senate on 
March l, 1948, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg said: 
This peace investment might cost one-third 
as much in four aIXi one-fourth years as we 
appropriated f'Gr war in just one bill that 
passed the Senate in five minutea and without 
a roll call one June afternoon in 1944. War 
has no bargains. I think peace has. I believe 
I am talking about one now.75 
In a statement before a Joint Session of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on 
February 8 ., 1949, Paul G. Hoffman declared: "If this program 
73aeorge Meany, 0 Why Labor Supports the Marshall Plan," 
American Federation1st, 55 (January, 1948), 6. 
-
74Harry s. Truman, "Message to the Congress on March 12, 
1947, tt United States Dttpartment of State Bul-letin Supplement, 
16 ( May 4, l94'1}, 832. 
75Arthur H. Vandenberg, "The E.C.A.: A Plan for Peace, 
Stability and Freedom.," Vital Speeches, 14 (March 15, 1948), 
324. 
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brings us peace and stability - and I fervently believe it can -
it will .turn out to be the greatest bargain that the American 
people ever had . " 76 
76Paul G. Hoffman, Statement Before a Joint Session of the 
Senate Fore! Relations Committee and the Houae Pore! &Affairs 
Co ruary, 
CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND TREND OF THE MARSHALL PLAN 
l. Effects on European Economy 
Notwithstanding a great deal of talk that the Marshall Plan 
was a failure, we can point out that this is politically incorrect 
and economically premature. 
Answering to those who were casting doubts and criticisms 
of the European Recovery Program, Marshall Plan Administrator 
Paul G. Hoffman, in an address delivered before the Michigan 
Municipal Le-ague in Battle Creek, Michigan, on September 15, 
1949, declared: 
In my opinion they are wrong. European recovery 
is tar ~ ~om -impossible; in fact, it is definitely 
possible, but is going to ~ake a lot of doing on 
the part of both Europeans and Americans. 
If Europe will be self-supporting by June 30, 
1952, it -.;111 be the most significant event of 
this c,ntury. 
I~ will mean that, with our help, the free na-
tion& of Europe can re-create those conditions 
under which democratic institutions flourish 
and under which ~pan live, with decency and 
dignity. It will mean that an enduring peace 
is at last wi.thin our reach, because no aggressor 
will dare march against .the free nations of Europe 
and the Atlantic community if .we continue to 
work together and stick together. 
This unity between the free nation! is our one 
best hope for a world without war. 
· lpaul o. Hoffman, "The Marshall Plan: Its Progress and 
Problems," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 170 ( September 
22, 1949) I ll70. 
In his speech delivered on the occasion of the half-way 
mark of the European Recovery Program, General Marshall said: 
Despite determined efforts to prevent the 
rehabilitation of Western Europe on a basis 
which would permit a healthy revival of 
democratic processes, the plan has succeeded • 
• • • Looking at the conditions prevalent in 
the spring of 1947, and considering the 
situation at this moment, I can only feel that 
one near miracle has been accomplished. we2 
must work for, and exp.eet, another miracle. 
In his Survey of Marshall Plan in Europe, Senator Pat 
McCarran, Chairman of the Joint Comil11ttee on Foreign Economic 
Cooperation, declared: "European recovery, me&~Jred b y all 
standards, has been more successful than even the most opti-
mistic had hoped for.n3 
•tt can be said immediately the Marshall Plan has proved 
an almost fantastic success, beyond the expeetation!l of even 
its warmest advocates," said the London Economiet.4 
A rapid recovery has taken place throughout the whole 
economy of Western Europe. United States aid, concentrated 
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on vital foodstuffs, raw materials and equipment, has made 
possible an increase in production many times greater in value. 
It has also made possible a rapid rate of reconstruction, a 
2Eeo:rmom1c Cooperation Administration, The Marshall Plan 
. at Mid-Point, (Washington: E. c. A., April, 1950), 4. 
· l)., ·:-~-,;..,,,. 
· 3u. s. Congress, Senage, survey of E.C.A. in Europe~ 
Senator Pat Mccarran, Sen. Document 141, Report to the Jont 
Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation, 81st Cong., 2nd 
Seas. (Washington: Government Printing Of:fioe, 1950}, 12. 
4ttHalf-way Mark,." (Review of TID Years of the Marshall 
Plan}, The Economist, 158 (February 11, 1950), 297. 
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high level of investment, a large increase in exports and , above 
all, hope and confidence in the t'uture of Western Europe. 
'11he program a-o far has cost the United States nearly nine 
billions, .but Europe seem! to be in better shape today than 
when the Marshall Plan began. 
With the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act, approved on June 
28, 1948, the Congress appropriated the Economic Cooperation 
Administration f'our billions tor the yea:t• April 3, 1948 -
April 2, 1949. 5 
With the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act , approved on September 
29, 1.949, and signed by President Truman on Octobe~ 6, 1949, the 
Congre-ss appropriated for the Economic Cooperation Administration 
$1,074,000,000 to cover Mar.shall Plan operations during the 
final quarter of the preceding fiscal year ended June 39, 1949; 
$3 ,628,380, 000 for the fiscal year July 1, 1949 - June . 30, 1950; 
and granted $ 150 millions of additional loan authorizations for 
Marshall Plan countries from the Export-Import Bank.6 
Th1s aid and the work of these two years have removed the 
immediate threat of bankruptcy and economic dissolution, with 
the political threats which would have followed, and has laid 
the groundwork for its lasting suppression. The first two years 
of the European .Recovery Program have been unreservedly succea,ful. 
5Un1ted States Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, Part I~ 1055 (1949). 
6t1nited Service, 81st Cong. $.e-a-s-.-.-------r~-~~-..... ~~-~--,.--. ~u,,ro.---.s 1ng Co., 1950), 726. 1st 
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Both in industry and in agriculture, recovery has gone 
much faater and farther than in the four years after the 1914-
1918 war.7 
The productiom records of industry and agriculture up to 
the present time testify that great progress toward reconstruc-
tion has been ms.de in Europe. 
In industry, the progress has been spectacular. Of all 
the Marshall Plan countries, only Germany and Greece are pro-
ducing less tl:lan pre-war; all the others are producing more , 
and many are producing substantially more. 
Industrial production has risen 25 per cent since Economic 
Recovery Program was started. Combined output in 1949 was within 
13 per cent of the 1952-53 goal . a 
Coal output is still slightly below pre-war, but. an indi-
cation of the progress made in the fuel balance · sheet is the 
reduction in imports from the United States from 35 million 
tons in 1947 to 10 million tons in 1949. It is now hoped 
nearly to eliminate the need for dollar coal imports in 1950-51. 9 
The production of steel rose by 56 per cent, electricity 
by 16 per cent 1n the two years of the Marahall Plan. The total 
for·European Economic Cooperation, :uroP!!n 
- Second Report of the o,..E. R.C., l Bar-fat , , 
ra ve en ra &, e ruary, ), 14. 
8Eeonom1c .Cooperat1on Administration, W~re Euro,ean Re-
covery stands, Seven Charts on Recovery Progres·s androblema . 
at the i!d-fioint of the European Recovery Program, (Washington: . 
E.C.A., Ji'ebruary 21, 1950), 1. 
output of the engineering industri,es increased by about 30 
per cent, chemical products by 25 per cent, textile manufac-
tures~by 35~40 per oent.10 
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Apart possibly from electric power, there are now ·generally 
no crit.ical bottlenecks in European industry; there is no single 
commocity which is so scarce that the lack of it d1srupte the 
whole industrial effort. This is the central achievement of 
the last two years' work~ 11 
The agricultural output as a -whole is 95 .. 100 per cent oi"( 
pre-war, but this is not nearly enough, for Western Europe has 
over 20 million more mouths to feed., and the Marshall P,lan 
countries hope to get production up to about 115 per cent of 
pre-war by the middle fifties. Of the principal food products 
only meat output la still substantie.lly below pre-war; all 
products are below 1952-53 goals . But an 1ncreaee of about 25 
per cent in two years is a good start.12 
Most countries foresee a epntinued increase 1n industrial 
production . Plans of the participating countries include a 15 
per cent increase 1n agricultural production. Total product.ion 
of ,commodities and services should 1'how a growth of 10 per cent 
by 1952. Investment to enlarge and improve production facilities 
1s to continue in most of the countries ... both 1n continental and 
overseae areas.13 
lOibid., 77. 
ll!bid. I 15. 
12Ib1d., 14. 
13aobert Marjol1n, Secretary General of the o.E. E.C., 0 The 
European Recovery Program Half-Way to Victory, 0 United Nations 
World, 4 (April, 1950), 60. 
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Considerable progress has been made since 1947 in the im-
provement. of national financ-es and the creation and maintenance 
of internal financial stability . The countries which were 
facing runaway inflation three years ago have brought i t under 
control; 1n other countries where overt inflation was · suppressed 
by controls, the inflationary pressure has been relieved. In 
only three of the: .Marshall Plan countries were wholes-ale prices 
more than 10 per cent higher in 1949 than in 1.948; 1n tour 
countries wholesale prices were lower, despite the widespread 
removal of controls.14 
'Ihe confidence of European people in their national curren-
cies has been greatly restored. Budgets are balanced or in 
surplus in the majority of participating countries. 
But inflationary pressure is likely to continue in 1950 
and later, and unless this pressure can be overcome, the Marshall 
Plan countries·wtll be unable to right their balances of pay-
ments . Improvement must be relentlessly pressed on', and t his 
is work of high priority during the next two years. 15 
In most participating countries there has been very little 
unemployment in post-war years. Except in Italy, Germany and 
Belgium, 1 t ha-s only been about a quarter ae high as before 
the war. In 1949, it rose slightly but remains a low percentage 
of the total unemployment. I n Belgium, Germany and Italy, 
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however, unemployment has been markedly higher. than before the· 
war, and still remains a serious problem despite the efforts 
being made by thelr ' governmenta .16 
Time lost through industrial disputes has been very low. 
Social unrest has diminished. Over-all production ls high 
and man-hour productivity has either reached or exceeded pre-
war levels. In 1949, the average factory worker produced 25 
per cent more than in 1947.17 
Through the exchange of technical information in industrial, 
agricultural and other fie,lds, much has been done to increase 
productivity in Europe . · A number of "technical teamsn have 
visited the United States . Some of these teams consist of men 
. 
from specific industries who visit United States plants and 
study m·ethods. Others consist of farmers who work on United 
States farms. In some cases United States technologists go to 
Europe to give instruction.16 
The health of young and old alike was endangered by short-
ages of medicine and drugs 1n the immediate post-war period. 
While the need for drugs. has not been fully met, great progress 
has been made through the shipment of essential items from 
America. Hazards to health have been multiplied due to congested 
living quarters, inadequate food supplies and other disruptions 
lSibid., 49. 
l7Eoonom1c Cooperation Administration, The Marsha_ll Plan 
at Mid-Point, (Washington: E.C.A., April, 1950), 6. 
18Economic Cooperation Administration, E. c. A. at Work!~ 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, Mireh 20 , 
1950), l. 
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of the war. Drugs and medicine supplied by the Economic Coopera-
tion Administration have done much to enable health services to 
tunction • .19 
' In the three · basic needs of food, clothing and housing, the 
average standard in Western Europe is very much better than it 
was two years ago. In a few sectors of private consumption the 
pre-war standards have been restored or improved; this is also 
true of medica_l and other services provlded_ by the. state. But, 
on the average, the etanda.rd of 11 ving of the people of Western 
Europe is still lower than before the war, and an unprecedentedly 
high proportion of Western Europe's resources has been devoted 
to investment.20 
In the 12-month period concluded June 30, 1949, out of a 
total gross income of about $140 billion, Europe invested more 
than $30 billion in capital assets.21 
Up to March 31, 1950, the local currency equivalent of 
$5,660 million bad been deposited in counterpart funds. These 
local currency counterpart furxls are divided into two portions: 
five per cent is allocated to the use of the United States within 
the country and the remaining 95 per cent is to be used in a 
19Ibid. 
20organizat1on for European Economic Cooperation, European 
Recover Pro ramme - Second Re ort of the O. E . E.C •. , (Paris: 
Impr mer e A n s ra ve Cen ra e·, e ruary, O), 57. 
21Paul o. Hoffman, ftThe Marshall Plan: Its Progress &nd 
Problems," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 170 (September 
22, 1949), 1170. 
manner proposed by national gover~ents and agreed by the 
Economic Cooperation Administration . 22 
96 
The approved withdrawal for use by recipient countries 
amounted to $3 , 7·oa millions. About 60 per cent. of the counter-
part funds utilized thus far hav, been used for the promotion 
of production . The largest amounts have been channeled into 
electric power projects, railroads, coal mining, agriculture , 
and various manufacturing industries. About 30 per cent ha_s 
been used to aid in the maintemnce of finan~ial stability 
through debt retirement . The remaining 13 per ~ent has been 
earmarked for other purposes such as housing, care of refugees, 
health and sanitation projects, and transportation of relief 
packagea.23 
France has both deposited and utilized the largest amount 
of counterpart - in terms of dollar equivalents withdrawals 
have been almost double those of the United Kingdom and four 
times those of Germany . As of the end~ of February , France had 
withdrawn 98 per cent of tJ:le counterpart funds deposited. Other 
- ' 
major countries have utilized from 27 to 83 per cent of their 
deposits . 24 
22Eeonomic Cooperation Administration , Statistic_s and 
Reports Division, '!'Went -second Re ort for the Pubi1c Adv1so 
Board of E. C.: A., as ng on: pr 
23Econo~o Cooperation Administration, Statistics and Reports 
Division, Local Currenc Counter rt Funds - Mid- Point Review, 
(Washington: E •• A. , Apr • 
24Ibid . 
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Prior to the Marshall Plan, hundreds of industrial plants 
lay idle for lack of electrical energy. Today factory workers 
have fuller employment and new jobs have been created because 
of the power projects .financed with the help of counterpart 
funds. After two years of the Marshall Plan, power for indus-
try, heat for cooking and electric 1ty in genera-1 is no longer 
severely rationed 1n Western European countries. CountePpart 
.funds -equivalent to $646 millions have helped to increase 
electrio~l output to levels ab~ve pre-war,, and ,have mater1:allly 
aided the industrial recovery of Western Europe .25 
I . 
Transportation is back on a more normal basis. Railroads 
are running6 motor trucks are· operating over rebuilt roads, 
ships and docks a r e again in operation, and airports are 
usable. To bring about this revival the equivalent of $466 
.millions in counte.rpart .funds, 26 per cent of the total counter-
part allocated for promotion of production, were used to 
rehab!lltate the railroads. 26 
The equ1 valent of $14'7 millions in (?Ounterpart was chan-
nelled into the repair and improvement of roads and highway 
bridges, waterways and harbors, merchant and fishing fleets, 
27 
and airports. 
25Ib1d. 
-
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The industries of western Europe have benefitt:Bd from the 
use of the equivalent of $'·371 millions in coun~erpart to f1 nance 
expansion or modernization of manufacturing and other production 
faoilities . 28 
Coal production is up to a point where most grades of coal 
and coke are adequate to meet the requirements of the partici-
pating countries . The equivalent of $322 millions in counterpart 
funds have been used to finance mining projects, all but $3 . 5 
millions t'or coal mlning .29 
Western European countries have rehabilitated war-damaged 
farms and through reclamation projects have brought into produc-
t :J.:o.n thousands of acres of land which never before produced 
crops of value . Since the inception of the Marshall Plan, local 
currency counterpart funds equivalent to $225 millions have been 
u.aed in agricultural programs designed to increase rood produc-
tion and make the participating countries less dependent upon 
importa.30 
In the European Recovery Program countries, the combined 
efforts of men and machines are re- channelling rivers, con-
solidating farms, draining swamps, and DBk1ng available thousands 
of acres of new farm land. Millions of dollars worth of food 
is being saved through campaigns to destroy and control. rarm 
28lbid . 
29Ib1d . 
30lbid . 
-
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pests, and crop yields are being incr,eased by the introduction 
of better seed, more machinery and new production methods . 31 
The need for providing shelter for the thousands of home-
le.ss famil1es has been one of the .major reconstruction tasks in 
Western Europe. Lack of adequate housing for workers bas ser-
iously hindered industrial production . War-shat tered dwellings 
throughout Western Europe are being replaced with new housing 
units. The Economic Cooperation Adm1n1stlll'at1on bas approved 
the withdrawal of the equivalent ot $150 mill.ions for housing 
programs . 32 
Local currencies equivalent to i,i billion dollars have 
been used by the participating countries for c1 ·ot retiremen t 
since t he beginning of the Marshall Plan, contributing to the 
financial stabilization. Local currency counte~part has been 
used tor the repayment of debt owed .by the government to the 
central banks and has resulted in the cancellation of part of 
the excess money supply. No payments have been made to indivi-
duals who could have used the funds involved to purchase goods 
and services and thus a dd to inflationary pressures. 33 
The expansion .of production in Western Europe has been 
ma.de possible only by United States assistance; $4 - 5 billion 
a year of aid has permitted an expansion. of annual output of 
31Ib1d~ 
32Ibid., 3- 8 . 
33-n,1d . 
-
about $30 billion. '!'he entire structure still depends upon· 
imports of food, fuel and raw materials from Nqrth America • . 
Now that the main general limitations upon production have 
been cleared away, the problem is. to develop tb.e production · 
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of those goods and services which can close · the dollar gap by 
earning dollars or by saving them. This means intens1 ve ac-
tion in several fields - particularly agriculture., petroleum, 
tourism., and the range of industries which can supply the North 
American market. Eut it also means concentrating on the 
reduction of costs., the increase of productivity., and the im-
provement of marketing technique., for the dollar gap hardly 
can be closed unless Western European products can c~pete 
effectively with American.,· both in North America itself and in 
the rest of the world.34 
A major source of dollars for the countries ·or EUrope is 
the travel industry. Tourism has long been ranked among Europe's 
greatest industries. Under the Marshall P1an, great facilities 
were granted by the European countries to American travelers., 
among which were the abolition of visas for short-term visits., 
special steps to free visitors from export and rationing con-
trols., and more liberal allowances for motor fuel., certain foods., 
and merchandise. Many countries are developing their .travel 
plants and formulating their travel programs, simplifying or 
eliminating their ·frontier c·ontrols, and increasing low-cost 
travel facilities. This "'invisible'• export of the European 
countries constitutes a great source of dollars and 1t is 
expected to reach between $2 and $2 . 5 billion during the four 
years · l948-1952.35 
2 . The Dollar Problem 
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Increased earnings . from shipping, tourists, and other ser-
vices have converted defic1 ts on invisible account to sur-
pluses . While helping to shrink the dollar gap, this 1ncoim 
is amall relative to trade deficit . · 
Western Europe's earn1ngs · through exports, shipping reve-
nues, servicestt_o touriists, and other intemational services 
constitute only about a quarter of the dollars she must have 
to buy 1n the United States, Canada, and other dollar markets 
needed food, raw materials, machinery, and the like . 36 
Progrea s has been made toward the reduction of the dollar 
deficit . In 1947, this was more than $8 billion . In 1948, 
it was reduced to about $5 . 5 billion . For the year ending 
July l , 1950, the gold and dollar deficit of the Marshall Plan 
countries with the United States ani Canada is estimated at 
35Econom1c Cooperation Adm1nlatrat1on , A Report on Recovery 
Prosress and United States Aid , (Washington: E. C.A. , February, 
194 ) , l72 . 
36 · Economic Cooperation Administration , The Marshall Plan -
Where We Are and Where We Are Going , (Washington: E.C .A. , 
March 31, 19 00 ) , I . 
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$4.4 billion; and t he principal changes, compared with 1947, 
are a contraction of about $2.5 billion in imports from this 
area am an expansion of only $204 million in Western Europe's 
exports to the area. 37 
This is, · however, the weak spot in the recovery or Europe. 
Trade among the participating eountrie.s of Western Europe 
has remained below the 1938 level until the last quarter of 
1949. Moreover, trade among participants has not recovered 
as much as exports to areas outside Western Europe. Also, 
trade volume has not kept pace with the expe.rision of produc-
tion.38 
Throughout 1948 and to the Spring of 1949, the reduction 
ot the dollar deficit was rapid; ' in the SUl11Dler or 1949 there 
was a serious deterioration wh ich lost much of the ground which 
had been won in the previous twelve months; in the last few 
months, following the devaluations, there has been a recovery 
again. The experience or 1949 has shown how vulnerable Western 
Europe's dollar earnings are to even a small shock coming from 
outside.39 
37J. H. Williams, "Marshall Plan Half-Way,'* Foreign Affairs, 
28 (April, 1950), 472. 
38Econom1c Cooperation Administration, Where &uro~an 
Recovery Stands, · (Washington: R.C.A., February 21, 19 ), 2 . 
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Western Europe's e.Jrp orts . to North America are small in 
~.elation to imports and this 1s not merely a result of the war, 
but a long-standing charac t eristic of the trade .between the two 
areas, Western Europe's share of United s tates rmilrket has been 
deolining steadily over the past fii'ty years. 
In his address delivered before the Boston Conference on 
Distribution, Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, declared: 
ln pre-war days Europe accounted for more than 
half of the world's total trade. Much of this 
was among the European eountr1e.s themselves. 
But in 1938 the sixteen Marshall Plan countries 
took 35 per cent of total- -. United States exp.o·rts~ 
In 1946 United States exports to those countries 
had tripled in dollar volume, from just over 
$1 billion in 1938 to more than $3 billion in 
1946. Tp.e proportion to United Stat es to.tal ex-
ports was about the same - 35 per cent. During 
the first six months of 1947, the dollar rate ot 
exports to the sixteen eountr1e.s ro~e still 
higher, but the 33 per e~nt raticv .remained 
constant. 
The value of imports from the same group ot 
countries bas been much smaller than United 
States exports to them. United States imports 
from these countries, worth $415 million in 
1938, constituted 21 per cent of United States 
total imports. In 1946 the dollar value ro$e 
to $676 million, but this higher figure amounted 
to only 14 per cent .of United States total im.-
ports, and tor the first half of 1947 the com-
parable figure was 12 per cen~ .40 
I n their trade .with the United States, as distinct from 
their total trade, t he partieipe.ting countries had deficits Qf 
40Norman Armour, "America's Stake in Europe," United States 
Department of State Bulletin, 17 ( November 2, 1947) # 864 - 65. 
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$4 .2 billion in 1946, $5.4 billion in 1947, and $3.5 billion in 
1948. If their overseas dependencies - formerly dollar earners -
are inelude.d, th~ eo_rreaponding deficits were actually · scmewhat 
larger ( $4 . 5 billion 1n 1946, $5 . 7 billion in 1947, and slightly 
more than $3 . 5 billion in 1948). Because of sharp increase in 
first half, the 1949 deficit was about same in previous year . 41 
In 1938, Western E'\lrope •s exports to North America were 
only 1/7 of her total overseas exports, while her imports from 
that area were about 1/4 of total imports from overseas . In 
1947, the Marshall Plan countries' exports to North America 
were 14 per cent of their imports from North America; in 1948, 
the proportion went up to 22 per cent; 1n 1949- 50 , it is esti-
mated at 24 per cent; and the countries are thinking that it 
will increase to 35 per cent in 1950- 51 and nearly 60 per cent 
in 1951- 52 . These changing proportions re~iect both a decline 
in imports and an increase 1n exports . 42 
Tb.e programa for 1950-52 show for the whole period 1947 
to July 1, 19S2, an estimated decrease of imports from the 
United States and Canada of $3 . 6 billion, and a rise in exports 
of $665 million . lVb.en these changes have been achieved, Western 
Europe ' s imports from this area will be $3 . 2 billion, nearly 
as large an amount of imports as in 1938, but representing 1/6 
41Economio Cooperation Adn?-1n1strat1on, 'lbe -En~op~an Recovery 
Profyam - Report of the E. C.A.-Commeree M1ss1on-"to Investigate 
PosN111t1es of Increasing . Western Europe t. s ·»ollar E.arn1ngs , 
(Washington: Government Printing Of.flee, October, 1949), 3-4 . 
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of its total imports and a contraction of 54 per cent compared 
with 1947. Western Europe's exports to this area will be 
$1-.5 billion, less than 10 per cent of total Western European 
exports, but an increase of 80 per cent compared with 1947.43 
The Marsba11 Plan countries have pointed out that they will 
be able to continue their recovery if they recel ve aid in the 
years 1950.51 and · 1951-52 at the rate of 75 per. c,ent and 50 
per cent ·or the 1949-50 level respectively. If' this ls not 
realized-, the plans for continued recovery set out in the 
programs cannot be · fully implemented. There would have to be 
reduetio)ls 1n essential imports, with cumulative effect upon 
production. 
On .favorable assumptions about the future course of the 
world economy - and in particular on the assumption that the 
United States business activity does not fall beLow the level 
of the middle quarters of 1949 - and about the amount of aid 
available, it is caleulated a reduction in the total dollar 
deficit from $4.4 billion in 1949-50 to $3 1/4 billion in 
1950-51 and $2 1/4 billion in 1951~52.44 
It is clear that a serious problem w111 exist after 1952. 
There is no single effective solution of the dollar problem. 
43J. H. Williams, ttllarsball Plan Half ... way," Fol"eign Affairs, 
28 (Apr.11, 1950), 472-73. 
4
~organ1zat1on for E\\ropean Economic Cooperation, European 
Recovery ·Pro~a:mme--Second Rep_ort of the O.<E.tE.:C!!;'" (Paris: . 
Imprlmerle A lnlstrative Centra!e, kebriiiry, 1950), 22. 
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It must be attacked from many sides. One ea sen tial element . ,is 
' 
a much better balance in the trade between Western Europe and 
North America. 
Even in 1951- 52, European ~ecove~y Program.,1d. woulQ amount 
to about 2/3 of the Mar$hall Plan countries' ·imports from North 
America, .· and for an ultimate stable balance a mueh larger pro-
portion of imports must be covered by the sale of exports. MUch 
would help if a dollar surplus can be earned on 1·nvis1bles or 
1f dollars can be earned net from the rest of ·the world. 
In 1951-52, a deficit is still foreseen in both of these; 
only in later years this should become a surplus. · Subs tan tia l 
United States investment in, and assistance to, countries out-
side Europe , in conditions which would permit Western European 
countries to earn these dollars thanse·lves, would, also, greatly 
contribute to ease the dollar deficit. In any event, it is 
thought bha·t hardly the <Marshall Plan eountr1es• dollar deficit 
could be eliminated with exports to North America less than 75 
per cent of imports from North America . 
In order to have a dollar balance, Marshall Plan countries• 
imports · from No,r th America would have to be cut to about 1/3 
of their current level, but this would bring unemployment 1n 
Amer1 can industries now selling to Europe, and a sharp set-back 
to .European unity and recovery. Or Marsha·ll Plan countries• 
exports to North America would have to be tripled, but this is 
seen certainly out of the question by 1953. 45 
45Ib1d. , 23. 
In the next two years, the Marshall Plan countries pro-
grams show an increase 1n their exports to North America by 
10'7 
1/2, and a reduction in the~r imports by 1/4 - and after 1951-52, 
further expansion of exports and reduction ot imports will be 
needed to eliminate the remaining deficit. Success depends 
upon how well and quickly the necessary adjustments can be made, 
on both sides of the Atlantic· ~6 
In 19.51-52, with American aid in the amount of $2 billion., 
Europe can only al.low herself $3 billioz,. of imports from North 
America. After 1951-52 the European countries will have to 
meet their needs with their resources alone. A new reduction 
in imports from North America'1is possible, but only in a 
limited way. 47 
Even if Europe succeeds in increasing her exports to North 
America by 50 per cent in 1951-52, these exports will still pay 
only half of her imports from North America . That is to say 
that the effort must be continued after 1951 ... 52, and must also 
be increased if possible. Taking into account invisible ex-
ports, as well as the possibility of earning dollars on other 
markets, the objective set for themselves by member states for 
the period 1mmed.1at.ezy following 1951-52 is a 75 per cent cover-
age of their imports from North America by their exports. 48 
0 
47Robert Marjolin , The European Recovery Program Half-
way to Victory,tt United Nations World, 4 (April, 1950)., 61. 
48Ibid., 62. 
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I£ certain conditions are met, with everyone cooperating, 
Europe should be able to reach, in 1952, its first goal -
independence from all special . foreign assistance. The deficit 
at that time, although it may not have disappeared completely, 
will have been reduced to modest ani manageable proportions 
which would make it su~ject to normal financing. 
The final objective, as well as the intermediary goals, 
can only be :reached 1f the domes tic stab ill ty of Europe 1 s 
maintained and consolidated. 
3. Necessity of United States Imports from Europe. 
The United States will have to make it possible for Europe 
to buy in North America the goods and services they need, and to 
pay for them w1 th their exports of goods and services to North 
America. 
Europe can do much to bring about a better balance in her 
trade, but the solution of the problem rests largely with the 
United States. It is basic to the United States security and 
prosperity that it does what is necessary to bring about a 
balance in international trade. 
Determined effort must be made to maintain a high level 
of employment and production in the United States, for even 
a small reduction in the rate of its production and consump-
tion affects imports sharply. 
As the free world's major creditor and supplier, the 
United States has an inescapable duty and responsibility to 
lead .the way toward a fundamental solution of the dollar 
shortage tba t will provide a solid economic founda t1on for the 
free world. 
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The indirect bene.t1 ts or increased American imports from 
Western EUrope would be considerable. They would reduce the 
general dollar shortage and so make it much easier to earn 
dollars through export surpluses to third countries. As long 
as there is a world ahori@.ge of dollars, such multilateral 
trade is bound to be severely limited. 
On the part of the United States, good will toward in-
creasing imports from Europe, and the recognitton of the role 
that should be played in international trade by a cred1 tor na-
tion, is demonstrated in recent speeches by leading statesmen, 
and also industrialists and businessmen. Secretary of State 
Acheson recently made it clear that the United States must 
atart trading with other nations along a two~way street. 
Referring to the United States balance of payments, he said 
in an address to the National Foreigp. Trade council in Novem-
ber, 1949s 
The bald fact is, · though many people do not seem 
to realize it, that we are in real balance-01"-
payments difficulties • · •• · We have an unfavorable 
balance ot trade, unta vorab le to the taxpayer, and 
unfavorable to the consumer •••• We must become 
really import-minded.. We must want to devote our 
time and energy to disQovering and bringing in 
imports. It is common sense tor us to want them 
and go after them.49 
He pointed out that the United States exports goods that 
might otherwise be available to consumers in this country, and 
that American taxpayers give and lend money to foreign countries 
49•Acheson•s Import Plan," New Republic, 122 (March 6,· 
1950), 36. 
to pay for these excess exports. More imports will tend to 
balance the trade ani relieve the American taxpayer. 
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In a message to Congress, President Truman stressed re-
cently the need to accept greater competition from European 
suppliers. He pointed out that even a doubling of Western 
European exports to the United States would only "scratch the 
tt 50 surface of American markets. 
Outlining the foreign policy of the United States and 
citing the European Recovery Program, Dean Acheson declared: 
our policy line must be to create those econo-
mic, political. social and psychological condi-
tions that strengthen and create confidence in 
the democratic way of life. 
One of the things that we must do 1 s to enable 
other countries to buy with their own products 
the raw material that they need to reed and 
clothe and employ their own people. This means 
that we mu.st buy their goods and their 8ervices 
to a greater extent than at present. 
We must take that kind of action even though it 
requires adjustments here at home - and it will 
require some adjustments. Make no mistake about 
it, if we want to have strong allies in Europe 
we have got to work out some kind or pattern or 
this kind.51 
It has been emphasized by Mr. Hof !man that: 
Imports do not hurt us but enrich us, both as 
individuals and as a nation~ They bring us 
goods that we could not otherwise have or afford. 
The¥ enable us to export an equal value of things 
we produce best at lower eoat. The acceptance of 
larger imports which our national and international 
6lnAcheson's Import Plan,n New Republic , 122 (March 6, 
1950), 36. 
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interests require may in certain cases seriously 
affect particular interests in the United States. 
But dare we in our new role continue to subject 
the whole American people to several billions 
of .dollars or taxes eaeh year in order to pro-
tect these special groupsf52 
Previously he bad declared: 
A self-sufficient and prosperous Europe ean well 
buy $5 billion of goods from America instead of 
$600 million, provided, of course, we in America 
import from Europe goode of about equal value. 
This greatly expanded 1nterehaq;e between Europe 
and America should be . our goal because both con-
tinents will be enriched by such a trade. 53 
uworld trade is essential to American prosperity, and 
world trade can exist only on a two-way street,tt said Mr . 
Hoffman. 54 
In a special report to him, the joint E.C.A.-Department of 
Commerce Mission , sent to Europe in May, 1949, to study trade 
problems, said that the trade of the United States with Western 
Europe and the rest of the world was so badly unbala~c•d that 
the United States 1n its own interest, as well as that of 
Europe, must seek a .fundamental solution based primarily upon 
greatly expanded imports to the United States. 
Pointing out that the United States was not importing 
enough from European Recovery Program countries for them to 
53:Paul G. Hoffman, Address before the Pittsbur 
of commerce on February · , ngton: 
54Paul G. Hoffman , 11 The Marshall Plan: Its Progress- and 
Problems," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 170 ( September 
22, 1949), 1170. 
, 4. 
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earn sufficient dollars to pay for what they must buy from the 
United States, the report said expanded sales in the Uni.ted 
States were necessary to bridge the dollar gap, which acted 
as a break on European recovery and a drain on American tax-
payers. 'Ihe report said that, because of the European dollar 
short(!lge, United Statee exports have been maintained by sub-
sidiee at taxpayers• e.xp.ense, the United States Government 
having provided $49 b1111on in grants and $19 bill-ion 1n loans 
to foreign countries from July, 1914, through 1948. ltporeign 
aid programs," it continued, 1'bave been necessary to prevent 
chaos and keep free institutions a11ve.n56 
Speaking about this special report, r.tr. Hoffman said: 
It is believed that neny 1 tems produced in Europe 
could be imported into the United Statee with 
little or no effect upon our own industrial econ-
omy. A number of items produced in Europe are 
not produced here. In the case of other commodi-
ties and products, competition would not be . 
involved to a great degree. The American capacity 
to consume is so large that it can absorb European 
imports in a volume important to European recovery, 
but only fractional in comparison to our productive 
resources.56 
He added that expansion in United State·s purchases from 
Europe and its dependencies is most likely in the fields of · 
tourism, raw :materials, and manufactured goods designed for 
specialized purposes or requiring special skills or unique 
raw materials for their production. 
~~eonom1c Cooperation Administration, The European 
Recovery Program - Report of the E.C.A.-Commerce M!sslon, 
(Washingto~:- Government Printing Office, October, 1949), 17. 
56Econ·o:m1c Coopera t1on Administration, A Current .. ~Report OJ>. 
the Marshall Plan Pre ared for the E.c.A. Public Advieor Board, 
No. ng on: E.C.A., Novem er, 4 • 
Any development in the European economic position, 
(said Prof . Lincoln Gordon of Harvard University), 
~as 1 ts counterpart in American foreign trade; 
indirectly 1 t al so affects . the level and compos1-
t1.on of domest1c .Ame.r1can activity. On the politi-
cal side , it n.eed hardly be pointed out so soon 
after two ·world wars with their principal origines 
in Europe that developments across the Atlantic 
may be the most potent determinants of our well-
being . 5! 
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nEurope ~ust earn - and United States must help to allow 
Europe to earn - mo;J"e · dollars in order to meet 1 ts dollar defi -
cit , ~ said Mr . Hoffman . nThis is not Just a fiscal nor a 
budgetary necessity. It is one of the necessities of healthy, 
peaceful and prosperous economte relations between Europe and 
1 11 58 Amer oa. 
In a talk delivered recently at the meeting of the Dayton 
Council on World Affairs, he noted that: 
Before we can claim e lasting victory for Western 
Europe and ourselves, a great adjustment must ,take 
place on this side of the Atlantic . We must condi-
tion ourselves to import about 2 1/2 billion ·more 
a year from Europe . T.bat increase canno!9poss1bly 
affect adversely our economy as a whole . 
Answering questions asked about the Marshall .Plan at the 
Dayton meeting, .Mr . Hoffman stated that these imports would en-
rich the lives of the American people and streng.then th~ir 
· economy . Of the increase, about 11 billion would be in non-
57Harvard Business Review, (FebJtUary, 1949), 3 . 
58:paul G. Hoffman, "The Marshall .,Plan: Its Progress and 
.Problems , " Commercial and · Financial Chronicle , 170 ( September 
22, 1949), 1170. 
59Economlc Cooperation Administration, E. C. A. At Work%, 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, larch 20, · 1950), l . 
114 
competitive items - such as American tourist trade in Europe 
and imports of many essential items, many vital to national 
defense. The remaining $1 1/2 billion might be competitive. 
This would represent 6/10 of one per cent of the total national 
produc t1on. 
This amount of additional imports., {continued 
Mr. Hoffman), cannot possibly harm our total 
national economy, but for Europe 1t means eeo-
nomic life or death. It can mean additional 
competition for some American producers - but 
America bas grown strong through competition. 
And each dollar spent for an additional import 
means ano~ser dollar spent abroad for American 
products. 
In 1ndors1ng another year of European aid, the Congress of 
Industrial Organizatlons, one of the two largest American labor 
organizations, touched on the question of admitting add1 tional 
foreign imports that would compete with domestic goods. A state-
ment by Philip Murray, President of the c.1.0., presented to 
the Senate Foreign Rela ti.ons Committee by Michael Ross, Director 
of the c.r.o. department for international affairs, pointed,cout: 
Our official c. I .o. policy is for economic 
expansion and growth .which will help maintain 
full employment and high prosper! ty, of which 
international trade is a fundamental part. 
In the long run, if Europe is to be self-
supporting, we must allow her to repay us for 
our aid. There is no way for Europe to do this, 
except by sending us her goods and providing us 
with services.61 
60Ib1d. I 4 • 
6loklahoma City Times, "c.1.0. Indorses More European 
Importa,w (February~S, 1950), a. 
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On the surface this looks as if the United States is getting 
the worst end of the bargain. The United States is assisting 
other nations in orde,r to have stronger competitors, but, 1n 
reality, this la not so. In 1949, in spite of the decrease in 
exports and the increase in imports to the United States, the 
excess o:f exports o:f this country still amounted to 15,376 
m1ll1on.62 Hence, either it buys more abroad and ships less 
abroad, or the American taxpayers pay for the e,xcesa of exports 
over imports from this country. , In 1946, the United States 
export surplus for the rest of the world was t, .a billion; in 
1947, it ran to $11~3 billion; in 1948, it was $6 .3 billion.63 
Is it any wonder, then, that payments cannot be made or are 
restricted? American taxpayers and consumers will continue to 
pay indefinitely, unless foreign nations are enabled to help 
themselves. 
A, dec1ai1ve condition for the solution of the dollar problan 
is ·;the maintenance of a hii#l level of business activity in the 
United states and in all countries: It United States demand 1a 
strong, primary producers earn large amounts o.f dollars and there 
ia an expanding market for participating countries' products; 
if United States demand weakens , the primary producers' dollar 
62Mareua Nadler, aimpact of International Situation on 
United States Economy," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 171 
( March 9, 1950), 1030. 
~eonom1c Cooperation Administration., The Euro~an Recovery 
Program - Report of the E.C.A.-Commerce Mission; (Wa ington: 
Government Printing Office, October, 1949), 3. 
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earnings rapidly fall away, and it becomes impossible to 
develop sales of quality products. The sort or expansion of 
dollar 'earnings which the Marshall Plan countries contemplate 
ia inconceivable in eond1tiona of declining business activity 
in the United States. Even a small adjustment in the United 
States business activity can have altogether disproportionate 
effects upon the Marshall Plan countries, whose financial and 
physical reserves are not large enough to take the strain of 
a .sudden loss of earnings; tbe losses of war and the crises 
of the post-war period have sorely weakened the Mar21hall Plan 
countries' external capital position, and this renders them 
much more vulnerable to· sudden change. 
It is hoped that 1 t will be possible to correct this to 
some extent during the next two years; without such a s treng-
then1ng, an effective world-wide multilateral trading and 
financial system will still be far away. 
The problem confronting the Western European 
countries, ( said Marcus Nadler, Prof. of Banking 
and Finance at New York University), w111 be 
alleviated if the economy of the United States 
1a kept strong, sound, and growing, thereby 
creating a greater demand tor imports of raw 
ma teriala and giving the Russians the lie about 
the weakness of , Cap1tal1em.64 
Mr . Roffman deelareds 
European production baa been mounting in volume, 
and European exports have been mounting in volume, 
6411arcus Nadler, loc. cit. 
but the catch is that they have gone mostly to 
soft-currency markets. Unless European manu-
facturers can aell to the dollar markets and 
unless, by vigorous and imaginative merchandising, 
they succeed in selling to the dollar market, 
Europe cannot obtain adequate food and raw 
materialg essential to a rising standard of 
living. 
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Most of the Karahall Plan countries governments have intro-
duced special schemes to encourage their producers and merchants 
to go for the North American marks t. This 1mpl1ea forcing the 
way into new markets, developing new techniques ot merehand.1s-
1ng and assuming additional costs and riaka. But the dollar-
earning drive cannot make its full contribution if the efro»ta 
of manufacturers and traders are impeded by high tariffs and 
arbitrary customs procedures. 
4. United States Tariff Walla. 
Prominent among the obstacles whose elimination would 
foster soundly expanded import trade, were listed in the special 
r. -- · 'Ort of the E.C.A.-Department of Commerce Mission: oppressive 
controls imposed· by the government a of exporting nations; th~ 
higil Al&erican tariff; United States customs procedures;· "buy 
American•• restr1et1ons on federal, state and local government 
procurement, and the high pr ices at which a number of products 
are offered to the United States market. 
Suggestions were made to the United States and foreign 
governments as to what could be done to expand imports to the 
65paul G. Hoffman, "The Marshall Plan: Its Progress and 
Problem•;" CoDlllercial and Financial Chronicle, 170 (September 
22, 19~9, 11'10. 
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United States and recommendation was stressed that the Organiza-
tion for European Economic Cooperation direct its greatest 
effort toward promoting the elimination of trade barriers 1n 
European countriea.66 
-The antiquated tariff laws of the United States, restrict-
ing imports, discourage efforts to repay. In 1921 and 1922 
American tariffs were raised, finally reaching reeord levels 
in the Hawley-Smoot 'fariff Act of 1930 .. Since these high im-
port duties made it difficult to sell foreign goods and services 
in the United States, many foreign borrowers were unable to earn 
American dollars in order to repay their debts to the United 
States or to buy Unite.d States export goods. 67 
The United States tariff still remains a considerable 
obstacle to imports. Rates of over 50 per cent are eommon.68 
In 1930, the depression convinced the Congress that the 
best way to bring back prosper1 ty was to keep foreign goods 
out or the United States, and high duties and complieated 
regulations were applied in order that foreigners could not 
compete very successfully in American narkets. Today, economic 
66Eeonom1c Cooperation Administration, The European Recoverz 
Program .;.Report of the E.C.A.-Cemmerce Misa!on, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, October, 1949), 17. 
Summary 
, 2. 
68organ1zat1on for European Economic Cooperation, European 
Recover Pvo ramme - Secord Re ort of (Paria: 
e n s ra • 
I 
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conditions are completely reversed. 'Ib.e United States has high 
employment, enormous production; the manufacturers no longer 
need a high protective tariff wall - they need markets abroad. 
The farmers, overproducing, must sell in foreign lands, and 
still the antiquated tariff laws and regulations remain in 
force, serving to shut off these foreign markebl, because the 
United States cannot sell, unlesa it buys. 
In the Report of the E.C.A.-Commerce Mission (headed by 
Mr . Wayne 'filylor) to investigate possibilities or increasing 
Western Europe's dollar earnings, there are many striking 
illustrations of the ~1gh rates of duty on manufactured imports, 
or potential imports, from Western Europe . 69 
With so many d1!1'1cultiea and uncertainties, it 1s hardly 
surprising that European manufacturers, especially the small 
ones on whom so many speciality exports depend, should be 
reluctant to embark on trade with the United States . 
These obstacles are coating American taxpayers about $1 
billion a year. This is what Harry s. Radclitte, executive 
secretary of the National Council of Importers, one ot the top 
authorities on imports, says: "If Congress will revise ade-
quately the customs regulations, imports will increase at least 
a billion a year."70 In other worde, foreign nations ould 
sell the United States $1 billion more of their goods, and, 
69~., 69, 161, 167, 193, 201. 
70Jerome Beatty, ttwe Can Save a Billion D~llars," The 
American :Magazine, CXLIX, l (January, 1950}, 30. -
consequently, they would have $1 billion more with which to 
pay the United States. for the goods it now gives them free 
under the Marshall Plan. 
Mr. Hoffman has pointed out tbat 0 many .American tariff 
rates still remain high and, in some cases, prohibitory on 
a wide range of products, many of which are non-competitive 
with United States goods. tt71 
We need to keep our tariffs reasonably low, 
(he declared), simplify our customs regula-
tions, and above all turn a deaf ear to the 
groups which call for "protection" as soon 
as imports begin to come. Provisions may be 
advisable to cushion the localized shock for 
certain workers and producers, but we cannot 
any longer allow .th~ special 1n1~rests to 
over-ride the national welfare. 
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When Paul O. Hoffman urged the United States to relax 1 ts 
trade restrictions slightly and admit a billion dollars worth 
of European goods into the American market, it was observed 
that, if the American people purchased a billion dollars worth 
of European goods, they are not likely to purchase a billion 
dollars worth of American goods. That might mean a letdown in 
the American domestic business and might lead to a considerable 
measure of unemployment and a consequent measure of privation. 
So, in order to heal the hurt of an enlarged importation of 
of European goods, Mr. Hoffman suggested that Congress :make an 
72Econom1c Cooperation Administration, E.C.A. At Workl 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, March 2o, 1950), 4. 
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enlarged provision for unemployment compensation. This would 
seem a vicious circle, but 1t should be the only way to permit 
a vastly expanding purchasing power of the European countries -
more than is promised by the business outlook - and to compensate 
the decrease in the home market for American production. 
The Joint communique issued by the United States , United 
Kingdom and Canadian Governments, on September 12, 1949, in-
cluded the following declarations: 
The United States and Canada should reduce ob-
stacles to the entry of goods and services from 
debtor countries in order to provide as wide an 
opportunity as possible for those countries to 
earn dollars. 
High tariffs are clearly inconsistent with the 
position of creditor countries.73 
These declarations are an encouragement to the participating 
countries. If they can put more drive into their efforts to 
find markets in the united States and can count on a more liberal 
import policy there, a large increase in dollar earnings can be 
won. 
5. European Economic Integration 
1he results of the Marshall Plan at the half-way mark, besides 
American aid, are due in great part to the efforts of the European 
countries to Join closer together and to integrate their economies. 
At the Marshall Plan half-way mark celebration, Secretary 
of State Acheson declared: 
All over the Continent people were longing to 
rebuild a useful and orderly existence after 
the long misery and the violence of war. They 
wanted to restore their homes am farms and 
workshops. They wanted to plan for the futures 
of themselves and their families; they wanted 
to move toward a more promising day, toward a 
world 1n which peace might endure • 
• • • With\OW aid, we hoped that the weak and 
war-wracked organism of E'Urope could regain 
strength and health ••• 
The progress that has been made is a triumph 
ot man's ingenuity, of man's will, of D'lln, s 
contidenee in the power of free institutions. 
It is not a triumph for any one nation, or for 
any one class, but triumph of cooperat1on.7~ 
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The capital importance of the economic integration of Europe 
was clearly recognized by the Congress of the United States. In 
amending the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, on April 19, 1949, 
1 t declared: 
Mindful of the advantages which the United States 
has enjoyed through the existence of a large 
domestic market with no internal barriers, and 
believing that similar advantages can accrue to 
the countries of Europe, it 1e declared to be 
the policy of the people of the United States to 
encourage these countries through their joint 
organization to exert sustained common efforts 
to achieve speedily that economic cooperation 
in Europe which is essential for lasting peace 
and prosperity. 
It is further declared to be the policy of the 
people of the United States to encourage the uni-
fication of Europe, and to sustain and strengthen 
principles of individual liberty, free institutions, 
aIXl genuine independence in Europe through aaeia-
tance to those countries of Europe which participate 
74Eeonom1c Cooperation Administration , The Marshall Plan 
at Mid-Point, (Washington: E.C.A., April, 1950), 4. 
aa1d: 
in a joint recovery program based upon self-help 
and mutual coopera~ion. 75 
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In his speech at mid-point celebration, General Marshall 
It 1s true that for Western Europe to get 1ts 
economic house 1n such order that it can survive 
and prosper in this competitive modern world 
requires a tremendous final effort over the next 
two years. The erasing of old trade barriers and 
the construction of new channels, such as a 
clearing union for Europe's varied moneys, may 
require a miracle of cooperat1on .76 
An economically strong world outside the Iron Curtain in 
the long- run is bound to have a favorable effect on the United 
Sta tea economically and m111 tarily. A strong 'V'~estem Europe 
whose economies are coordinated, no matter how great the cost 
may be, will b .e cheaper then a weak 'Europe constantly threatened 
by the aggression of the Soviet Union . 
"A prosperous, stable Europe and a wisely cooperating America, tt 
said :Mr. Hoffman, nare indispensable partnera in building the 
peace or the world. We are living in a moment of great crisis, 
but we are also living in a moment of great opportunity."77 
The Economic Cooperation Administrator thought the moment 
bad come to move faster toward the long- range goals of the Marshall 
76United States Code - Confressional Service, Slet Congress -
1st Seas . , Vo! . I, (st. Paul, ~nn . : West Publishing co ., 1950), 
53- 54 . 
76Econom1c Cooperation Administration , The Marshall Plan at 
Mid- Point, (Washington: E. C. A., April, 19$)), 4. 
77paul G. Hoffman., "The Marshall Plan: Its Progress and 
Problemst" Commercial and Financial Chronicle , 170 (September 
22, 1949} , ll70. 
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Plan, as he demanded that the Europeans do something serious 
about the economic integration or Western Europe . Be called 
for Europe to establish, without delay, an economic unification 
which would create a single market of 270 million consumers, 
saying that only within such a framework Europe can begin to 
become truly self-supporting and achieve a rising standard of 
living. Speaking before the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, 1n Paris, on October 31, 1949, he warned that 
"integration is a practical necessity in Western Europe today." 
We must now devote our fullest energies to the 
building of an expanding economy in Western 
Europe, through economic integration. Thia 
would make it possible for Europe to improve 
its competitive position in the world and thus 
more nearly satisfy the expectations and needs 
of its people. 
The people and the Congress of the United States, 
and, I am sure, a great majority of the people 
of Europe bave instinctively felt tba t economic 
integration ls essential if there is to be an 
end to Europe's recurring economic crises. A 
ope an program to this end - one which showed 
reail promise of taking this great forward step 
aucceaafully, would, I strongly believe, g1 ve 
new impetus to American support for carrying 
;;b.rough into 1952 our joint effort toward 
lasting European recovery. 
'!'his is a vital objective. It was to this tbat 
Secretary Marshall pointed in the speech which 
sparked Europe to new hope and new endeavor. It 
was on this promise that the Congress of the 
United States enacted the Economic Cooperation 
Act. This goal is embedded in the Convention of 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. 
This is the goal which President Truman reaffirmed 
to me just before I left Waahington.78 
· Paul G. Hoffman, E.C. A. Asks O,E . E .c. for 1950 Program, 
(Washington: E .C. A., 1949), 3-8. 
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He defined "integration" as the formation in Western 
Europe of a single economic market where all restrictions on 
movement of goods and eventually all tariffs are permanently 
swept aside." He explained that if trade among the nations 
of Western Europe was permitted without restriction, there would 
be a greater interchange of goods and, as a result, more produc-
tion. It would create, moreover, mass-markets for low-cost, 
mass-produced goods,79 
One such restriction is "dual pricing." This practice 
limits the volume of intra-European trade and hampers recovery. 
It is essentially a form of price discrimination that is fairly 
widespread in Western Europe, and involves setting higher prices 
for foreign buyers than are charged domestic purchasers of the 
same commodity, The reasons for dual pricing are, first, a 
desire to obtain higher retums from export sales; second, 
governments wish to restrain inflation at home by keeping cer-
tain commodities at artificially low price levels, or below 
world market prices; and third, the competitive ability of 
domestic 1ndustrie.s is improved by the assurance that certain 
raw materials produced in the country will be cheaper than 
those obtainable by foreign competitors. 
But, since each country adversely affected by the higher 
import prices seeks to retaliate to the limit of 1 ts bargaining 
power by raising its own prices, the end results are higher costs 
79Ib1d., a. 
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throughout Western Europe. If this trend is continued , Europe 
may be permanently saddled with many high- cost industries . 
"It cannot be squared with your pledges of mutual aid , " 
warned the Administrator . SO 
Another restriction is 111mport quotas'' - limitations on 
the amount of goods one country will import from another . Such 
restrictive trade leads to development of uneconomic substitute 
industries to supply normally imported goods for wh1.ch the 
specific foreign currency is not available . 
I e.an assure, (declared Mr . Hoffman), that 
throughout Europe there is an awareness of the 
urgent necessity of coming quickly to grips 
with the problems of economic unification and 
increased dollar earnings . Bl 
During 1949 , the participating countries agreed to take 
an important step toward the removal of quantitative restric-
tions . They undertook to remove such restrictions on at least 
50 per cent of their trade on private account with other parti-
cipants by December 15, 1949 , both in relation to total trade 
and to each of the three principal groups of imports: food and 
feeding stuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods . These 
undertakings have, on the whole , been t'ulfilled. The trend in 
commercial policy in Western Europe over the past twenty years 
has thus been reversed. 82 
a0Ib1d. 
Slpaul G. Hoffman, "'!he Marshall Plan: Its Progress and 
Problems , " Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 170 (September 
22, 1949) , 1170. 
Before the American Federation of Labor, in st. Paul, 
Minnesota, Paul G. Hoffman declared last November: 
••• I am glad that I can bring you an item of 
good news. It is tidings of what shall . surely 
b~ a better day for Euro-pe, and 1f a better ~ay 
for Europe, a better ·day for the world. 
For three European nations have' just taken an 
historic step. Italy, Great Britain and France 
are lifting quantitative restrictions and 
import quotas as much as 55 per cent of their 
total imports- fro·~ other" Marshall Plan co·untries. 
This is a practical move towards creating within 
Western Europe the same sort of free inter-course 
that h\s proven so fruitful among the forty-eight 
states in our own country • • .83 
Member countries have_ now decided to make it thei·r aim 
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to remove, as soon as a satisfactory payments so.heme comes into 
force, quantitative restrictions on at least 60 per cent of 
their imports on: private account from other Member countries. 
As soon as possible after June 30, 1950, they will decide what 
further progress during 1950 they ehould undertake ~it~ a view 
to at_tain1ng a liberalization of 75 per oent of their imports 
on private account from other participating eountr1e·s. The 
parti'cipating countries have decided that in any event quotas 
still existing after December 31, 195.0, would have to be justi-
fied. To give effect to this, the participating countries are 
considering methods by which a European Payments Union might be 
established to make possible the transferability of European 
currencies. 84 
83isconom1c Cooperation Administration, A Current Report on 
:Marshall Plan Pre ared for the E.C .A. Publ!e Adv1so Board, 
as • 
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6. European Payments Union and Regional Agreements. 
To achieve complete freedom of intra-European trade would 
require free transferability of .currencies. Tb.ere· has been 
effective collective action toward this goal , particularly in 
intra-European trade and payments. Intra-European trade in 
1947 was only about 2/3 of pre-war volume, end the lack of 
dollars and scarcity of key commodities were forcing countries 
increasingly to resort to bilateral bargaining, and even to 
barter. In 1948 was adopted the first Intra~European Payments 
Scheme and, in 1949, this was followed by the second, ,which 
sought to remedy defects in the first aoheme and introduce a 
greater element of flexibility. These schemes, which were 
temporary devices designed to enable the Marshall Plan countries 
to obtain essential imports from each other, were instrumental 
in enabling the recovery of production and the overcoming of 
inflation in individual countries to be strengthened and fostered 
by a ·recovery of intra-European trade, which is now equivalent 
in value to $9 billion a year - about the pre-war volume. In 
the past two years, trade between the participating countries 
has increased by 50 per cent, exports to non-participating 
countries by 1/3. The deficit with the rest of the world wae. 
reduced from $7 1/2 billion in 1947 to little more then $4 
billion in 1949.85 
85 
~-, 77. 
Tp.e Marshall Plan countries are now negotiating a new 
European Payments union which will act as a clearing-house 
for the nations of Western Europe in settling their debts 
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with each other and also, to some extent, aa a bank to finance 
a deficit country. 
The Economic Cooperation Administration planned to with-
hold not less than $600 million from the total 1950-51 appro-
priation, which could be made available to the new European 
Payments Union to encourage economic unity. 86 
On May 5, 1950, the Congress authorized the Economic 
Cooperation Administration to use that amount of money "in 
order to facilitate the development of transferability of 
European currencies, or to promote the liberalization of trade 
by participating countries with one another and with other 
countrie a. "87 
On November 2, 1949, it was agreed by the Organization 
:for European Economic Cooperation that it might be 
desirable to provide for a closer economic and 
monetary association on ·a regional basis between 
some of the Member countries, mere the requis1 te 
conditions already exist, such arrangements ~o 
be compatible with the wider poasib111 tiea -that 
may be of:fered b y the co·llec ti ve action of all 
Member countriea.88 
86Econom.1c Cooperation Administration, E.C.A. At Workl, 
(Dayton, Ohio·: Dayton · Council on World Af'fa!re, .March 20, 
1950), 4. 
87u. s. Congress, House, Economic Coo~eration Act of 1950, 
H. R. 7797, 81st Cong., 2nd Sees. (Waihlng on: Government 
Printing Office, May 5, 1950), 31. 
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Since the end of the war, a number of regional agreements 
have been concluded. The first of these was that between Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, generally known as~ nelux." 
The Franco-Italian customs Union .waa agreed upon in pririciple in 
March, 1948. More recently, negotia tiona were begun between 
France, Italy and Benelux; and an agreement has been reached 
between the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries: 
Dem:nark, Norway and Sweden. 89 
The regional agreements are all directed toward a more 
liberal pattern of tra4e and pa~ents. They constitute a real 
and practical advance toward the objectives of the Mar~all Plan. 
The laat three arrangements are still at an early stage, but 
that of Benelux has already yielded positive results of importance. 
'7. Difficulties to Overcome for European Economic Integration. 
-
But, in the opinion of the ltrctonQmtet Cooperation -Administra-
tion, the European Recovery Program countries have not done 
enough to aintegrateft the economy of Western Europe, and admittedly 
a gl"eat deal more remains to be done before this integration ean 
be fully achieved. 
On the Europ~an side, ( said Mr . Hoffman ), complex 
and deep-seated attitudes must be changed. Western 
'Europe ''s present inability . to pay it.a own way stems 
.not only from •ars but from indulgences in economic 
practices tba t are basically unsound. Those prac-
tices have a long history.90 
89D>1d. 
9~conom1c Cooperation Administration, E.C.A. At Work!, 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, March 2o, 1950), 1. 
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He continued, saying that wherever producers are ineffi.;. -
oient, pressure for the erection of trade barriers against 
foreign competition sets in, and that . is what happened in 
EUrope. It is this economic nationalism which must be up-rooted 
it Europe is to produce the quantity of· goods and the kind of 
goods at competitive prices, which will not only put her in a 
position to earn the dollars she requires for grains, cotton 
and other items from the Western Hemisphere, but also to raise 
the standard of living of her people, and free her from depen-
dence on extraordinary outside aid at the earliest possible 
date. 
Economic Cooperation Administration's position, 
(Hoffman said), that Europe must move boldly in 
the reduction of trade barriers, has been attacked 
ae an impractical dream. Our reply is that there 
are moments in history when the impractical becomes 
a practical necessity. It is, in our view; quite 
·impossible for Europe to become e nduringly &e lf-
supporting_ with a reasonably high . stand_ard of 
living for its people, unless Western .burope•s 
270 million co~sumera are welded into a single 
-grea t market.91 
This is the objective toward which the Marshall Plan is 
striving. But why is it so difficult to reach this objective 
which looks so reasonable? 
In Western Europe, during the past 40 to 50 years economic 
initiative and en terpr1se have been stifled by narrow and non-
compet1 t1ve national markets. 'lb.e stagnation of enterprise and 
initiative was encouraged by trade barriers and restrictive 
trade practices which producers relied upon to maintain sales 
91Ibid. 
-
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and protect high cost and inefficient operations. There was 
little inclination by governments or producers to tackle the 
problem of increased productivity. Protected by tariffs, 
cartels and other restrictive practices, uneconomic industries 
persisted, catering to the limited and protected home markets, 
or able to sell their goods abroad only because of export sub-
sidies and bilateral agreements. 
Besides, this integration involves economic as well aa 
social and political changes. Many barriers will have to be 
torn down, barriers of false national pride, tariffs, social 
injustices, ancient prejudices. Many a day-dream will have to 
end, economic and political isolation will have to give way to 
cooperation and coordination. 
While efforts have been made to 1ntegra te the European 
economies, the goal has not yet been completely attained because 
of the conflicting economic interests of the individual coun-
tries. These often are deep-rooted. Integration of the European 
economy involves a great many difficulties and obstructions. 
The economies are not entirely complementary and there are 
individual groups which fear that they may be adversely affected 
by competition. Also, there is the great fear, (particularly 
in .Great Britain), that integration may lead to an increase 
of unemployment. 
In removing restrictions, governments must pay regard to 
the fact that the reappearance of competition will adversely 
affect some sections of the population and may call for social 
and economic adjustments that will be d1ff1~lt to carry out, 
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\ 
especially in countries already :faced with heavy url~mplbyment. 
l, . 
~ \ . 
If widespread dislocation of production and anploym~t 1ere to 
:follow :from freer trade, one of the main objects of the European 
Recovery Frogram would be frustrated. 
The most serious difficulti es, however, have yet to be 
! 
.faced. The current levels o.f economic activity and living 
standards depend on large-scale American aid that will diminish 
rapidly over the next two years. The next stage in .treeing 
intra-European trade and payments will be more difficult than 
the firs_t. Nevertheless it is right to record the very striking 
progress that has been made, and to draw :from it encouragement 
in the tasks that lie ahead. 
The period of the Marshall Plan has also been that o:f the 
Brussels Treaty, the Council of Europe, and the Atlantic Pact. 
At any time before 1947 so much progress would have seemed 
little short of miraculous. It may not be union, but 1t is a 
degree of unity never achieved in t h e Atlantic world before. 
nwestern Europe has made more progress towards economic 
union under the :Marshall Plan than in the last 600 years,n 
said Mr. Hoffman. 92 
With the experience of the past two years to draw upon, 
the participating countries can now make further progreBs toward 
a closer economic integration in Western Europe. This is a 
step toward the creation of a world-wide multilateral trade and 
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payments system. The objective is clear - it is to secure 
to the .fullest extent possible the advantage of a large compe-
titive market with 1nQreaeed speGial1zat1on of production. To 
gain th.is objective, Western Europe has embarked on the pro-
gressi've removal of restrictions that hamper the flow of goods 
and services between the participating countries, and on the 
creation of a multilateral payments system. 
The task for Europe will be to encourage maximum practical 
investment in productive enterprise, and to encourage European 
Recovery Program co\.Ultrie s to adopt f'inancial and economic 
policies that will enable them to move as fast as possible 
toward a ba~ance in dollar accounts. 
This will be done through more intensive development of 
the reaources of the dependent overseas territories, and through 
integration of the economy of Western Europe, the creation of 
a freely trading area of 270 million workers and consumers in 
which quantitative restrictions on trade, monetary barriers, 
and eventually all tariffs would be permanently swept away. 
Tb.is would bring to Europe the stimulus of intensified competi-
tion and the economies of mass production for a mass market. 
Of course, other things should be done by the European 
countries, too, before the Marshall Plan ends, to give it 
optimum effectiveness, for instance, tax reforms and land 
reforms in France and Italy. The Economic Cooperation Adminis-
tration favo~s such reforms and insists upon them. 
Europe can also bring an intensive and a concerted attack 
on the problem of increasing productivity, and of lowering cos t s • 
. ' 
Moat important of all wi 11 be the direct promotion of 
exports in the dollar area and the encouragement of dollar 
earning by the establishment of adequate credit facilities 
for export trade, and the maximum stimulation of American 
tourist trade . 
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It is the job of the Economic Cooperation Adm1n1strat1on 
in the next two years to help bring about those fundamental 
adjustments in European and United States economic policies 
and practices that will allow Europe's trade, the trade of 
the united States, and the trade of the world to continue at 
a livable level without Marshall Plan subsidy . 
Also, in order to maintain gains already achieved and to 
make further progre~s, the Economic Cooperation Administration 
is encouraging and helping the participating countries over 
the next two years to devise effective ways and means ~or: 
coordinating national f1 seal and monetary policies and adjusting 
exchange rates; harmonizing commercial policies and practices; 
and cushioning the shocks of adj us tmen ts to removal of bar,riers . 
'·The E. C.A. is asking Europe to force in 25 months a process 
of economic 1ntegra tion which might nonnally take 25 years~''' said 
Mr . Hoffman . 93 
It should be possible to lay in the next two or three 
years the foundation of the new political structure 1n Europe 
without which economic integration - in the full sense of the 
word - can never be achieved.1 The ueans do not yet exist for 
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perauading governments , business interests and the ordinary 
voters that the sacrifice.a which sueh integration would involve 
are tolerable in the short and beneficial in the long run. 
There is no form for European debate save the infant Council 
of Europe; there is no agreed democratic procedure by which 
national policies can be coordinated . 
America bas the power, if it will be patient , to impel 
Europe along the road to real integration; but it must recog-
nize the fact that it ms.y take a generation of planning and 
adaptation to reach the stage at which it brings real economic 
benefits to the Continent, It has also the power to persuade 
Europe to take all the risks involved 1n quickly creating 
a free market - if it will underwrite the venture . What is 
not possible , what might indeed shatter the Marshall Plan and 
frustra.te the whole purpose of American policy, is a spectacular 
attempt to combine short-ter~ recovery wi th a long- term reorgani-
zation ·of Europe, to telescope into one great act or policy 
a process which took over thr·ee generations to complete in the 
pre - industrial United Statea;.,.94 
In the future , efforts to coordinate new investments and 
to liberalize trade and . payments will be combined as part of 
a general attack on the problem of making the beat use of 
European resources . Positive measures for the co rdination of 
investment mp_st be des.igned to promote a pa.ttern r,f production 
94ttcongresa Expects , ·'-' .The Economist, 1§.7 (November 5, 1949), 
987 . 
that, by earning or saving dollars, will contribute to the 
final solution of the dollar problem. 
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The habit of working together is being formed in all the 
Marshall Plan countries, different though they are in their 
political, economic and social structures. A strong working 
organization has been built up (Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation); it has been tested and has proved its 
worth in the delicate operation of recommending division of 
aid and formulating the payments schemes, in carrying out the 
freeing or trade and 1n dealing with the mass of day-to-day 
business of cooperation. In the course of th.is work, a mutual 
understanding is being built up in Western Europe. In the 
future, as in the past, the frank discussion of difficulties 
which inevitably appear will be the foundation of European 
cooperation. This cooperation is indispensable: in it lies 
the best hope for the future. 
8. Future Developments of the arahall Plan. 
The balance of judgment on the Marshall Plan at the half-
way mark must be that in those directions in which it was best 
fitted to produce an effect, it hae been a complete success. 
The first aim, to stave off complete economic collapse 
and to make good the dislocation of war, restoring and raising 
Western Europe's productive capacity, has been largely achieved. 
The second aim, to restore balance in world trade ani thus 
make possible a return to freely convertible currencies and 
multilateral trading, can be accomplished only if soft European 
curre)/l.cies can be hardened into dollars. 
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'.Ihe second aim and the third, to make the .Marshall Plan 
into an instrument for bringing about the political and economic 
integration of Europe, have not been completely accomplished 
because they raised issues beyond the power of the Marshall 
Plan to settle. Even so, a part of the ground has been covered 
and the nature of the problems still to be solved is now much 
clearer than was the ease two years ago. The specific economic 
problem that worried Western Europe in 1947 is almost solved. 
The general economic rele. tionsb.ip between Europe, the dollar 
area anc:l- the sterling area, between ,manufacturing nations and 
primary pro~cers, between competitive economies and comple-
mentary economies is not yet solved, and it is this wider 
problem that the Marshall Plan is aiming to solve in the future. 94a 
The authors of the Marshall Plan hope that, if their aims 
are achieved, it will lead to: (1) the ultimate convertibility 
of the Western European currencies; (2) making it possible for 
Western Europe to be economically and militarily strong enough 
to stand on its own feet if backed by the might of the United 
States; (3) elimination of all danger of a third world war. 
The full objectives of the European Recovery Program can 
be reached by the middle of 1952, but the :Marshall Plan countries 
cannot do this alone, either by their own national efforts, or 
by collective action. 'lb.e closer 1ntegrati,on of their economies 
will be a source of strength in the long-run, but this does not 
itself contribute decisively to the immediate dollar problem. 
The balancing of trade between Western Europe and North America, 
and of both with the rest of the world, is a joint problem, which 
can be solved only by joint action. 
948•Halfway Mark,• The Econom1et, 158 (February 11, 1950), 297-9. 
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I! this action is taken, the problem can become manageable 
by 1952, To achieve and maintain a stable equilibrium within 
a world-wide multilateral trading and financial system, and 
contrib~te to further economic progress in Western Europe, 
will remain the continuing task of the Org~nization for European 
Economic Cooperation~ 
An extension of the Mari,hall Plan is President Truman's 
"Point, Four Program, tt providing teehnic.al assistance to under-
developed "'reas and, consequently, new markets for American 
goods while the United S.tates .buys from abroad, and encouraging 
American .investors to send dollars abroad. 
In hi.s message to the Congress transmitting the proposed 
legislation (The Point Four Program: Aid to Underdeveloped 
Areas), on June 24, 1949, President Truman declared: 
The develop~ent of these areas is of ~tmost im-
portance to our efforts to restore the economies 
.of the free European nation.a. As the economies 
of the underdeveloped areas expand, they will 
provide needed products for Europe and will 
offer a better market for European goods. Such 
expansion is an essential part of the growing 
s7stem of world tr~ie which is necessary for 
European recovery. ' 
Cooperation for economic recovery has led to cooperation 
for: military defense (Atlantic Pact, Military Assiatance Program, 
ete.). Institutions Qf · European cooperation have been started 
95aarry s. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeche.a and Statements, U. S. Dept. ot State (lashington: 
Government Printing Off'ic.e, 1949), 27. 
and are growing in strength: (a) Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation; (b) Council of Europe; {c) Integrated 
military defense. 
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In his address (-Collective Security and Freedom from 
Aggression) delivered before the Convention of the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, in Miami, Florida, on August 22, 1949, President 
Truman declared: 
The purpose of the Military Assistance Program 
is to prevent aggression. our European partners 
in the North Atlantic Treaty are not strong 
enough today to defend themselves effectively. 
Since the end of the war they have been concen-
trating on rebuilding their war-torn economies. 
We can strengthen . them, and ourselves, by 
transferring some military means to them, and 
by joining with them in a common defense plan. 
The Military Assistance Program is based on the 
same principle of sel.£-help and ·mutual aid that 
is the cornerstone of the European Recovery 
Program and the North Atlantic Treaty. 
We are not arming ourselves and our friends to 
start a fight with anybody. We are bu11~g 
defenses so that we won't have to fight. 
He added: 
The Military Assistance Program and the European 
Recovery Program are part and parcel of the same 
policy. There is. the closest relationship between 
economic recovery and military defense. On the 
one hand, economic recovery will lag if the 
ha\Ulting tear of military aggression is widespread. 
Such fear will prevent new investments from being 
made and new industries from being established. 
On the other hand, if protection against aggression 
1a assured, economic recoYery and adequate military 
defense must be earried for ward · together in balance. 
That is exactly what we propose to do. 
96Ib1d., 47. 
Great progress has been made in economic recovery 
in Europe. The production of the We!tern nations 
of Europe has been rising steadily. To continue 
the momentum of this economic advance it is 
necessary now to remove the obstacles created by 
the fear of military aggression.97 
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Together with the Mill tary Aid Program, designed to help 
Western Europe build up her military defenses, the Marshall 
Plan is working now at full power toward the economic recon- . 
struction of Western Europe , and there are many signs that, 
notwithstanding some di!'fieulties of pol,.1t1cal and economic 
nature, it will succeed in creating a better Europe , first step 
toward a better world. 
9. Effects on the united States Economy. 
The European Recovery Program, in contributing to the 
financing of exports, has had a stabilizing .effect on the 
American economy. The Economic Cooperation Administration pro-
vided $4.2 billion in 1949 toward the financing of these exports. 
This amount was equivalent to 27 per cent of the dollars that all 
foreign countries used during the year to finance purchases of 
goods and services in the United States and pay interest and 
dividends on American loans and investments.98 
The dollars supplied by the Economic Cooperation Adminis-
tration to the European countries for procurement outside the 
United States also helped to sustain American exports by enabling 
97 Ibid, 48. 
98Eoonom1c Cooperation Administration, Seventh Report to 
Con8yess, (Washington: Government Printing ott!ce, May a, 
195 , 58. 
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the participating countries to make dollar expenditures in 
foreign countries, which were then permitted to purchase more 
goods in the United States than they could otherwise have done • 
. Payments of E.C.A. dollars to Canada and the Latin American 
countries for goods purchased from them by the part1c1pating 
nations was the source of funds for a significant portion of 
their 1949 expenditures in the United States - 16 per cent for 
Canada and 9 per cent for Latin America . 99 
By putting Western Europe on its feet and making it an 
effective business partner in world trade, the United States 
is helping to keep its owrr wheels of industry running and is 
contributing to the prosperity of its own workers, farmers, 
and businessmen. 
American tobacco, cotton and wheat farmers have enlarged 
their bank accounts by selling produce to the United States 
government for shipment to Europe under the Marshall Plan, 
which has been a source of sizable profits to hundreds or 
companies and millions of stockholders in the United States 
itself. 
Some indication of th.e impact of the European Recovery 
Program on the American economy can be obtained by examining 
the commodities slated for procurement in the United States . 
Of the $2.7 billion worth of goods authorized during 1949 
for procurement 1n the United Statee , about $1 . 4 billion com-
prised food and agricultural items and $1 . 3 billion industrial 
commodities. About half of the total authorization were for 
99Ib1d. II 59. 
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cotton, machinery and equipment, and wheat and other bread 
grains. About 90 per cent of E.C.A.-financed requirements of 
the participating countries for food and agricultural commodi-
ties, except wheat and sugar, was purchased in the United 
States. 100 
E.C.A. financing accounted for more than half the United 
States total exports of cotton, tobacco, a.nd coarse grains to 
the participating countries and the world as a whole. Twenty 
to twenty-five per cent of the wheat, cotton, and tobacco pro-
duced in the United States in the year ending June, 1949, was 
purchased by the participating countries, with E.C.A. and other 
funds. Without E.C.A.-finan~ed procurement, Government price 
support op_era tlons :for these commodities would have been sub-
stantially larger. 101 
In its amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Congress 
took into consideration the special interest of small business 
by declaring: 
Insofar as practicable and to the maximum extent 
cons.is tent with the accomplishment of the purposes 
of this t1 tle, the Administrator shall assi.st 
American small business to participate equitably 
in the furnishi,ng of eommod1t1es and services 
financed with funds authorized under this title. 
lOOibid., 60. 
101Ibid. 
102 
• • 
102u. s . Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Eurovean Recovery Pro~ram, Sen. Report 935, on s. 2202, 80th 
Cong., 2nd Seas. (Was~lngton: Government Printing Office, 
February, 1948), 3. 
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During the period November 10 to December 10 , 1949, an 
opportunity was offered American firms - through extensive nation-
wide publicity - to register for inclusion in a directory of 
American small suppliers which the Economic Cooperation Adminis-
tration planned to distribute to importers in the participating 
countries . Approximately 15,250 companies submitted applications , 
indicating the products or services they sell, for listing in 
this directory . Also completed was the publication of the 
directory of European importers of E. c . A.- financed commodities . 103 
An analysis of E . C. A. transactions during a representative 
four-month period - May , June and November, December, 1949 -
indicates that small American firms have had a substantial share 
of the business involved in the Marshall Plan . 104 
This is an example of the interests from the Marshall Plan 
for individuals or corporations in the country, but the national 
interest, besides, is reinforced by the Marshall Plan. Critically 
ne.eded materials are being supplied to ;he United States by 
Western European nations in partial return for Marshall Plan aid . 
1 
- ··. : r 
Sine$ the beginning of the Marshall Plan , the equivalent 
~~ $217 millio~ (5 per cent of deposits) has been set aside in. 
counterpart funds for use by the United States . The United States 
portion has been devoted principally to the acquisition of 
l03E~onom1c Cooperation Administration , . Statistics e.nd 
Reports Division, Twen t - first Report for the Public Advisor 
Board of the E. C. A. , ash ng on: E. C. A. , March 4 , 
l04Ib1d ., 7 . 
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strategic materials in the United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, 
France, Denmark and Norway - committments for this purpose 
amounting to more than half of the total funds obllgated.105 
Expenditures of 5 per cent counterpart funds to purchase 
strategic materials has added over 38 million dollars worth 
to the United States supply, which otherwise would have required 
the use of direct dollar appropriations for stockpiling. Addi-
tional counterpart has been obligated for this purpose but not 
yet expended. The first procurement of stockpile commodities 
was for supplies of rubber, sisal and industrial diamonds from 
the United Kingdom. Other purchase contracts with the United 
Kingdom cover platinum, sperm oil for high grade lubricants, 
and tantalite for the manufacture of high temperature resisting 
alloys. Purchases trom other countries include bauxite, palm 
oil, quinid1ne, graphite, cryolite,_ and beryl.106 
It is estimated tnat the whole European Recovery Program 
will cost Americans, in t axes, about $100 per head, or an aver-
age of $25 a year for the four years. It has made jobs for many 
thousands of Americans in factories and on farms which have 
produced the goods for shipment overseas under the Marshall 
Plan. As Europe recovers and can pay cash for what she buys -
provided ~he United States takes a reasonable amount of imports 
105Econom1c Cooperation Administration, Statistics and 
Reports Division, ~cal Currency Counte~art Funds - Mid-Point 
Review, (Washington. E.C.A., April, 19 } , 1. 
l06Ibid., 2. 
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in return - those jobs will be permanent and the E.C.A. tax-
funds will cease after 1952.107 
A prosperous Europe means more jobs for Americans because 
,, ' 
the United States already sells one-tenth of all its ftmoveable 
goodstt - anything which can be exported to foreign countries, 
and its trade is always best with the more prosperous, 1ndus-
trialized nations. Both the American Federation of Labor and 
the Congress of Industrial Organizations have warmly endorsed 
the Marshall Plan.108 
107 Economic Cooperation Administration,._ E.C.A. At Work !, 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, larch 2o, 1950), 4. 
108Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL GAINS OF ~ MARSHALL PLAN 
AND NECESSITY OF ITS CONTINUATION 
l. Results in Europe . 
To the truly stupendoue economic achievements of the Mar-
shall Plan are directly attributable the recent social and 
political gains in Western Europe . 
Socially, the European Recovery Program bas meant improved 
standards of living in Western Europe, more jobs, more food, 
better clothing, better housing. A sustaining diet has been 
restored. Real wages and living conditions have improved 
materially. These are the visible results of the progr~, not-
withstanding living standards still lag some 10 per cent 
below the pre-war levels. Western Europe now bas an adequate 
diet. Europeans still are not well-fed by American standards, 
but the threat of starvation, wh.1c1l existed when the Marshall 
l Plan started, 1s no more. 
The European Recovery Program has succeeded in turning 
back the tide of Communism in Western Europe . It has stiffened 
the ability and the will of the peoples in Western Europe to 
resist Communist movements within their own borders and to 
strengthen their democratic governments. Individual freedom 
has been strengthened. 
l Economic Cooperation Administration, '!he Marshall Plm -
Where We Are and Where We Are · Going, (Washington: . E.C.A., 
Marcli 31, l95Q} I l. 
Before the E . C . A. went into operation, ( declared 
Mr. Hoffman), the Marshall Plan was already 
paying dividends. The hope engendered by the 
proposal proved enough to off set the frenzied 
e.fforts of the Cominform. to make Russian police 
stat·ee of Italy and France.. What might have 
happened to the nations of Western Europe if 
those two countries had been drawn into the 
Russian orbit, is too grim to think about . 
Once the plan was in action, American dollars 
did ·more than just augment scanty rations and 
bring up production .figures. They have give.n 
. heart to the workers, restored the confidence 
of the people, brought new vigor into commun1-
t1 es that a year ago were listless and inert. 
The tide of communism in western Europe is 
ebbing wherever the Marshall Plan has gone . 
The Kremlin has been altogether too successful 
in carrying out its plan for world conquest since 
V-J Day , but it has been stopi:e d cold in thie 
cold war it declared in Western Europe.2 
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In his talk delivered recently at the meeting of the Dayton 
Council on World Affairs, Paul Hoffman stated: 
The Europeans, with our help , are winning the 
"cold war.n The men, women, and children of 
W'eetern Europe today have enough tood so t.ba t they 
can work hard and grow. The mood of Europe is 
wholly different from what 1 t was 1n 1947. Then 
there was despair. Today there ls hope . 3 
In his inaugural address ( '!he Faith of the American People) 
on January 20, 1949, President Truman declared: 
Almost a year ago, in company with sixteen free 
nations ot Europe , we launched the greatest 
cooperative economic program in history. 
2paul G. Hoffman, .Address Delivered Before the Ph1Ja dellhia 
Chamber of Commerce on 1'1ebruary 21, 19..W, (Waehfngton: E.c •• , 
1949), 4. 
3Econom1c Cooperation Administration, E . C.A. At Work l, 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, March 20, 
1950), l. 
Our efforts have brought new hope to all man-
kind. We have beaten back despair and defeatism. 
We have saved a number of countries from losing 
their liberty. 
The initiative is ours. We are moving on with 
' other nations to build an .even stronger structure 
ot international order and just1ee.4 
In bis address ('Ihe Requirements for a Lasting Peace) 
delivered at the dedication of World War Memorial Park in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 11, 1949, he declared: "It 
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1s fair to say that the European Recovery frogram has halted the 
social and economic disintegration which threatened the countries 
of Western Europe with Communism and civil strife.tt5 
The result of the elections in Italy on April 18, 1948, was 
a clear example of the willingness of the people to live under 
democratic institutions, as they rejected the danger of being 
ruled by a totalitarianism so far from their nature. 
'lbere bas been no advance in totali tarianiem on 
the continent of Europe, {declared Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson ). Within the participating 
countries there has been a rebirth of faith in 
the vitality of the democratic system and its 
ability to deal with their post-war problems. 
In every important election held in these countries 
since the inception of this program of recovery, 
the people have more vigorously reaffirmed their 
adherence to the .principles o~ individual .freedom 
and governments based on constitutional restraints. 
Tho e elements within the countries who, by deliberate 
4nar;ry s. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and Statements , tr. s. Dept. o? State , (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 4-5. 
5Ibid., 21. 
choice or foreign inspiration, sou~t - in 
the words of Secretary Marshall - to perpe-
tuate human m1serl in order to . profit there-
from politically, have been checked and 
forced into retreat . 
In both France and Italy , Communist inspired 
attempts to defeat recovery and sabotage domestic 
production have be en met with energy an:i courage 
· by the Governments of those countries with the 
full support or the great majority of their 
people . 0 
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In his address to the Veterans or Foreign Wars, President 
Truman declared: "The European Recovery Program has prevented 
general collapse in Europe, and has given hope to all countries 
who want to see the world resume the course of economic progress . n7 
In his address delivered at a meeting of the Council of 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in Paris, on 
October 31, 1949, Paul Hoffman stated: 
Since 1947, we have confounded both the Commu-
nists and the other cynics by proving, first, th.at 
together we could successfully start economic re-
covery in Western Europe, and, second, that we 
could join in laying .the foundation for S-ecurity 
against attack upon our Atlantic community. We 
have seen anxiety give way to hope . Tod~y I am 
asking you to turn hope into confidence. 
:rn his cablegram of congratulations to the E.C . A. Adminis-
trator, on the occasion of the Marshall Plan half-way mark, 
6nee.n Acheson, "European Recovery Program Gives New Faith 
in Vitality of Democratic System, 11 United States Department of 
State Buluetin, 20 (February 20, 1949), M!3 . 
7:s:arry S. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and statements , u. s. Dept . of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 46 . 
8paul G. Hoffman; .c.A. Asks O. E.E.c. for 1950 Program, 
(Washington: E. C. A. , g49), 1 . 
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Ambassador w. Averell Harriman, United States Special Represen-
tative in Europe , said: 
The free world has come a long way sine e the 
beginning of E.C.A. two years ago, a ~onger way, 
in fact, than most of us i,r!i;ially dared hope. 
In increasing measure, the free peoples of ·Europe 
and America have come to understand the issueis s,n:d 
the objectives, and the need to go forward together 
in the defense of free-dom. Here in Europe in the 
last two years, the will to push back Communist 
aggression and the will to build a decent t'uture 
for free men and women have been reborn.9 
The success of the program in meeting the cr1.t1cal pro-
blems o~ Europe is that th~ Marshall Plan is giving to the free 
peoples of Eurol)e a · continuing determlna tion to resist totali-
tarianism and remain free. It is the new spirit of cooperation 
that has come to Europe as a direct result of the Marshall Plan 
that offers the best hope for peace. 
2. Effe.cts on Public Opinion in Europe . 
Public opinion polls indicate that a majority of Europeans 
in most countries fully approve of the European Recovery Program, 
and only a small minority ie opposed. The number of persons 
favorable to the program has risen steadily over the past year.10 
The second year of the European Recovery Program witnessed 
a profound psychological ferment in Europe and significant 
shifts in public opinion, '.Ihere was a manifest growth of hope 
9:sconomic C9operation Adm1n1strat1on, The Marshall Plan at 
Mid-Point, ( Washington: E ~C .A., April, 1950), 5. 
l~eonomic Cooperation Administration, Seventh Report to 
Congress, (Washington: Government Printing office, May S, 1950), 
x. 
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and confidence among the people of Western Europe . Democratic 
governments were strengthened and free institutions gained in 
vita.lity.11 
The unmistakable evidence of economic improvement, 'Which 
has convinced the European peoples that democratic governments 
could solve economic problems effectively, has been the factor 
primarily responsible for these changes in Europe's outlook.12 
· 'lhe European press, which reaches about 160 million readers 
and is the most influential single source of opinion, has roughly 
doubled its coverage and discussion of the Marshall Plan. With 
the exception of the Coinmunist organs, the dailies and weeklies 
are predominantly favorable to the Marshall Plan. 13 
In general, there is a small, hard core of Communist oppo-
s1 tion ln each country which is often reinforced by a small 
group representing special interests. There is gratifying evi-
dence that the youth of Europe are enthusiastic supporters of 
the Marshall Plan. Support for the Plan is also strong among 
professional and intellectual groups •14 
The :Marshall Plan is now 1nterpr~ted as a major element 
in the political and economic life of Western Europe, and has 
thus become part of the thought and intellectual fabric of the 
continent.15 
11Ib1d. J 74. 
12 Ib1d., 75. 
13~ •• 76. 
14Ib1d. 
l5Ib1d., 79. 
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3. Effects on European Labor. 
"The most gratifying response to the Marshall Plan has been 
the strengthening of democratic institutions in the Western 
European countries and the de-011ne of Communist influence in 
polities, labor unions and all areas of public life," said vr. 
16 Hoffman. 
In the free countries of Europe, (declared 
Secretary of State Acheson in his statement be-
fore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations), 
labor, on whom so much depends for the success 
of this program, has not permitted itself to be 
misled by foreign dictation into the sabotage of 
.its own well-being. It baa become increasingly 
aware of the aims of those who have, for political 
ends, . seized upon grievances - in many instances 
legitimate grievances - for the purpose of dis-
rupting progress in reeovery.17 
.Mr. Hoffman declared: 
The spread of CQDlDlunism has not only been checked, 
but the Communists have been put on the defensive 
throughout . the ti-ee nation.a of West-em Europe. 
The Communists have been driven out ot -_ny unions 
as a result of eourageQus action on tq.e p~rt or 
trade union leaders. Communist- inspired strikes 
have collapsed. Communist propaganda is being 
forced to shift its tactics. The Communists are 
having to drop the line that the Marshall Plan . ls 
not proQioting recovery, and to substitute the weak 
thesis that 1 ts benefits cannot last because of a 
depression which they are constantly predicting 
for the United States. 
From my own observation and from all the facts 
available to our ]!.C.A. missions abroad; I report to 
you that the advocates of Communist dictatorship are 
16Eeonom1c Cooperation Administration, E.C.A. At Work!, 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, larch 20, 
1950), 4. 
l7Dean Ache.on, •EUropean Recovery Program Gives New Faith 
in Vitality of Democratic System," United States Department 
ot State Bulletin, 20 (February 20, 1949), 234 . 
\ 
I 
' 
weaker in Europe today than at any time since th• 
end of the war.18 
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Labor groups have been primary targets of Conmunist pro-
'paganda i n Europe a gainst the Marshall Plan. In the European 
Recovery Program nattons there -.re about 35 nilllion organized 
trade union members. About 6 million of these are under 
Communist domination, the bulk being in France and Italy. 
There are also many non-union workers in Europe who are exposed 
continuously to Communis t propaganda directed at all labor 
groups.19 
Communist-dominated unions, taking their cues from Russia, 
are in complete opposition to the European Recovery Program. 
In some countries their attacks on the Program have been more 
difficult to overcome because of persist~nt unemployment, inade-
quate housing, or other economic dislocations not yet remedied, 20 
There are signs, however, of the results attained by the 
E.C.A. general information program in explaining to the workers 
of Europe the meaning of the European Recovery Program. In 
every participating country, trade union support of the govern-
ment has been maintained or increased over the past year. 
In election after election since the E.c.A. program -was 
launched, notably in Norway, Austria, Germany, Sweden, and 
18Paul G. Hoffman, "The Marshall Plan: Its Progress and 
Problems," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 170 ( September 
22, 1949), 1138. 
19Economic Cooperation Administration, Seventh Report to 
Con~ress, (Washington: Government Printing ottice, May B, 
195 ), 76. 
20Ibid. 
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Belgium, Communist strength has steadi ly declined. Communist 
control of large segments of the labor movement has been broken, 
particularly in Italy and France, where Communist propaganda 
has been most intense, and the free trade unions of Western 
Europe have recently established their ·own international organi• 
zation to replace the Communist- cornupted World Federation of 
Trade Unions . 21 
In his telegram of congratulation to E. C. Administrator 
Paul Hoffman, on the occasion of the half - way mark of the Mar-
shall Plan, William Green, President of the .American Federation 
of Labor, said: 
The American Federation of Labor ls proud of your 
achievements and happy that it has been privileged to 
work with you in the great and human! tarian e.ffort 
to which this country has dedicated itself. Great 
strides have been made in Europe both economically 
and politically. And we of the American labor move-
ment are particularly gratified that th-is new feeling 
of well being and hope abroad has provided a favorable 
climate for the establishment of a new and ~~mooratic 
international organization of trade unions . 
These achievements can best be evaluated in the light of 
the Communist effort to stir up working class opposition, and 
also in the light of continuing economic difficulties in several 
countries . 
'!he Soviet strategy to ceounteract the rehabilitation of 
Western Europe under the Marshall Plan is obvious: Russia does 
21Ibid ., 77 . 
22Economic Cooperation Administration, The Marshall Plan 
at Mid- Point, (Washington: E. C. A. ~ April, 1950) , ? . 
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not want Western Europe to get on its feet, because an eeono-
mically sound Europe , adequately fed and housed, would never go 
ColilDlUni sj:;. 
"Russia is not likely to march against a strong , prosperous 
and unified Western Europe,tt said Mr . Hoffman . 23 
In his talk delivered recently at the m:e eting of the Dayton 
Council on World Affairs, Paul Hoffman declared: 
By their deliberate choice and action, the Nussians 
made the Marshall Flan and the survival of .freedom 
in Western Europe their major ta·rget in · their · llcold 
war" against freedom everywhere. So it is that the 
· Marshall Plan finds itself in the .front line of 
defense for Western c1v111za tion and pla1.ing a . very 
act! ve part in a relentless ttcold war . tt24 · 
And so the Marshall Plan has become the United States 
foreign policy "big stick" to stop the westward thrust o.f Commun-
ism. 
In his telegram of congratulation to the E .C. Administrator 
Paul Hoffman, on the occasion of the half-way mark of the Marshall 
Plan, President Truman said: 
The threat of Communist aggression has been averted 
in many countries and great strides have been made 
toward those conditions or world stability and pro-
gress which ar·e necessary if we are to achieve a 
peaceful and prosperous· world .25 
23Economic Cooperation Adm.1n1.atrat1on, E.C. A. At Work%, 
(Dayton, O~io: ~ayton Council on World Affairs, March 20, 1950), 4. 
24Ibid. ' · l. 
25Economic Cooperation Administration, The Marshall Plan 
at Mid-Poiri't, (Washington: E.C •. A., April, 1950), ·s. 
157 
4. Need of Europe for Continuation of the Marshall Plan. 
The Marshall Plan will cost the United, States as much as 
it cost it to figh,; ninety day~ ·~f the late war, · but the final 
result will certainly •ccomplish more in world peace than the 
last war did in trying to upl'pot and destroy a series of brutal 
regim&s-. The Marshall Plan demonat~ated itself as an effective 
force in the peaceful preveh"tii,e economic war against Communism 
and cannot be abandone in the middle- of the struggle . 
If Marshall Plan aid to Europe were to be halted now, this 
.~ . 
would be the inevitable conseq~ences in Europe: (1) . production , 
employment , and diet levels would tmmediately and sharply decline 
tor want of needed food, raw materials , machinery, etc . r· (2) 
each European country, 1n an et;ort to protect its reserves, 
wou.ld be compelled to reimpose str-ingent rationing and national 
trade controls, freeze up intra-European tr,ade again; ( 3) European 
cooperation - economic, political, and mllit~ry - would be 
weakened; ( 4) Russian imperialism under its d'ommunistic banner 
would resume its forward march amid eondit ions of want and loss 
of hope . 26 
In his address (A People's Fo.re1gn Policy) delivered at 
Soldie~sField before the Imperial Council Session ot · the Shrine 
of North America, iri Chicago , President Truman declared: 
We must take action ·to insure that the hard-won 
econo~ie recovery of other free nations does not 
26E!conomic Cooperation Administration , The. Marshall Plan -
Where We Are and Where We Are Going, (Washington: E. C. A. , 
March 31, l950), 1-2. 
revert to stagnation and despair. One of the 
most foolish things we could do right now would 
be to slash our appropriation for European re-
covery. If we did that, we would be deli~erately 
throwing away gains for peace and freedom tha~ 
we have pa1n!"ul.~y made. Only the .commun$.·&ts. · 
would profit if we took such a short-sighted 
course. 
We have been 'making progress in working toward 
p·eace and freedom be.cause: vie have been willing 
to make the investment that was necessary. It 
wou~q be disastrous now to , chang~ our P,Olicy a~d 
settle for q.alf .... way measures.. It would be disas-
trous to lose or impair the understanding and 
support we have gained among the other democratic 
peoples. These are priceless assets in the great 
task of constructing a peaceful and orderly world.27 
There are now many attempts to cut down Marshall Plan 
spending, not only for the purpose of reducing the expenses 
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of the budget which must be paid by the American taxpayer, but . 
because, it is argued, the original goals of the Marshall Plan -
halting Communism and encouraging economic recov:ery in Europe -
already have been accomplieh~d. 
The Economic Cooperation Administration has asked that 
Europe should not be penalized "ju~t because she is doing so 
well~n An abrupt stoppage of aid would be a severe economic 
shock and could well cause the loss of everything Americans 
have invested so far. 2a 
At the Dayton ,meeting Mr. Hoffman said: 
27Harry S. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs~ -Selected 
Speeches and Statements, -tr. s. Dept. , ot State (Washing ton: 
Government Printing Office, 1949l, .42. 
28Economic Cooperation Administration; E.C.A. At Work!, 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, March 20, 
1950), 4. 
, We must not exaggerate the extent of our gains . 
Europe was a very sick patient. She is convales-
cent but is not yet well nough to stand alone. 
If American aid were suddenly-,, withdrawn or if 
.American aid were reduced too sha,rply, we mfght 
witness another collapse. This would bring a 
victory for Communism. It could mean ,:los·s of 
the cold war.29 
Furthermor~, while Europe has made excellent progress, 
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the standard of living of her people has not gone up in propor-
tion. This is partly because Europeans themselves are investing 
a big portion of their incomes in tools for production so that 
they can be independent of American help in the future • 
. They are tightening their belts and matching our 
. own contribution many times over, (.said Mr. Hoff-
man), but living conditions are st.ill bleak for 
·averag• c1 ti zens. A premature stoppage of American 
aid would be an· economic disaster and could cause 
the· loss of the billions of dollars of aid the 
American people hav• so far invested.30 
In his speech .at mid-point celebra t1on, General Marshall 
said: · ''The job is only half done . I mu.st emphasize the tremen-
dous importance of carrying through on the scale planned. We 
must avoid proposals to emasculate and reduce the Economic 
Cooperation Administration to a mere relief affa1r.n31 
In his telegram of congratulations President Truman de-
clared: 
Though much has been done, a major portion of the 
task and many difficulties and perplexing pro~ lems 
lie. ahead. We must attack these problems with 
29Ib1d. 
30Ib1d. 
31Econom"io, C.oo~ra tion: Admlnistra tion,. The Marshall Plan 
at Mid-Point, (Washington: E . C.A" , April, 1950), 3. 
all our energies and with fully adequate re-
sources if we are to solve them. Imbued with 
that spirit and determination, we will carry 
this momentous program - a program unprecedcmted 
in world history - to a successful completion.32 
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"As we look forward • • • , tt said Secretary Acheson, . "we 
must remind ourselves that the real test of stamina is how we 
do in the long middle stretch sf the race.tt33 
A program of foreign economic assistance will 
be continued, (said · Senator Pat MacCarran). 
This appears to be justified not only by the 
commitments already made to the participa.ting 
countr·lea by the United Sta tea, but also by 
the fact that ~oat of the major maladjustments 
which have handicapped Europe since the war 
still remain. 
It is in the interest of the United States 
temporarily to ¥eep the countries of Europe 
which cooperate with the United States from 
bearing the full impact of their predie•~ ent.34 
In his Survey of the Economic Cooperation Administration · 
in Europe, Senator Maccarran declared: 
• • • No one maintains that the present economic 
level of activity could long be maintained if 
the United States aid were withdrawn . This pre-
sents the danger of causing too rapid a reduction 
in these present standards which .could, of course, 
undo most of the good that we have done • 
• • · • The governments or the countries ean maintain 
a stable position only so long as the economic 
activities within those countries continue and do 
not deteriorate appreeiably . :55 
321bid: ~ 5 ~ 
33 Ib1d . ; 4. 
34u. S. Qongress, Sena'l;e, An Analzsis of .the E. c.A. Program, 
Sen- Document 142, Report presented by Mr . lacdarran, 91st 
Cong. , 2nd Sea~. (Wash1ngtQp: Gove.rnment Printing Off1ce, 1950), 2 . 
35u. s . Congre.ss, Senate, S:urvez of E.C.A. in Europe by 
Senator Pat M.acCarran , ·sen. D9eument 141, ·ffeport to ·the Joint 
Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation, 81st Cong., 2nd Seas . 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), 12 . 
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In his telegram of congratulations to Mr . Hof.tinan, Arlon 
E. Lyon, Executive Secretary of the Railway Labor Ex.ecutivest 
Association.; said: "Organized railway workers in thts country 
are wLth you for the duration of the Marshall Plan'. We send 
you our best wishes and assurance·s of continuing endeavor in 
behalf of free workers throughout the world.n36 
5. Necessity of the United States 
Continuing the Marshall Plan. 
It Marshall Plan aid were to be halted now, these would 
be the consequence's to the United States: (1) United States 
etforts to unify the Western world in mi.11tary, political, 
and economic defense against Communism would be undermined; 
(2) United States expenditures on milltary defense would probably 
1nc·rease sharply; (3) United States exports would decrease by 
at least $3 billions and probably much more. Th1:s would have 
deprnsing effec.ts on U;ni ted Sta tea economie activity, eml).loy-
ment, and prices. 37 
In his address made at the Golden Jubilee Natio,nal Conven-
tion of Veterans of Foreign Wars, in Miami, Florida, Ambassador 
Phillip c. Jessup, declared: 
At this moment in history we must continue the 
process of helping Western Europe to rebuild 
36Economic Cooperation Administration, '!he Marshall Plan 
at 16.d-Po1nt, {Washington: E~C.A., April, 1950), ?. 
37Econom1c Cooperation Administration, The ·Marshall Plan -
Where We Are and Where We Are Going, {Washi ngton: E.C.A., 
March 31, 1950), 2. · 
itself in economic stabtlity and in the sense 
of safety which comes from a well-planned 
common defense 1f any state should again be 
misled into contemplating the fatal step of 
committing aggression against the democratic 
forces of the world. 38 
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In his Survey of the Economic Cooperation Administration 
in Europe , Senator MacCarran said: 
If the self- interest and security of the United 
States is the more important objective, · then 
it is !nevi table tbs. t we must maintain the sta-
bility of our political allies in the ev~r-
eontinuing struggle to wipe _out Communism. 
; 
Success in this objective hae been immeasurable, 
but it has not been complete and 1 t does not 
appear that it will be complete in 1952 . 39 
Unless Western Europe, with United States help , becomes 
economically heal thy, poll tically stable, and militarily strong, 
and thus avoids falling into the Soviet orbit, the United States, 
even though it may avoid war, will have to become a ~arrison 
state . 
That means it goes on a war tooting, (declared 
Mr. Hoffman). That means larger defieits, be-
cause instead of the $13 billion it now contem-
plates spending annually on defense , its budget 
for that purpose would be . poss1 bly doubled . 
Secret&ir•y of the Army Gordon Gray has said that 
the cost to the United States of World War III 
w-111 eventually reach one trillion dollars. The 
$ 15 billion total cost bf the Marshall Plan may 
prove to be ·the -best bargain the American people 
ever bought . 40 
38phillip c. Jessup, "The Foreign Policy of a Free De~oracy , " 
u. s. Department of State Bulletin, ( September 5, 1~49), 349 . 
39u. S . Congress, Senate, Survey of E . C. A. in -Europe by 
Senator Pat MacCarran , Sen . Document 141, Report to the Joint 
Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation, 8ls t Oong., 2nd Sess. 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), 13. 
40Economlc c.ooperation Adm.1n1st:rat1on , E.C. A. At Workl, 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, larch 2o, 1950), 4 . 
163 
In his speech delivered on the occasion of the mid- point 
celebration, General Marshall said: 
We are now e:p.gaged in a great s truggle.. We here 
may not be in the same sort of physical danger 
as troops on the battlefield, but we are engaged 
in a contest with a foe who · has designs no less 
deadly than those we have ever faced . Make no 
mistake about 1t , the chips are down . Winning 
this struggle is as vital to the peace and pros-
perity of the world as any military campaign in 
history . Indeed, unless we achieve victory our 
great military and financial !icrifices may have 
been largely in vain, I fear. 
On May 5, 1950 , the Congress of the United States authorized 
the appropriation of $2,700,000,000 for the fiscal year July l , 
1950 - June 30, 1951 , thus recognizing the necessity and the 
interest of the United States and the world in continuing the 
aid for the progress of the European Recovery · Program. 42 
41Economic Cooperation Administration, The Marshall Plan 
at Mid-Point, (Washington: E.C . A., April, 1950), 3. 
42u. s . Congress, House, Economic Coo!e~ation Act of 1950, 
H. R. 7797, 8let Cong. ·, 2nd Sess. (Washing on: Government 
Printing Office, May 5, 1950) • 3~,. 
CHAPTER VI 
EFFECTS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN UPON IN.TERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
1. The Question of Infringement of Sovereignty. 
Shortly after Secretary Marshall's Harvard speech, France 
and Great Britain invited Russia to meet with them to consider 
whether a joint program for the economic recovery of Europe 
might be devised . Russia refused to cooperate on the ground 
that such a program "would lead to interference in the internal 
affairs of European countries. 111 
Following this refusal, Russia , on July 8, 1947, sent a 
note to fourteen European nations, which were going to meet in 
Conference to discuss the Marshall Plan, charging that the 
United States desired to force ·On th.em its own program to make 
it more dif fioult for them to direct surp·lus production to mar-
kets of their own choosing, and 1n this way to make the economy 
of these countries dependent on the interests of the United 
States .2 
The international debates on the question of natJonal 
sovereignty raised by the Marshall Plan were climaxed by strong 
charges of United States imperialism on the part of Russia and 
her satellites. 
l Ernest A. Gross, "International Law and the European 
Recovery Program," United States Department of State Bulletin, 
18 (May 2 , 1948), 564~7. 
2Robert E. Summers, Economic Aid to Euro!e: The Marshall 
Plan, (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1948), 11. 
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At the debate on the Marshall Plan, held by the United 
Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1947, Soviet Dep~ty 
Foreign Minister Vishinsky declared: 
It is getting more and more clear to everybody 
that the Marshall Plan •• ; will mean ·a subjuga-
tion of the European countries to the economic · 
and political control exercised by the United 
States and direct interference on its part wi.th 
the internal affairs of those countries ••• 3 
The plan would force the countries in need of relief to "give 
up their inalienable right to dispose of their own economic re-
sources, to plan their own national economy as they see fit." 4 
The Yugoslav representative agreeq. with the Soviet _ inter-
pretation 'or the aim of the Marshall Plan: to create a estern 
bloc in Europe subservient to the United States and directed 
against the Soviet Union and the new demoeracfes .5 
The Russian delegate, Professor Arutiunian, declared that 
the motive underlying the Marshall Plan represented a change-
over from a policy of international co opera t1on on the basis 
of the principles of the United Nations to one of direct ex-
ploitation of finanoial assistance for the economic and politi-
cal enslavement of countries to which financial aid was given .6 
3!1Rel1.ef and Reconstruction Debated," United Nations Weekly 
Bulletin, 3 {September 30, 1947}, 429. 
_4~. 
srbid. 
6"call to Implement Economic, Social Decisions," United 
Nations Weekly Bulletin, 3 (October 21, 1947), 538. 
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According to the Russian view, the United States had made 
the largest gains from the war, and therefore was in a position 
to render a id; and besides fearing an impending crisis, the 
United · states wanted to extend credits for the purpose of ex-
panding markets. The u.s . s.R. did approve plans to assess the 
needs of individual countries, and to discover the contribution 
which the United States might make; but they would not tolerate 
any infringements of sovereignty involved in an integrated 
Eu.ropean plan which, moreover, would determine the lines of 
economic development of each country.7 
The head of the British delegation to the United Nations 
As aembly,. Hector MacNeil, answering these charges, said th.at the 
nations that participated in the Paris conferenee on the Marshall 
Plan ''did so of their own free will . tt 
He denied that they had compromised their national sovereignty 
in doing so~ 
Speaking of the concept of "absolute sovereignty,n he pointed 
out that the Charter of the United Nations does not insist on it , 
but on the sovereign equality of states. Any state entering 
into an agreement, bilateral· or international, gives up some 
part of its sovereignty by doing so . 
There was· a tactical reason, Mr. MacNeil believed, :for the 
Soviet insistence on ~bsolute sovereignty. He quoted in this 
7u. s. Congress, Senate, T.p.e European Recoverf Program, 
Sen. Document 111, Basic documents andbaekgroundnformatlon 
prepared by_ staffs of Senate Forei-gn Relat~ons Comm.1 ttee and 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, 80th Cong.~ 1st Seas . (Wash-
ington·: Government Printing Office, 1947) , 155- 158. 
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connection from a lecture by a Soviet official, given earlier 
that year, to show that in the Soviet Union sovereignty was con-
sidered "a tool in the etruggle of the progressive democratic 
forces against reactionary- imperialistic forces . n8 
Warren Austin, United States delegate, pointed out., 1n a 
speech, October 5., 1947, th.at 1f it were the aim of the Uhl ted 
States to dominate other nations, "it would pursue policies and 
tactics to keep t hose countrie s weak,tt rather than to build up 
their strength. 9 
French Foreign Minister Bidault denied that the Marshall 
Plan was an effort to enslave or divide Europe., or to infringe 
upon the sovereignty of the European states. British Foreign 
Minister Bevin stated: "It is a fundftmental prineip~e by which 
we work not to interfere in the internal affairs of ether 1:-oun-
tries and we hope the national sovereignty of EurQpean powers 
will be recognized and respected equally by everyone., while this 
attempt is bein~ made to achieve economic coope'ration . ttlO 
America's answer was ec.onomic recovery, not econ.omic chaos . 
Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett ., on October 8~ declared 
that the United States wanted ~nly to insure peace by helping 
8ttRelief and Reco·nstruction Debated.," United Nations Weekly 
Bulletin ., 3 (September 30, 1947)., 430. 
9F. L. van Schaick., ttcondit1on for the Marshall Plan Ques-
tions on Infringement on Sovereignty. tt Editorial Research Report ., 
(October 17 ., 1947)., 759. 
lOnRelief and Reconstruction Debated.," United Nations Weekly 
Bulletin., 3 (September 30., 1947) ., 430 . 
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Europe to revive economically. Thia was reaffirmed the next day 
by President Tru.man, when he declared that "America sought 
peace, not land. ,,11 
''This is certainly not the program of a country seeking to 
exercise domination or to influence unduly any foreign country,n 
said Secretary Marshall, "The nations and political groups 
which have now declared their oppos1t1·on to the program apparently 
wish to block for their own reasons the revival of Western 
Europe.tt12 
If the United States entertained any idea of ex-
tending Am~rican influence or domination over 
Europe , (he explained later), our policy would 
not be directed toward ending European de.pendency 
upon this c6lllj§ry but toward perpetuating the 
relationship. 
The American proposal for assistance to Europe is directed 
toward production, construction, and recoveryr It is a _genuinely 
cooperative undertaking, which is being worked out in an atmos-
phere of mutual trust and with careful regard for the sovereignty 
of nations. In'deed, this joint endeavor by the United Sta tea . 
and sixteen European states is a cl.ear and convincing demonstra-
tion of coop~rat1on f~eely given t.o achieve the common goal: As 
such, it perfectly reflects one of the basic precepts of democracy. 14 
118Reply to the Reds, 0 Newsweek, 30 (October 20, 1947), 25. 
12oeorge c. Marshall, "Foreign Aid and Reconstruction: Effects 
on Long-Range World Economy," ·united St·ates Department of State 
Bulle tin, 17 ( November ~3, 1947) , 970. · 
130earge C. Marshall, "The Problems of European Revival, " 
Address delivered at a dinner .aponsored jointiy by the Chicago 
Council of Foreign Rela tiona and the Chicago chamber of Commerce 
on November 18, 1947, United Stat~s Department of State Bulletin, 
17 {November 30, 1947), 1026. 
14:Ibid. 
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2 . Answers to Russian Criticism. 
Russia had refused to permit Poland and Czechoslovakia to 
participate in the Paris Conference, and yet , Soviet Foreign 
Minister Molotov, in a speech broadcast by the Moscow radio on 
November 6, 1947, said: 
The policy ot the Soviet Union 1 s based on opposite 
principles , on the principle of respect for the 
sovereignty of all states, big and small, on the 
principle of non- intervention in the internal affairs 
of other state& 
The Sovie~ Union, in common with other democratic 
states, stands for peace and international collabora~ 
tion on democratic principles. 
The democratic forces cannot be possessed by 
imperialism, which denies the democratic rights of 
the people, infringing on the so·vereignty of the 
nations and basing its plans on threats and adven-
turea . 15 
What is the record? (asked Secretary Marshall) . 
We have annexed no territory. We have not used the 
greatest military power and military resources ever 
assembled to acquire tor the United States a special 
privileged position, either political or economic. 
Furthermore, since the elose of hostilities the United 
Sta tea and Great Britain have voluntarily reduced the 
area of their sovereignty in the world ••• • While 
the Wes tern Democracies have beeri reducing the ar·ea of 
their sovereignty, one country has taken the opposite 
road . 'lbe SovQet Union bas, in effect, considerably 
expanded her frontiers . Since 1939, she has "de facto" 
annexed territory comprising an area of more than 
280,000 square mili! ' with a population of some 
22,000, 000 people . 
At the Paris Conference , Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had 
declared: 
15PM, "Molotov's Speech, n - 5 (November 7, 1947), 8-9. 
16oeorge C. Marshall, "The Problems of European Revival ,tt 
uni ted tates Department of State Bulletin, 17 (November 30, 
194'7 ) , 1026'. 
The question of Am.er.lean economic aid • • • pro-
vided an occasion for the British and French 
governments to seek the creation of a new organiza-
tion standing over and above the countries of 
Europe and interfering 1n their int~rna~ affairs 
down to determining the line of development to be 
followed by the. main branches of industry.17 
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"It clearly followed," he . continued, "that the European 
countries would find themselves placed under control and would 
lose their .former e·conom1c and ns. tional 1nd~pendence because 
it so pleases certain strong powers.nl8 
The allusion to the United Stat.es was clear, but Secretary 
Marshall, in addressing the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerc-e, 
stated: 
Far fr.om interfering with the ~overeign rights of 
the countries involved, as hostile propagandists 
have alleged, the United States retrained. from any 
suggestion or advice to the European representatives, 
despite the tact that repeated and urgent app~als 
for such counsel were made. We were determined that 
the 1n1 tia ti ve $hould be confined entirely to the 
European countries involved.19 
Yet, the House Co~ttee on Foreign Aid, expressing itself 
strongly against Socialism nevertheless urged controls which 
are an important part of Socialism, and would ne>t.-allow petty 
"·•w•-·· ----'>"-~ ..... 
-
considera tioncof sovereignty to exclude the imposed elements of 
Sociali sm: 
. . 
In working toward European unity and the improvement 
of produc1,1ve efficiency of Europe , the Administrator 
l 7 '*E.-conom1c Commission. for Europe Convenes,~ United Nations 
Weekly Bulletin , 3 ( July 15, 1947}, 85 . ·· 
18Ibid. 
19oeorge C. Marshall, §he Stake of the Businessman in the 
European Re covert fro.Nam - Address dellv_ered 'on January 15, 1948, 
u. S. Dept . of ~ate aehington: Government Printing Office, 
1948), 3 . 
will find himself faced with the old cry of 
interference w1 th national sovereignty • • • 
Our. concern must be with the maintenance of the 
basic human freedoms - with individual rather 
than with national s9v.ereignty: for i f ab.solute 
sovereignty blocks the economic integration which 
is essential to European recovery, human treed~m . 
itself will be lost.20 
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Private enterprise undoubtedly received favored treatment 
under t he Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. 
I.n his addres s (New Problems 1n World Prosperity) delivered 
before the Convention of the American Legion in Philadelphia, 
Presid&nt Truman declared: 
I.n our approach to problems with other nations, 
we m13st keep clearly in mind the basic underlying 
principles upon which the economic policy of the 
.tree nations must be based. · 
••• (One) principle is that t,l:le democratic nations 
are not pr-oposing to 1nterf'ere with one another's 
internal politics. We know very well how we would 
feel 1f some. roreign nation tried to tell us how to 
vote·. We recognfze that each nation bas its own 
· pol1·tical problems and different slogans · .from those 
we use at home. In tbe same way, nations have 
different business practices and d.1.fferent govern-
mental devices for achieving the same economic ends. 
A community of democratic nations cannot insist on 
uniformity in mattere ot poli ti.cs or business. '!'he 
only uniformity on whieh they c·an insist - and this 
.is :v,:hat binds them together as free nations - is a 
firm adherence to democracy, coupled with a common 
desire to !.~rove the standard ·of living or all 
their eitlzens.21 
2laarry 3. Trumap., A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
$peeche.s and Statements, 'U •. Si, ·Zept.' of ·$ta te (·Washing ton: 
Government Printing orr1ce, 1949·), 57-58. 
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In his speech delivered before the American Bankers Asso-
ciation, in San Francisco, William c. Foster, E.C.A. Deputy 
Administrator, said: 
I would not wish to give you the impression, how-
ever, that the Economic Cpoperat1on Admin1atrat1on 
uses its financial power to direct the E-ur·opean 
enterprise. We are not doing so. We do not wish 
to do so. And, we could not do ao if we wished. 
I give you that straight out of my experience with 
the European end of E.C.A. 's operations. EUI'opeans 
are running their own show. 'lhe United Sta tea is 
only putting up three per cent of the funds going 
into capital improvement and expansion in Europe, 
a_s compared: with Europe's 9'7%. As bankers, we 
advise, suggest, and in certain instances withhold 
money for materials that appear te be unneeded for 
the recovery program. But as go~g bankers, we do 
not try to run the business ••• 
'!he Co~gress had to refrain from imposing conditi~ns for 
American aid which would have seemed to support Russian charges 
that ·the United States was in.fringing the sovereignty of othel" 
nations. 
In his statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, in January, 19·48, Secretary Marshall said: 
The • • • main eonsideration which, I feel, should 
be borne in mind in connection with this measure is 
that relat.1ng to conditions or terms ·upon which . 
American assistance will be extended. This aspect 
of the program is perhaps the mo.s .t delicate and 
difficult and one which will require the exercise 
of a mature judgment and intelligent understanding 
of the nature of the p.roblem faced by the European 
governments and of our particular position o~ 
leadership 1n this matter. We must alwaye have in 
m1nd that we are dealing with. democratic governments 
of $OVereign nations. 
22Economic Cooperation Administration, A Current Report 
the ?!4arshall :Plan ·repared for the E.C.A • . :Pu'Sllc·. Adv!sor 
E. 
-. • • We have stated in many ways tba t American aid 
will not be used to interfere with the sovereign 
rights of these nations-and their own responsibility 
to work out their own salvation. I cannot emphasize 
too much my profound conviction that the aid we 
furnish must not be tied to conditions which would, 
in eff'ect, destroy the 'Whole moral justification for 
our cooperative assistance toward European partnership. 
• " • We _cannot oxpect any democratic- s> ver:ttment to 
take upon itself obligati~ns or accept eondi t1:oJ?.s 
which run counter to the basic national sentiment of 
its people. 'l'hls program calls for free cooperation 
among nations mutually respecting one another's sin-
cerity of purpose in the common endeavor.23 
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Indeed, conditions of a certain degree were laid down to 
the participating nations, but they could not be considered an 
infringement of their sovereignty. 
In the discussions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, 
both the House and Senate Comm1ttees made it clear that they 
would hold European countries to their promises of cooperation. 
Secretary Marshall indeed po1nt.ed out that the United States has 
to respect the sovereignty of' these nations, while .others suggested 
that the.re was no issue of sovereignty; for the countries had 
promised to cooperate. 
In the view of the ·administration, periodic appr1sals would 
be made and the penalty for not adhering to agre-ements would be 
loss or reduction of aid.24 
23aeorge c. Marshall. "As.sistance to European Economic 
Recovery," United States Department of State Bu1let1n,. 18 
{January 18, 1948), ?l-77. 
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In fact, in passing the Economic Cooperation Act .on April 
2,, 1948, the Congress asserted: 
It 1s .further declared to be the policy or the 
United States that continuity of assistance pro-
vided by the United States should, at all times, 
be dependent upon the continuity of cooperation · 25 
· among the countriet participating in the program,· 
coordination of vital national polici~s, (explalped 
Mr.~ Hoffman), need not result in 1dent1 ty or policy~ 
Coordination need only · go so far as to insure that · 
policies will not diverge so drastically as to br.eak 
down the whole structure of European unity; but it 
must go at least that rar.26 
The European nations and the United States had at· stake 
vital economic and political reciprocal interests when the Mar-
shall Plan was proposed andaccEJpted. Consequently, the 
participating countries .agreed on a pact binding them to cer-
tain conditions in ·order to attain the common goal. 
In his address to the Congress on March 17, 1948, Presi-
dent Truman said: 
Thia agreement was -not imposed by the decree of 
a more powerful neighbor. It was the free choice 
of independent governments representing the will 
of their people, and acting within the terms of 
the Charter of the United Nationa.27 
There can be no conflict, then, with established concepts 
of sovereignty 1f the Charter of the Economic Cooperation 
25United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, Part I, l (1949). 
. . 
26Paul G. Hoffman, E •. c.A. Asks O.E. E.C. for 1950 Program -
Address delivered before 1t:6.e O.E.E.C. · on October 31, 1g49, 
(Washington: E.C.A., 1949), 5. 
27Harry S. -Truman, Toward Securinf Peace and Preventing 
War, Message delivered on ·'Mirch 17,198, tr. S, Dept. of State 
Tfiashington: Government Printing Office, March, 1948), 3. 
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o~ganiza.t1on is ratified by the members, and the provision of 
assistance to the members is made possible by agreements to be 
negotiated between the United States and the 'other cooperat i ng 
states. 
The legislative consideration of this subject is, also, 
revealed by the report on the Marshall Plan of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee: 
In s tressi~g the importance of these obligations 
(1.e., tho.se embodied in the mult1lat1l~aiJ under-
tak1ngs), the Committee was sens1t1.ve to the fact 
that the countries of Western Europe are highly 
developed sovere1:gn nations and would bo .tJ.!'" ~,_parly ' 
resentful of any interference from the outside in 
their internal affairs. There can be no p:assible 
criticism on this score inasmuch as the undertak-
.1ngs were voluntar.ily assumecl by the Committee of 
European Economic cooperation countries upon their 
own inittative and in no ·- sense represent an attempt 
on the part of the United States to impose restric-
tions on t~3 sovereign rights of t h e participating 
eountr1ee. 
As long as decisions are reached among nations based on 
,,, 
their own choice and will, 1 t cannot be spoken of as an in- -. 
fringement of sovereignty, even if conditions are made in oP,der 
to gain concessions. 
At the basis of the Marshall Plan, 14.e• the principle of 
cooperation, and, if .any limitation to the sphe:re of activity 
,'\ 
of an 1nd1v1dual nation •x1sts, this is no more giving up the 
28tJ. s . Congress, Senat;e, Com.mi ttee on Foreign Relations, 
European Recovery .Pro~ram, Sen. Report 935,, on s. 2202, 80th 
Cong., 2,nd Seas. (Wa's~ lngton: Government Printing Office, 
February, 1948), 44. 
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sovereignty than it is· in the case o.f the individual who, 
freely, binds himself in a contract signed for the reciprocal 
benefit of the contracting parties and in which he engaged 
himself to do or not to do certain actions. 
Measures of economic development and the conditions of the 
use of capital 1ri developing natural resources are matters which 
call for specific programs of cooperation among participating 
countries and between each ps.rt1cipating country and the United 
States. Each one of t.b.ese elements of a program of economic 
cooperation involves some regulatory aspects comparable in 
many respects to domestic national laws and the regulations 
affecting trade, industry and commerce. The essential difterenee, 
of course, is that on the international level the program turns 
upon agreements and undertakings voluntarily assumed by equals. 
Domestic legislation and regulations are not merely com-
patible with the rights of individual liberty and enterprise 
which we cherish, but they are essential to assure those condi-
tions which permit maximum freedom to all. They are consistent 
with - indeed, they recognize and protect - the genuine "sovereignty• 
of the individual. In the same sense, the cooperation envisaged 
by the European Recovery Program is consistent with and protec-
tive of the true sovere.ignty of the participating countriee.29 
29Ernest A. Gross, Legal Adviser of the Department of 
State, "The European Recovery Program: Outline of Agreements 
in the Common Effort, 11 American Bar Association Jo.urnal, 34 
{December, 1948), 1103•ll04. 
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'Ihe Marshall Plan cannot, then, be considered intervention 
in the political affairs of other countries, but a weapon with 
which the United States participates together with peaceloving 
and democratic nations in the struggle against Communism. The 
main issue o! United States foreign policy is to fight this 
ideology which is in open conflict with 1 ts traditional economic 
and political conceptions. As the Communist doctrine finds 
its major source and soil in poverty and misery and yet its 
po,licy is to cr1.3ate political and economic chaos, the dynamics 
and the self- interest of the United States brought it to fight 
economic distress of the European countries when it was recognized 
that their freedom was jeopardized by Communism. 
Then, leadership, and not domination, ie the role of the 
United States in helping European recovery; collaboration, and 
not intervention; participation in the common active defense 
and preservation of the human c1v111zat1on against economic 
and political ideologies which would again put the world under 
a barbarian domination, which would draw an end to the freedom 
of the -individual and to all the conquests of the human spirit. 
3. Relation to International Law. 
If we consider the facts of history which have necessitated 
the . formulation of the European Recovery Program, we can put 
it in perspective and we can see the problem as a whole, rather 
I ff 
than as' a fragment, in relation to the dynamics of international 
law. 
'lhe report on the :Marshall Plan of the Senate Comm.1 ttee on 
Foreign Relations, describing the political and economic situation 
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in Europe at the end of World War II, pointed out the pol1t1-
cal tensions and uncertainty, the war devastation, the economic 
nationalism, the prolonged interruption of international trade, 
the internal financial disequ111br1um, the rampant inflation 
and the subversive elements hampering recovery and engi~eering 
social chaos.30 
Practically every nation in the world maintaine~ or inten-
sified its use of war-time governmental controls of trade in 
order to make sure that its inadequate foreign purchasing power 
would be used only for the most essential imports. Thus, 
import quotas, controls of' foreign exchange, import and export 
licensing systems, clearing and barter arrangements, were re-
sorted to in order to insure not only that those countries 
would receive products in exchange for their scarce exports and 
credits, but also that the products which they obtained were 
those most urgently needed. All these trade restrictions and 
11m1tat1orui bad blocked many normal channels of trade and bad 
nullified the ef'fects of economic factors. 
At the time when increased international trade was an 
obvious necessity, restriet1on1sm, bilateralism, and "special 
dealism" threatened effectively to strangle sueh trade. 
r.rb.e Congress of the United States, in passing the Economic 
Cooperation Act of 1948, "recognizing ttle intimate economic and 
3°tJ. s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
European Recovery Pro!ram, Sen. Report 935, on S. 2202, 80th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Was ington: Government Printing Office, 
February, 1948), 1. 
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other relations between the Un1.ted States and the nations of 
E\frope, and recognizing that disruption following in the wake 
of war is not contained by national frontiers,t• found that "the 
existing situation in Europe endangere the establishment of a 
lasting, peaee, the general welfare and national interest of the 
Un1t~d States, and the attainment of the objectives of the United 
Nations . n31 
The report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation 
on·-.the necessity of Europe for the Marshall Plan is a monumental 
tribute to the ability of like-minded nations working together 
to achieve agreement and important results in fields previously 
marked by controversy and dissension . 
The network of mutual pledges, coupled with bilateral under-
takings, reflectsin an almost dramatic manner the scheme of 
self-~elp and mutual aid which underlies the entire concept of 
the Ma-rshall Plan. It is an epochal achievement .in the history 
of international" .dealings . Never before have sovereign states 
in solemn covenant with other membe~s of the international 
community; pledged their best efforts to insure the attainment 
32 
of their goals . 
In the light of the situation in Europe, the consequent 
danger threatening the United States and the world, the willing-
3lun1ted states Statutes at Large, Vol. 62, Part I, 137, 
(1949) . 
32Ernest A. Gross , "European Recovery Program: Outline of 
Agreements in the Common Effort , " American Bar Association 
Journal, 34 (December, 1948) , 1105. 
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ness o.f European nations to work together, the United States 
enacted the Marshall Plan for the establishment of sound 
economic oondi tions, wi'th progress! ve elimination. or trade 
barriers, stable international relationships, and a stable 
world with t'ree political institutions and the rule of law. 
These aims indicate the faith of the United States in the 
necessity for closer economic cooperation among nations and the 
sure knowledge of the interdependence of the economies of the 
werld, one on the other. 
Fundamentally, then, the problem is that of international 
law not so much in rela t1on to the European Recovery Program, 
but in rel.a tion to the changing economic - and there.fore 
political - interaction and interrelation or the nations of 
the world. These relations are changing and will change, and, 
as change in the relations of man to man reflects itself, some-
time.a tard°!ly., in the internal law of nations, so this change 
in international relations - this weaving together of economies -
will affect international law. The 1nterna'tional law is, and 
must be, a ready tool, not for change for the sake of change, 
but for the real interest of nations and peoples. To a certain 
fl.xtent, the .Marshall Plan is, on the part of the United States, 
a measure of self-defense, which 1a completely justified by the 
law of nations. 
Can the European Recovery Program be considered to have 
modified or violated what are established principles of 1nter-
na tional law and does it conflict with the concept of territorial 
sovereignty? According to the Soviet Union, yes, when she 
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declared that the Marshall Plan is only a constituent part, 
the European subsection, of a general plan for the policy of 
global expansion pursued by the United States in all parts of 
the world. · But Russia forgot the dogma of the Chie·f of the 
Soviet State, announced more than fifteen years before the 
Marshal.l Plan, tba t the premises of the proletarian revolution 
must start 11from the point of view of the state of world 
economy, inasmuch as the individual countries and individual 
national economies are no longer independent economic uni ts • • • 
and inasmuch as the old "e1v111zingtt capitalism has grown into 
1mper1a llsm, and imperial.ism is a world system of f inanc1al 
bondage 1133 • • • 
It remains true tba t fundamental changes in economic rela -
tions among nations may well develop new international law and 
it is clear that other new and important problems of interna-
tional law are I""aised by the Marshall Plan . As economic coopera -
tion between nations increases and as nation• bind themselves 
to take joint action or to be governed by the decision of a 
jointly established organization or body, familiar problems 
will arise of freedom of administrative decision, deference to 
the expert judgment of the administrator, wl.th adequate judicial. 
guaranties of the fundamental rights and of adherence to the 
rules of fair play . 
New problems in international law are posed by the pro-
cedures by which the provisions of the multilateral reciprocal 
33Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, (New York: 
International Publishers, 1939) , 35. 
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undertakings of the participating countries are carried out, 
like the agreement to cooperate with 11one another and like 
minded countriesft to reduce tariffs and other barriers to the 
expansion of trade; to remove progress! vely obstacles to the 
free movement of persons in Europe; and to organize together 
the means whereby, common resourc,es can be develibped in partner-
ship, 
Aiso the relationship with each of the participating 
ccuntries t the United States is of considerable interest to 
international law and numerous questions of interpretation may 
arise, but all these a~e details of little concern in compari-
son with the great interests at stake in the European Recovery 
Frogram. 
The vitality of international law, as of domestic law, lies 
in its adaptability to new circumstances, end its strength is 
its ab1_lity to per£orm. the basic task of supporting the economic 
and political institutions which preserve human dignity, the 
best of economic individua:Uam, and the virtue-s of nationalism. 
4. Relation to t~e United Nations Organization. 
Another criticism of the Marshall Plan was that the economic 
policies of the United States were in conflict with the Charter 
of the United Na t1ons. In his ape ech at plenary sesaion of 
United Nations General Assembly, on September 18, 1947, Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky charged th.at the Marshall Plan 
and the Truman doctrine were particularly striking instanees of 
the violation of the United Nations organization principles and 
of ignoring the organization. He aqded that the Marshall Plan 
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was undertaken outside of the framework of the United Nations 
organiaation and in evasion of it and that such a policy was 
in a deep contradiction with the principle proclaimed by the 
General Assembly in its resolution of December 11, 1946, that 
the assistance to other countries "should never be used as a 
political weapon.u34 
At t..1-ie general debate on the Marshal 1 Plan held at the 
United ~at1ons on &eptember 27, 1947, the British delegate, 
Christopher P. Mayhew, pointed out that the Paris Conference 
was not contr~ry to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter; that the economic problems of Europe were of the ut .. 
most urgency, and that the General Assembly's resolution on 
poat-U. N.R. R. A. relief needs envisaged grants of aid by one 
state to another. ••Therefore, 0 he argued, "the Marshall Plan 
was a direct contribution to the implementation of that 
resolution.u-35 
lres1dent Truman, in his message to Cong~ess on the Mar-
shall Plan, on December 19, 1947, emphasized the relationship 
between the European Recovery Program and the United Nations, 
because of the central importance in the United States foreign 
policy o:f support of the United Nations. 
34nRelief and .Reconstruction Debated," United Nations Weekly 
Bulletin, 3 (September 30, 1947), 429 . . · 
35"European Reconstruction Problems - Marshall Plan and 
Paris Conference Discussed," United Nations Weekly Bulletin, 
3 (October 14, 1947), 503. 
The program is designed to be consistent witn other 
international relationships and responsibilities ot 
the United States . 
Our support of European recovery is in !'ull accord 
with our support o!' the United :Nations . 'fhe success 
of the United Nations depends upon the independent 
strength of its members and their determination and 
ability to adhere to the ideals and principles em-
bodied in the Charter. The purpo&es of the European 
Recovery Prqgram are 1n e-0mplete harmony with the 
purposes of the Chart~r - to insure a peaceful world 
through the joint e fforts ·of free nations~ Attempts 
by any nation to prevent or sabotage European recovery 
!'or s e5iiah ends are clearly contrary to these pur-
poses . 
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Robert P. Patterson, former United States Secretary of War, 
declared: 
On ·June 5 , 194'7, when it was apparent that the United 
Nations would not be able to aid European recovery in 
time, Sieretary of state, George c. Marshall , made his 
celebrated speech at Harvard Un1versity . 37 
In his address to the Congress on March 17, 1948, President 
Truman said : 
The principles and purposes expressed 1n the 
Charter of the United Nations continue to represent 
our hope for the eventual eatablil!!hment of the rule 
of law in international affairs . The charter consti-
tutes the basic expression of the code of international 
ethics -to which this country 1s dedicated . We cannot , 
however, close our eyes to the harsh fact& that through 
obstruction and even defiance on the part of one nation, 
th1a great dream has not yet become a full reality . 
36 Harry s . Truman, A Program for United States Aid to 
Euroeean RecQvery - '!he Message to the Congress on December 19, 
1947, v. s. Dept. of State ( Washington: Government Pr1nt1ng 
Office, February 1 1948), 4. 
37Robert P'. · Patterson, "The Marshall Plan ., America's 
Historic Opportunity,tt United Nations World, (january, 1948), 
17 . 
It is necessary, there.fore, that we take additional 
measures to supplement the work of the United Nation s 
and to support its aims • 
• • • I regard it as my duty, therefore, to l"'ecommend 
to the Congress those measures which, in my judgment, 
are best calculated to give support to the free end 
democratic nations of Europe and to improve the solid 
foundation of our own national strength . 38 
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In his statement made before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on February 
8, 1949, Secretary Acheson said: 
A strong United Nations, composed of free member na-
tions, in turn composed of free men, ·depended upon 
the avoidance of disintegration both in the inter. 
national and in the nation.al lives of its member 
countries. This the Congres$ rightly believed could 
only be achieved by the nations with which we are here 
concerned Jqin1ng in a great group effort and by the 
United States adding its aid to their efforts. It 
was for this purpose that the European Recovery Pro-
gram was devised and enacted . 39 
One of the features of the Ji..'Uropean Recovery Program which 
interested the Russians was t he failure to use the United Nations 
organization tor any aid offered. In his defense of the United 
States policy, Warren Austin, before the United Nations , stressed 
the fact that the United Nations did not have the necessary re-
sources, nor were the other 1nterna tional agencies; and the 
fifty - five nations in common harness had mueh pulling power, but 
they were not easy to handle .40 
38narry s. Truman, Toward Securing Peace and Preventini War -
Address delivered on March 11, 1948, u. s. -nept . of state ( ash-
1ngton: Government Printing Office,, March, 1948), 3 . 
· 
39nean Acheson., "European Recovery Program Gives New Faith 
in V1t·ali ty of Democratic System, tt United States Department of 
State Bulletin, 20 {February 20, 1949), 232. 
, 6- 7 . 
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In his message to Congress on the Marshall Plan, on ·necember 
19 , 1947, President Truman stated that it wae not feasible to 
carry out the recovery program exclusively through the United 
N~tions, as five of the participating countries were not ·yet 
members, and furthermore, some European members were not par-
ticipating in the program. He expected, however, that the 
greatest practicable use would be made of the facilities of the 
United .Nations and its related agencies in the execution of the 
program, and stated that this view was shared by all the par-
41 ticipating countries. 
Indeed, the EUropean Recovery Program accords with the 
procedures and the objective of the Charter of the United Na-
tions and explicitly contemplates coordination with the 
specialized agencies of' the United Nations . 
In passing the Foreign Aid Act of 1948,. the Congitess asserted : 
The Fre.s1dent is authorized to request the coopera-
tion of all the use of the services and facilities 
of the United Nations, its organs and specialized 
agencies, or other international organizations, in 
earry1ng out the purposes of the Economic Coopera-
tion Administration . 
The President shall cause to be transmitted to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations copies of 
reports to· Congre,s on the operations conducted 
under the Economic Cooperation Act. 
Any agreements concluded between the United States 
and participating countries , or groups of such 
countries, shall be registered with the United 
41Harry s . Truman, A Program for United States . Aid to 
Euroiean Recovery - The Message to tlie · Congress on December 
19, · 947, O. s. Dept . o.f State (W.ashington: Government 
Printing Office , February, · 1948), 4. 
Nations 1f such registration i\2required by tlle Charter of the United Nations. 
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The committee of European Economic Cooperation was careful 
to point out 1n its general report that, wherever tJUitable inter. 
national machinery existed, it was the desire of the pa~tici~ 
pa.ting countries that their collect! ve tasks l)e undertaken 
within the framework of the United Nations . 
In Article 20 of its Charter, (Relations With Other Inte~..-
national Organizations), the Committee asserted; 
(a) The Organization shall eetablish sueh formal 
or informal relationships •1th the United Natlons, 
its principal organs and subsidiary bodies and 
w:i,. th the Speclalized Agencies, as. may best f'a-eili-
tate collaboration in the achievement of their 
respective aims,, 
(b) The Organ1,zat1on may also, maintain relationships 
w1 th other international bodiee.,4~ 
From all this, 1 t can be seen how all existing institutions 
and established conoepts have been respected in enacting the 
European Recovery J>rogram and how a 11 the opposition to 1 t 
comes from the conviet!on that its effects in all N.elds of 
human activities simply upset the plans and designs of unscru..: 
pulous men devoted to generate economic and political chaos in 
the world, in order to es ta:bl ish on it the1 r complete domina t1on . ' 
42un1ted States Statutes at Large, Vol. 62 , -Part I, 155 
( 1949). 
43un1ted States Department of State, Convent,1.or~ for European 
Economic Coo~eration, (Washington: GovernmEr1t Printing ottiee, 
lay I l948} I 0 . 
CHAPTER VII 
RELATION OP THE MARSHALL PLAN TO 
THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
1. Alternatives for the World " 
From what has been said previously, one thing becomes 
clear: the world stands s. t the crossroads., the world must 
choose between communism or democracy; there are no other 
choices. 
In his enunciation of the Truman doctrine., in the message 
to Congress., on March 12., 1947, the President said: 
At the present moment in world history nearly 
every na t1on must choose alternative ways of 
life. The choice is too often not a free one. 
One way of life is based upon the will of the 
majority, and 1s distinguished by free insti-
tutions, representative government, free elec-
tions., guaranties of individual liberty, freedom 
of speech and religion, and freedom from political 
oppression . 
The .second way of life 1s based upon the will of 
a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. 
It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
presa and radio, fixed eleitions, and the suppres-
sion of personal freedoms . · 
As the President's Committee on Foreign Aid., the Harriman 
Committee, wrote in its Report: 
lgarry S. Truman., "Message to the Congress on March 12, 
1947, '* United States Department of State Bulletin Supplement., 
16 (_May 4, 194'1 >, 931. 
The interest . of the United States in Europe 
cannot be measured simply in economic terms. 
It is also strategic and political. We all 
know that we are faced in the world today with 
two conflicting 1deolo.gies. One ia a system 
in which individual rights and 11bert1e~ are 
maintained. The opposing system is one where 
iron discipline by the state ruthlessly st11mps 
out , individual liberties and obliterates all 
opposition.2 
In order to avoid allowing the European countries only 
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the second of these alternatives, the United States decided 
that it must be its policy to support free peoples who are re-
sisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures and to assist them to work out their own ·deetinies in 
their own way . 
Even in countries with a high degree of civilization and a 
long tradition in free democratic institutions, the economic 
instability baa brought, today, the threat of Communism. Larger 
and larger parts of the populations, belonging to all walks of 
life, losing their faith · in democracy, turn their hopes toward 
the Communist doctrine. 
2. Political Stability Through Economic 
Prosperity by Peaceful Means. , 
The United States wants to avoid a shooting war • 
• • • We know what World War II cost, ( said Mr . 
Hoffman). We do not know what World War III would 
cost, but its coat, both in dollars and human 
suffering, would be so great ~t we do know there 
must not be a third World War . 
; 
2European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the 
President's Committee on F'oreign Aid, (Washington: Government 
Printing O.ffice~ November 7-, 1947), 19. 
3paul G. Hoffman, Addrees delivered Before the Philadelihia 
Chamber of Commerce on February 21, 1949, . (_Washington: E.C • .• , 
1949), 5. 
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Then the United States decided to fight a peaceful pre-
ventative war in the economic battle.field; with the ousting of 
hunger, idleness, and desperation, Communism loses its strength 
and 1ts, breed1ng ground . 
We are engaged in a perilous struggle with an 
implacable foe, ( said General George Marshall). 
We must carry thls battle to the finish; we must 
avold the. temptation to imperil the whole invest-
ment - and it is just that, an investment in 
saving all those precious articles of faith and 
ways of life we call democracy . It is an invest-
ment in preserving the freedoms of man in a clean 
and decent world . ~ 
The Marshall Plan was the instrument of the American 
foreign policy which the United States decided to use for attain-
ing these purposes. 
In his address delivered in Los Angeles on March 7, 1949 , 
Wilfred MalenbaUlll, Chief of the Division of Investment and 
Economic Development, of the United States Department or State, 
declared: 
The foreign policy of our Government 11 directed 
toward the creation of a world of enduring peace, 
a world of nations rich in the f'our freedoms . As 
an integral part of that policy, it 1s the United 
States policy to favor and foster economic develop-
ment 1n foreign area§., · 
•• • Economic development is the process of expand- · 
1ng and using more effectively the means of- production 
available to the people of the world. It is a 
a1multaneous process of creation of new product! ve 
facilities and of better use of resources . Its object 
is a constantly increasing total product from the 
world's manpoweP and resources so that the people of 
the world may enjoy an increased real income. Hunger 
and poverty, despair and hopelessness are the allies 
of anti - democratic forces. 
4Economic Cooperation Administration, '!he Marshall Plan 
at Mid-Point , (Washington: E.C.A., April, 1950)-, ' 4 . ·:e 
As-Secretary Acheson recently aa1d, !'It is not 
that material objects in and of themselves make 
a better or fuller life; but they are the means 
by which people can obtain freedom - from the 
pressure of those other human beings who would 
restrict their freedom ••• n 
Economic development thus appears as an easent1al 
for the creation of material me·ans to ·non~·--
mater1al epd. As such, it is a potent tool for 
· molding a world dedicated to democratic and pe.a~e-
ful ideals. In this way, the fostering of economic 
development indeed becomes a most important ele-
ment of a positive and constructive u. S. foreign 
policy.5 · 
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The shrinkage of time and space, through developments in 
communications and transportation, have brought peoples closer 
together, yet the failure of many nations to enjoy the progress 
produced by modern invention is the cause for t)le restlessness 
existing in the world today. 
In his address broadcast on December 8, 1947, former Under-
secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William L~ Clayton, 
declared: 
Some people seriously question our respons1bD.1ty 
and interest in the European Recovery Program; they 
argue that Europe's difficulties are not of our 
making and that we should let Europe work out of her 
troubles as best she can. 
This view tails to take into account the vast change 
wh1eh has come over our world in the la st few years. 
Many of us can remember when there were no airplanes, 
or radios, or even automobiles. In less than fif'ty 
years the world has been transformed into one great 
big neighborhood. 
5w11fred Malenbaum, ftAm.erica's Role in Economic Develop-
ment Abroad, n United States Depa~tment-of State Bulletin, 20 
( March 27, 19 49 ) , 371 ~ f' 
Not for long can we have a happy and prosperous 
America if other large atxi important sections 
of the world lie prostrate, cold, and hungry as 
a result of the war.6 
In his address made before the General Federation of 
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Women' s Clubs in Portland, Oregon, on May 28, 1948, Secretary 
Marshall said: 
It ie ver",f important to realize that the world 
today is in a ferment of pr9found unreet. '. The 
gre.at maes of the ill-favore9, people of the world 
have come to realize all that tbe.y lack in com-
parisoil with the advantages enjoyed by others .• 
The tremendous development of communications and 
of the motion picture has brought to these masses 
at least a partial understanding of the unfairness 
of their situation.7 
For · this reason, in order to preserve the peace, the United 
States decided to have as its policy the establishment of econo-
mic stability and orderly political procesees in all countries. 
3! The Fallac~ of Isolationism. 
In his address ( ~ Requirements for a .,Lasting Peace) 
l 
delivered at the dedicatiQn of World War Memorial Park in Little 
Rock, Arkansas, on June 11, 1949, President Truman declared: 
We have taken the lead in cooperating with other 
nations to restore a mutually beneficial system 
ot world trade • . No nation today can achieve 
prosperity in isolation. Only through participa-
tion in the trade of the world can a country raise 
6william ~. Clayt~n, "Aid Essential to European Integrity 
and Independence, 11 United States Department of State Bulletin, 
17 (December 21, 1947), 12~3. , 
7oeorge c. Marshall, "Firm and Determined Course for the 
Democra<;:les, 11 United States Department of State · Bulletin, 18 
(June .6, 1948), 745. 
its own standards or living and contribute to 
the welfare of other nations.a . 
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The world has beeome a whole thing; it cannot remain in-
different to any event taking place anywhere and its stability 
depends upon the stability of each individual nation. A dl~ 
eased nation would soon spread its virus to the world. 
In his message to the Congress on November 17, 1947, 
President Truman said: 
We have learned b~ the costly lesson of two world 
wars, that what happens beyond our shores determines 
how we live our own lives . · We have learned that, 
if we want to 11 ve 1n treedom and security , we must 
work with, all the world tor freedom and seeuri ty . · 
In his address delivered at the commencement exercises of 
the University of California, Berkeley, on June 12, 1948, the 
President· s·aid: 
The. American people know from experience that our 
own dally lives are affected not only by what 
happens in this country but also by events abroad. lo 
The nations have become interdependent and the narrow 
interpretation of nationalism must give place to the concept 
of broad international cooperation . 
In his address delivered before the National Conference of 
American Foreign Policy in Washington on March 17, 1949, 
Ambassador Philip c. Jessup noted: 
8Harry ~ . Truman , A New Era in World Affairs ... Selected 
Speeches and Statements , u. s. Dept. ot State (Washington: 
Government Brin ting Office, 1949),. 20. · 
/ 
9aarry .s . Truman "The Future of the Free Nations of Europe 
Hangs in the Balanoe, A United States Department of State Bulle-
tin, 17 (November 30, 1947), 1o23 . 
/ 
l~arry S. Truman, American Peace Pollet - Address delivered 
on June 12, 1948, V. s . Dept. of state (Wasnni~on: Government 
Printing Office, June, 1948), 2 . 
We have not had in the history of the United 
States a large number of wb.a t m1@')1 t be referred 
to as basic foreign policies of. a long- ter.m 
character and or supreme importan~e . 'l:rad1-
tionally, we have always r-eferred to tlie Monroe 
Doctrine and the poliey of neutrality . 
I think _that 1n retrospect , as the histori~ns 
write the history of this modern period, the 
present policy of international cooperation 
( which certainly has taken the plaoe of the 
essence of our traditional policy of neutrality 
from the beginning of our period up through. .the 
ninteenth century and the earlier part of this 
century), certainly the principle of international 
cooperation needs to be listed in the l ong- range 
history of the United States as something of great 
consequence and of lasting validity . l l 
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In his address delivered at the dinner given 1n honor of 
General George c. Ma~shall by the Chiefs of .Mission of the Mar-
shall Plan Countries in Washington, on June 5, 1949, President 
Truman asserted: 
Our great hope for peace and prosperity lies in the 
developing sense of unity among the free nations of 
the world . We have learned full well that no nation 
can live to itself alone . And we have also learned 
that wb.en the :free peoples of the world stand united 
they are unconquerable. 
The United States will continue to dedicate its 
strength and resources to the building of a peaceful 
and prosperous world . 12 
Addressing the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce on February 
21, 1949, Mr. HoffDBn declared: 
l lph111p C. Jessup* "Bases of United States Foreign Pol1cy, 11 
United States Department of State Bulletin- 20 ( March 27, 1949), 
393-394 . 
12Harry S. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs , Selected 
Speeches and Statements , u. s. Dept . of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office , 1949), l\~ 
If the free nation·s of Europe and this free nation 
of ours work together and stick together, we can 
flourish 1n prosperity - and in peace. 
No a gg;ress_,or will dare ma.rch against the united 
free people because with the free people lie all 
the ~aterial and spiritual advantages.13 
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4 1 Policy of Cooperation in Europe as Opposed to Nationalism. 
The policy of the United States in Europe was directed toward 
economic and, consequently, political recovery and stability 
which, while breaking the strangling bonds of little nationali-
ties, retains the individual freedom and the hard-won rights of 
man on which alone a secure and peaceful society can ultimately 
be founded. 
Before the war, the countries of Europe had tended toward 
economic nationalism, resulting from political factors that in 
turn gave them the power singly to wage war. This lack of unity 
in Europe, the rivalries among her nations, the barriers in the 
economic relations weakened her in respect to other nations and 
continents, and the strong ideas of nationalism opened the way 
to imperialisms, dictatorships., and, consequently, wars. 
The United States wanted to revive Europe economically on 
' . 
a continental basis, rather than a nationalistic basis. 
In the countries where freedom of opinion and action 
still prevailed, (said Secretary Marshall), the idea 
of the .Marshall Plan quickly eaught hold and served 
as a strong stimulus to morale as well as a spur to 
action in a material way. It focus-ed , attention on 
13I?aul G~ Hoffman, Address Delivered Before the , Philadelphia 
Chamber 9f Commerce on February 21, 194~, (waihlngton: E.C.A., 
1949), 5. 
the: necessity of treating economic recovery as a 
continental and cooperative matter, rather than a 
problem oonfined to the narrow purview of each 
nation . 14 · · 
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If successful', the Marshall Plan will rebuild a new and 
changed Europe and will reknit her into a workabl e economic 
system based on a wider and franker measure of cooperation than 
ever before bas been achieved. This would be praQtical coopera-
t ·llan . If the nations build a new order on that basis, 1 t ought 
to be a new order of tremendous potentialities for the future 
of mankind . 
'l'he success of the Marshall Plan will be a cornerstone of 
a brighter , freer, prosperous world and , through the political 
and economic unification of Europe, it will be the first step 
toward the realization of the dream of the world's political 
cooperation and unity, and a world Federation . The United 
States have recognized, as have the leaders of European nations , 
the need to break down the narrow barriers of nationalism, first 
step toward the realization of the wider goal of a federated 
world government . 
Two world wars have taught the United States tbs. t it cannot 
live a l one, nor isolate from reality and insulate itself .from the 
inevitable consequences of momentous happenings abroad. It 
cannot be prosperous when the countries of Europe, with which 
it is intimately tied by race, are threatened with violence . 
14oeorge c. Marshall, The Stake of the Businessman in 
the Euro~an Recoverit Program - Address delivered before the 
Pittsbu:r · Chamber o Commerce on January 15, 1948, , ~. S. Dept . 
of State (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), 3 . 
I believe, (said President Truman), that in years 
to come, we shall look back upon this undertaking 
as the dividing line between the old era of world 
affairs and the new - the dividing line between 
the old era of national suspicion, economic 
hostility, and isolationism, and the new era of 
mutual · ooperation to 1nerease the prosperity of 
people throughout the world . 15 
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The rela t1on of the Marshall Plan to. the policy of isola. 
t1onism was clearly expressed in the words of Artur Syran, 
Director of the Economic Cooperation Administration Transporta-
tion Division, pronounced before the Hagerstown Traffic Club 
in Hagerstown, Maryland, on June, 1949: 
• • • 'Ihrough Economic Cooperation Administra t1on 
you are investing in an opportunity to go on liv-
ing peacefully_~ ••• You are· investing in the hope 
of sending that boy of yours off to college some 
day instead, perhaps, to war. You are investing 
1n the right to live your own lives as you see fit, 
of saying what you pl ease , of working at a job of 
your own choosing ••• • You are investing in the 
survival of a free world. 
It took two world wars to prove to the American · 
people that they had a stake in the pol1tieal sta-
bility of Europe. We learned the lesson the bard 
way, but most of us , I think, have learned it . 
The myth of isolationism blew up with a great part 
of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor . 16 
In his address (Collective Security and Freedom From Aggres-
sion) delivered before the convention of the Veterans of Foreign 
15Harry s. Truman , A New Ere. in World Attairs - Selected 
Speeches and Statements, u. s. Dept. ot State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949) , l . 
16Eeonom.1c Cooperation Administration , A Report to the 
Public Advisory Board . on the E.C.A. : The Marshal l Plan, No . 1, · 
( Washington: E. C . A. , June, 1949 ) , 22 . 
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Wars, in Miami , Florida, on August 22, 1949, President Truman 
declared: 
We must face the fact that we have forever put 
behind us the false security of isolationism. 
We have done 10 because we have learned - learned 
the hard way - that, in the world of today, 
isolationism is a futile and a vulnerable shield. 
We have learned that the defense of the United 
States and the defense of other freedom-loving 
nations are indivisible. We have learned that we 
can serve our country best by joining in the common 
defense of the rights of all mankind ••• 17 
5. Leadership of the United States Among the Free Nations. 
In the Marshall Plan lies a challenge to the ability of 
the United States to meet world responsibilities and, as all 
the free nations look at it for leadership, the United States 
cannot withdraw from the enormous task undertaken, if it does 
not want the world to crumble down in chaos and destruction, 
and if it does not want to be fatally involved in its complete 
ruin. 
In his address delivered before the annual Convention of 
the Texas Cotton Association in Corpus Christi, Texas, on March 
19, 1948, Mr . Winthrop G. Brown , acting director of the Office 
·, 
of International Trade Policy, llepartment of State, declared: 
Almost exactly a year ago today the President 
spoke of the United States as the ttg1ant of the 
economic world.n 
In a multitude of other countries, men and women 
are looking to this 1nt~mat1onal economic "giant" 
for leadership. We have accepted this leadership, 
actively and concretely. 
17Harry s. Truman, A New Era in World Affairs - Selected 
Speeches and Statements , U. s. Dept. of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949), 49.~ 
The ''giant o:f the economic world" can continue to 
accept the responsibility for leadership placed 
upon it by the course of events and work for a 
better, more prosperous, and more peaceful world . 
Or it can turn its back on that respon~ibil1ty, in 
which case the future for the world is bilack .. indeed. 
I have no doubt as to which alternative the American 
people wish to adopt . 18 . 
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In his address (A People's Foreign Policy) delivered at 
Soldier Field before the Imperial Council Session of the Shrine 
of North America, in Chicago, on July 19, 1949, President Truman 
asserted: 
The peoples of the world look to the United States 
for the leadership of this great crusade :for peace . 
We have not taken up this task lightly, and we wi 11 
not lay it down. 
We must go resolutely forward, step by step, toward 
the creation of a world 1n which we, and all people, 
can live and prosper in peace . 19 
,. 
Leadership means responsibility end the task 1s heavy, but , 
in this struggle, not only is at stake the future of other na-
tions, but the very :future of the United States. 
The American people , (said Secreta~y .Marshall), 
:frequently hear assertions that events have thrust 
our nation into a position of world leadership 
which imposes on us unprecedented responsibilities . 
There is truth in these assertion, . 20 
l8w1nthrop G. Brown,. United States Pore1~ Economic Policy , 
u. s. Dept . of State ( Washington: Government r!nting ott!ce, 
1948), 1-11. 
19aarry s. Truman, A New Era in Wor.ld Aff'airs - Selected 
Speech•s and Statements, u. s. Dept. of State (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1949) , 42 . 
20oeorge c. Marshall , The Stake of the Businessman in the 
Eurm.Sean Recovery P.rogram - Address delivered before the Pittsburgh 
Cha er of Commerce on January 15, 1948, u. s . Dept. of State 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948) , f . 
:~:~:n!~ . ~1position of leadership by force of cir-
There will always be 1n this generation of men a need 
for our moral and spiritual backing . 22 
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But still a part of the American people did not reali ze in 
full the meaning of this historical necessity . 
In his address made before the General Feder.a ti on of Women ' s 
Clubs in Portland, Oregon , on May 28, 1948, Secretary Marshall 
said: 
It is of the utmost importance that all Americans 
realize the significance of our position in the 
world today, Our leadership ie recognized the world 
over, but the obligations of such leadership are 
not completely recognized by us Americans ourselves . 23 
The Marshall Plan , however, is the most striking example 
of the acceptance by the Un i ted States of the l eadership· of the 
free nations . 
The United States at long last has accepte~ leadership 
of the free world, {said Economic Cooperation Administra-
tor Paul G. Hoffman) . As the leading nation of the free 
world, we can, with lnfini te profit to ourselves, help 
shape mankind in the full image ot freedem. 
If we do so, this atomic era upon which we are entering 
can become the Golden Age about which men have dreamed 
through the centuries . 24 
21George C. Marshall, "Relation of European Recovery Pro-
gram to American Foreign Policy," United States Department of 
State Bulletin, 18 (January 25, 1948) , 114. 
22 EQonomic Coeperation Administration, The Marshall Plan 
at Mid-Point , (Washington: E. C. A. , April, 1950) , 4. 
23Geo~ge c. Marshall, "F irm and . Determined Course for the 
Democracies," United States Department of State Bulletin, 18 
(June 6, 1948) , 744 . . . 
24Economie Cooperation Administration, E. C. A. At Workl , 
(Dayton, Ohio: Dayton Council on World Affairs, March 20, 1950), 1 . 
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